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 During the SARS outbreak of spring 2003, quarantine and isolation were 
used as tools to limit disease transmission on a scale unprecedented in several 
decades.  To improve understanding of quarantine and isolation, including issues 
surrounding their application in the United States, the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) requested and supported this study.  The research was 
funded through a cooperative agreement with the University of Louisville School 
of Public Health and Information Sciences, No. U90/CU422056.  The views and 
opinions expessed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not 





 This report uses the experience with Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
to highlight the broad legal and policy challenges in preparing for an outbreak of 
infectious disease or similar public health emergency.  Based on an analysis of the history 
of quarantine and isolation, relevant U.S. law, and the roles of various governmental 
bodies in infectious disease control, as well as lessons learned from detailed case studies 
of the six jurisdictions at the center of the SARS epidemic (Canada, China, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam), we identified twelve key issues for public health 
officials and other policy makers within three broad categories:   
 
 Legal and Public Health Systems.  To respond promptly and effectively to SARS, 
affected countries needed public health laws that established a mechanism for regulating 
travel into and out of affected areas; case surveillance, reporting, and analysis; and a 
range of increasingly coercive measures including quarantine and isolation.  They also 
needed the political will to enforce these measures.  
 
 Public Health and Health Care Infrastructure.  To minimize the toll from SARS 
through quarantine and isolation, affected countries needed the public health 
infrastructure to coordinate the public health response among all levels of government 
domestically and internationally, as well as a health care system with adequate levels of 
providers, facilities, equipment, and medications. 
 
 Law Enforcement and Ancillary Services.  To implement successful programs of 
quarantine and isolation, affected countries needed ancillary services and logistical 
support, including law enforcement and other measures to ensure compliance, wage 
replacement systems, delivery systems for food and medical supplies, and public 
education and communication measures to inform and gain the support of the public.  
 
 These broad “lessons learned” provide the framework for considering the issues 
to address in preparing the U.S. for a serious outbreak of infectious disease or similar 
public health emergency. 
 
 Legal and Public Health Systems 
 
 1. Political/legal system 
  
 Lessons Learned 
 
 The countries we studied differed in size, population, political system, and legal 
system, but each found its existing statutes and/or regulations inadequate and so had to 
amend its laws to empower public health agencies.  In achieving a strong, coordinated 
response to SARS, good working relationships among governmental officials were 
exceedingly important.  SARS also highlighted problems with the World Health 
Organization (WHO) as a regulatory body versus a facilitator of information gathering 
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and sharing.  Finally, the SARS experience underlined the need for vigilance and restraint 
in the use of the political and legal systems to address emergencies 
   
 Issues to Consider 
 
 A.1.1 Clear delineation of authority and responsibility for the various 
public health functions in an epidemic needs to be undertaken among federal, state, 
and local officials. 
 
 A.1.2  Because political boundaries are not barriers to infections, regional 
coordination should be supported and increased among all agencies with public 
health functions, including departments of public health, health care providers and 
hospitals, law enforcement, federal and state emergency preparedness officials, and 
the legal system. 
 
 A.1.3 Public health measures adopted in response to an emergency that 
restrain civil liberties should be reviewed periodically and should not be extended to 
other conditions unless previously established criteria are satisfied. 
 
 2. Travel restrictions 
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 Restrictions on travel are essential in limiting the geographic range of an 
epidemic, yet travel restrictions involve the difficult balancing of public health with 
human rights and economic interests.  Further, the marginal public health benefit from 
ratcheting up restrictions may not be predictable.  All of the countries we studied 
followed the WHO recommendation concerning exit and entrance screening for SARS, 
addressing ground and sea as well as air travel. Under the intense pressure of the SARS 
outbreak, many countries were forced to adopt novel approaches to population risk 
assessment and disease containment, including thermal screening to identify febrile 
persons at risk for SARS. The countries we studied placed restrictions of varying 
stringency on domestic travel.  News of the global SARS epidemic caused the voluntary 
curtailment of international travel to affected areas.  Travel advisories and travel alerts 
from WHO and individual countries helped to provide timely and accurate information.   
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 A.2.1 In the event that an international traveler develops an infectious 
disease, there is an urgent need to be able to locate crew members and other 
passengers from the same flight or ship.  Public health officials must have 
immediate access to passenger manifests or be able to require all arriving 
passengers to complete a public health form containing, for example, the 
individual’s health status, seat number, countries visited, and contact information.  
The information must be in electronic form. 
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 A.2.2 Affected countries felt compelled to adopt thermal imaging and other 
screening methods before they were able to conduct rigorous research to assess their 
effectiveness.  Various new public health assessment tools should be carefully 
evaluated before the next epidemic strikes. 
 
 A.2.3 The authority of the United States government to control foreign and 
interstate travel is established by the Constitution and federal statute.  It is less 
clear, however, the circumstances under which states may restrict interstate travel 
to prevent the spread of infection, and this issue should be thoroughly researched 
and resolved through memoranda of understanding or other means.  
 
 3. Surveillance, reporting, and epidemiology 
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 Early identification of case clusters, expert laboratory and pathology analysis, 
timely tracking of contacts, and prompt reporting of findings to public health officials at 
all levels are the first lines of defense.  The public health significance of the slowness of 
the initial response in China is perhaps the greatest lesson of the SARS epidemic.  State 
and local public health departments must have surveillance systems and sufficient 
numbers of epidemiologists to detect suspicious patterns and conduct investigations.  
Laboratories must have adequate staffing and expertise, as well as quality control, to 
identify the suspected pathogen, and reporting channels must be in place to trigger large-
scale investigations and public health alerts.  In light of the September 2003 case of a 
laboratory worker infected in Singapore, it is important to develop international standards 
for certifying laboratories and their personnel in infection control measures. 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 A.3.1 The U.S. would benefit from undertaking a nationwide public health 
human resource needs assessment, and measures should be taken to increase 
training programs, recruitment, and staffing levels to meet these needs.  Prior 
assessments by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists and the 
Association of Public Health Laboratories need to be updated and expanded.  
 
 A.3.2 There should be a greater emphasis on public health in medical school 
curricula and continuing medical education programs to provide the training 
essential for prompt identification and reporting of suspicious cases.  Health 
professionals also need to have a clear understanding of the laws related to public 
health reporting so that, for example, misunderstanding the requirements of the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) does not lead to a 
failure to report cases of infectious disease to public health officials.   
 
 A.3.3 Signing comprehensive international agreements for cooperation on 
public health and developing public health infrastructure should be a high priority 
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for U.S. foreign policy.  International agreements must be sufficiently flexible to 
permit a quick response to emerging infections and other public health emergencies. 
 
 4. Quarantine and isolation 
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 Although public health laws were on the books in all of the jurisdictions we 
studied before the outbreak of SARS, the legal authority to order quarantine was limited 
to specific diseases.  Hence, the SARS epidemic required amending the existing legal 
authority.  China adopted the most extensive quarantine; it is not clear that such measures 
would be acceptable in the U.S.  Taiwan illustrates the delicate balance between public 
health and political considerations in quarantine.  Officials in Taiwan now believe that its 
aggressive use of quarantine contributed to public panic and thus proved counter-
productive.  In virtually all jurisdictions there were some incidents of violation of 
quarantine.  In Toronto, the two groups most likely to violate quarantine were teenagers 
and health care workers.   
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 A.4.1 The decision whether to order a large-scale quarantine requires a 
complex analysis of scientific, political, and social considerations.  Public health 
officials need to be able to present comprehensive, understandable assessments of 
the options to other government officials in a timely manner.  Contingency planning 
for emergencies through simulations and establishing vertical and horizontal lines of 
communication are extremely valuable in ensuring a prompt response to a public 
health emergency. 
 
 A.4.2 Public health laws need to be flexible enough to permit appropriate 
responses to new epidemics and new circumstances, and public health officials and 
professionals need to be familiar with the statutory and regulatory procedures for 
invoking their (or the governor’s) authority for quarantine and isolation as well as 
the mechanisms to enforce directives. 
 
 A.4.3 Legal authority and public health strategies need to be in place for 
dealing with individuals who violate the law, and judges and law enforcement 
officials should be educated about the relevant enforcement provisions of public 
health laws.  Studies need to be undertaken to determine if incentives or penalties 
promote compliance with quarantine.  
 
 B.  Public Health and Health Care Infrastructure 
 
 1. Public health officials and health care providers 
 
 Lessons Learned 
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 The SARS epidemic highlighted an acute shortage of epidemiologists and other 
essential public health professionals.  In Toronto, it took an average of over nine hours 
per case to perform contact tracing, and there were 2,282 cases to investigate.  Bringing 
in staff from other jurisdictions was not a solution because knowledge of local conditions 
was essential in contact tracing.  Owing to the strain of SARS on local resources, WHO 
played a crucial role in several countries.  Further, while epidemics always place burdens 
on health care providers, SARS, by infecting health care workers at a high rate, presented 
enormous challenges. The immediate one was maintaining adequate staffing levels 
during outbreaks.  Not only were health care workers incapacitated due to illness or 
quarantine, in every country we studied, physicians and nurses avoided caring for 
infected patients, and officials responded with penalties and/or incentives.  Long-term 
repercussions for health care staffing follow from reports of psychological problems (e.g., 
exaggerated and disabling fear of infectious disease) and, as in Toronto, departures from 
the health professions and declining enrollment in training programs.   
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 B.1.1 The current shortage of epidemiologists, public health nurses, and 
other personnel in the U.S. will reach a crisis stage in the event of an epidemic.  
Budget cuts in state and local health departments have further depleted the human 
resources needed to deal with a public health emergency, and if these positions are 
not restored an otherwise containable epidemic may spread rapidly. 
 
 B.1.2 Contingency planning and cross-training are needed to ensure that 
sufficient numbers of health care workers trained in infectious disease, emergency 
medicine, pulmonology, toxicology, and other specialties are available in an 
epidemic or bioterrorism event.  
 
 B.1.3   Training to diagnose, treat, and report infectious diseases as well as to 
take precautions for their own protection must become an essential part of the 
continuing education of front-line health care professionals.  
 
 B.1.4 Ongoing studies in Toronto of the long-term effects of SARS on health 
care workers need to be followed closely and a range of psycho-social and 
educational interventions should be assessed. 
 
 B.1.5 More fundamental and comprehensive measures may be necessary to 
deal with the unwillingness of health care providers to treat infected patients.  Some 
options include a greater emphasis on teaching professional responsibility in 
professional schools and continuing education, and more closely linking licensure 
with public service obligations.  We also need to study whether fragmentation of the 
health care system and its effects on the provider-patient relationship would have 
adverse consequences in a public health emergency.  
      
 2. Hospitals and other facilities 
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 Lessons Learned 
 
 The SARS epidemic demonstrated the lack of surge capacity for isolation and 
treatment in hospitals and the lack of adequate residential facilities for quarantine.  In 
China, new hospital facilities were built rapidly to respond to SARS; in the U.S. context, 
an alternative might be standby hospital facilities available for use in the event of an 
emergency.  In any event, quarantine plans should be in place, and periodically updated, 
that designate certain facilities for use in a public health emergency.  Planning needs to 
be coordinated with local emergency management agencies and the Red Cross.  
Quarantine areas also need to be identified for other special facilities, including jails, 
prisons, and military installations.  Unlike the jurisdictions we studied, many of the 
hospitals in the U.S. are privately owned, hence advance consideration of issues of cost 
and compensation is important.  There must be a plan for ensuring the viability of 
institutions shouldering the burden of patient care and for allocating financial 
responsibility among governmental entities.  
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 B.2.1  Surge capacity hospital space for public health emergencies needs to 
be developed for every area of the country. 
 
B.2.2 Every public health district needs to develop an emergency 
quarantine and isolation plan with local facilities that could be used to house people 
in the event of a large-scale quarantine.  The plan should be coordinated with local 
emergency management agencies and the Red Cross. 
 
B.2.3 Legislation should be considered to provide for the funding of health 
care institutions during public health emergencies.  One possibility is to award 
grants to hospitals in each area to develop and maintain a public health emergency 
capacity.  The Health Resources and Services Administration has begun programs 
in this area.  
  
 3. Medication and equipment 
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 Shortages of protective equipment were common in the countries we studied.  
Public health planning includes stockpiling medical supplies and equipment, which may 
be expensive, meaning government assistance will be required.  The Strategic National 
Stockpile is reportedly expanding its supply of ventilators and other equipment, but 
logistics also need to be in place for distribution to health care providers.  Many of the 
countries affected by SARS also distributed a vast amount of medical supplies, such as 
digital thermometers, directly to the population.   
 
 Issues to Consider 
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 B.3.1 A public health preparedness inventory should be undertaken for 
each public health district, noting needs and available supplies. 
 
 B.3.2 Emergency distribution plans should be developed among federal, 
state, and local public health and disaster preparedness officials. 
 
 4. Coordination  
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 All of the countries we studied made concerted efforts to coordinate their 
response to SARS among all of the departments of government, both horizontally and 
vertically.  There was no advance planning for the coordination, however, and measures 
undertaken “on the fly” led to problems. For example, in Canada, early coordination 
efforts among city, provincial, and federal officials were weak, thereby delaying an 
effective, unified response to SARS.   
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 B.4.1 Joint response plans involving all appropriate government agencies 
should be developed for a range of public health emergencies, including natural 
disasters, infectious diseases, and bioterrorism events.   
 
 B.4.2 To conserve state and local public health resources and ensure 
consistency, there should be a single, integrated, public health response plan for all 
public health threats, including SARS, bioterrorism, and West Nile virus, rather 
than layering a new plan for responding to the threat onto prior response plans. 
   
 C. Law Enforcement and Ancillary Services 
 
 1. Law enforcement  
  
 Lessons Learned 
 
 Law enforcement was very important in controlling SARS.  For example, in 
Toronto law enforcement personnel were used to enforce the isolation of patients with 
SARS at hospitals, to serve quarantine orders, to conduct spot checks on people in 
quarantine, and to track down people who broke quarantine.  Traditional law enforcement 
functions also were affected by SARS.  In Singapore, the police were directed not to 
arrest individuals with SARS engaged in certain illegal acts lest infected individuals be 
“driven underground.”  While voluntary compliance with quarantine was high in the 
countries we studied, it is not clear that a largely voluntary approach would work in the 
U.S. with its cultural notions of individuality, due process, and skepticism of government.  
Securing large numbers of quarantine orders, however, would severely strain the 
resources of public health agencies, prosecutors, and the courts. 
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 Issues to Consider 
 
 C.1.1 Public health law training should be provided to all health care 
providers and government officials charged with obtaining and enforcing orders for 
quarantine and isolation of individuals, including police officers, prosecutors, public 
health officials, and judges.  Public health law training also should be incorporated 
into law school curricula. 
 
 C.1.2 Because federal and state health officials have concurrent jurisdiction 
in many quarantine cases, memoranda of understanding should be developed 
setting forth the responsibilities of various agencies and departments. 
 
 C.1.3 Appellate courts with jurisdiction to hear appeals of quarantine and 
isolation cases should review their procedures for emergency appeals so that a trial 
court’s granting or denying an order of quarantine may be appealed immediately, 
before an individual is wrongly denied his or her liberty or wrongly permitted to 
infect other people.  In jurisdictions that issue quarantine orders administratively, 
procedures for emergency judicial review need to be in place.     
 
 2. Delivery of food and medicine 
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 A large-scale quarantine requires a wide range of services to be provided to 
confined  individuals.  In all of the countries we studied, food and supplies were 
delivered by public and private social service agencies.  Special precautions were 
required for waste disposal and mortuary services.  And in several countries a special 
ambulance service transported those who became symptomatic to a designated SARS 
hospital.  All of these “ancillary” services must be provided with regard for cultural and 
religious diversity.  In the U.S., questions to be addressed include:  How would financial 
responsibility be shared among federal, state, and local governments? Would individuals 
in quarantine be required to pay for some of the food and supplies they received?  Would 
only “authorized” delivery services be permitted? 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 C.2.1 Public health planning for a large-scale quarantine needs to consider 
the wide range of logistical issues involved in providing food, medicine, and essential 
services for thousands of people in quarantine.  Planning should be coordinated 
with the Red Cross. 
 
 C.2.2  Representatives of people from all racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
and cultural groups as well as people with disabilities and other special needs in 
each geographic area need to be involved in the quarantine planning process so that 
a plan appropriate to the needs of each group is developed in advance of an 
emergency.  Policies need to be developed on the appropriate site for quarantine of 
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individuals who have mental illness, mental retardation, substance abuse problems, 
or other conditions that make home quarantine infeasible. 
 
 C.2.3 Legislation is needed to further address the responsibility for funding 
ancillary services in a quarantine. 
 
 3. Nondiscrimination and wage replacement  
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 Quarantine resulted in the confinement of thousands of individuals who were well 
enough to work and who needed to work to support themselves and their families.   
Because the success of quarantine depended on compliance by the affected individuals, 
all of the countries we studied took some steps to provide for income replacement and 
employment security of individuals in quarantine.  SARS-based discrimination in 
employment was a problem in all of the countries we studied; health care workers were 
among those suffering the most discrimination.  Bad economic conditions associated with 
SARS also resulted in unemployment.  Governmental responses varied.  For example, in 
Hong Kong, sick leave was granted to individuals in home confinement.  Canada passed 
a law prohibiting the discharge of employees under quarantine absent proof that a 
business downturn necessitated the elimination of positions and providing compensation 
for individuals absent from work for at least five days and physicians affected by hospital 
closures due to quarantine. 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 C.3.1  In general, under current U.S. law, employees without a contrary 
contractual provision may be discharged for being in quarantine.  Laws need to be 
enacted to prohibit discrimination and to provide for the job security of individuals 
in quarantine.   
 
 C.3.2 With the exception of those contractually entitled to paid sick leave, 
employees in the U. S. are not eligible for income replacement due to quarantine 
under any federal or state law.  Providing income replacement for employees and 
self-employed persons is essential to ensure a high rate of compliance with 
quarantine. 
  
 C.3.3  To promote adherence to quarantine, individuals in quarantine need 
to be held harmless for various consequences of lost income, and therefore measures 
need to be explored that would, for example, provide for insurance and rent 
payments and protect against repossession for missed car payments. 
 
 4. Public education and communication 
 
 Lessons Learned 
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 Public education and communication played an essential part in preventing panic 
and flight, protecting against discrimination, and promoting sanitary practices and 
adherence to quarantine.  Features of communication and education programs varied by 
country; examples of specific measures include a 24-hour SARS television channel and a 
SARS telephone hotline staffed by public health nurses.  In many jurisdictions special 
outreach programs were developed for minority populations.  Not all of the efforts to 
allay public fears were successful, and some countries took action based on exaggerated 
public fears rather than public health considerations. 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 C.4.1 Additional research and funding are needed to study and improve 
programs for public health education and communication. 
 
 C.4.2   Prior communication involving public officials, public health experts, 
public health lawyers, business officials, and other civic leaders is essential in 
implementing a quarantine. 
 
 C.4.3 Frequent communication by a single, or a very limited number of 
credible spokesperson(s) throughout an epidemic is essential to improving public 
understanding of and maintaining public support for quarantine, isolation, and 





 Testifying before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions on April 29, 2003, Dr. Julie L. Gerberding, Director of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) stated: “The kinds of things we are doing for SARS we 
can anticipate we are going to do again and again.”  This report, prepared at the request 
of the CDC, is intended to highlight the broad challenges in preparing for the large-scale 
use of quarantine and isolation in response to an epidemic of infectious disease of any 
type.   
 
It is important to delineate the scope of the report.  Although it reviews the 
epidemiology of SARS in countries especially hard hit, the focus is not on the biology or 
epidemiology of SARS, or the clinical care of infected individuals.  Although it reports 
on the epidemic of 2003 in Asia and Canada, it is not an in-depth investigation of the 
public health efforts of particular countries.  Although it discusses the implementation of 
large-scale programs of quarantine and isolation, it is not a scientific evaluation of the 
efficacy of quarantine and isolation as a public health strategy. Finally, although it 
discusses areas in which legislative action is needed, it does not present or endorse any 
specific laws or model statutes. 
 
The report describes the political, legal, public health, and health care response to 
SARS in Canada, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and it attempts to 
identify broad “lessons learned.”  Virtually all of these countries have done their own 
detailed assessments, and therefore our review is more limited.  The report has been 
drafted with an eye toward public health law and policy in the United States, and it 
identifies essential areas of federal and state public health law and related laws of direct 
relevance to large-scale quarantine.  The report also addresses the human resource and 
infrastructure needs of public health, health care, law enforcement, and social service 
agencies. 
 
Part VI of the report identifies twelve key issues for SARS policy.  For each one, 
we include “lessons learned” followed by “issues to consider.”  It is our hope that this 
report will stimulate discussion, additional research, and prompt action by public officials 
to prepare for a public health crisis in the United States.     
 
The views expessed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the CDC.     
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I. QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION  
 
 
 A. History  
 
  1. Europe and Asia 
 
Concern over and the practice of avoiding persons with contagious diseases has 
been documented in the most ancient of texts and writings, including the Old Testament 
(avoiding lepers) and the works of Thucydides (c. 460-400 B.C.E.), Hippocrates (c. 460- 
370 B.C.E.), and Galen (c. 130-200 C.E.).1  One of the earliest uses of quarantine - and 
isolation-type measures to control the movement of sick persons is said to have taken 
place in 532 C.E., when the Emperor Justinian of the Eastern Roman Empire commanded 
that persons arriving into the capital city of Constantinople (current day Istanbul, Turkey) 
from “contaminated localities” be housed in special facilities to be “cleansed.”2  Similar 
quarantine and isolation measures have been used often over the succeeding centuries—
particularly in seventh century China and other parts of Asia and in the Middle Ages in 
Europe3—to protect coastal cities from epidemics of plague and other communicable 
diseases.   
 
The term quarantine is derived from the Italian words quarantina and quaranta 
giorni, which were used during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and referred to a 40-
day period in which certain ships that entered the port of Venice were obliged to wait in 
isolation before any person or good was permitted to go ashore.4  The measure was later 
applied to other Mediterranean ports under Venetian control, as well as to land 
quarantine, under which both sick persons and healthy individuals arriving into Venice 
from plague-infected areas were placed for 40 days or more in a special isolation station 
called a lazaret (derived from Lazarus or leper).5 The use of 40 days as a quarantine 
period is thought by some to be based upon the observation at the time that “after forty 
days, people stricken with the plague either died or recovered without further spread to 
others.”6 
 
Other examples of past uses of quarantine and isolation in response to the spread 
of plague are similar to those used in Venice.7  For example, in 1622 in the port city of 
Marseille (France) a law was passed that prohibited the landing of persons arriving from 
other locations or countries without first undergoing a medical examination.8  In 1683, 
new laws were passed in Marseille that required all persons suspected of having plague to 
be quarantined and disinfected; similar laws were later passed that applied to all ports 
along the French coast, particularly in response to the spread of yellow fever from the 
West Indies.9  In Germany, considered vulnerable to the “invasion of plague” from Italy 
and Turkey, a law was enacted in 1666 in Frankfort that prohibited persons who lived in 
“infected” houses from visiting markets or churches.10  In England, a royal ordinance was 
issued to require the building of lazaret-type facilities for the isolation and detention of 
all ships, their cargo and persons, both English and non-English, to determine if the ship 
had arrived from a plague-infected location; if so, the ship, including its cargo, 
passengers and crew, were sent back out to sea.11 
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Later epidemics, particularly yellow fever and cholera, began to galvanize 
international interest in quarantine and isolation in an attempt to control the spread of 
these and other diseases.  A number of countries (e.g., Britain, France, Russia, Spain, 
Italy, and Greece) with significant maritime trade organized quasi-governmental entities 
in Asian and Middle Eastern countries (including Morocco, Egypt, and Turkey) that were 
considered the conduits or sources of cholera—and through which passed a large volume 
of trade—and established multinational “sanitary councils” in an attempt to coordinate 
and oversee the establishment and maintenance of a system of quarantine institutions. 
   
Many of these early efforts at multinational control and coordination were not 
successful, however, in large part because of the political bickering between European 
powers with competing interests in preserving or enlarging their commerce and trade 
with the Middle East and Asia, as well as the questionable effectiveness of traditional 
quarantine measures (e.g., detention alone) as a response to the spread of cholera.12  It 
was not until the mid-to-late nineteenth century that intensive efforts were made at 
exploring international cooperation and coordination in controlling contagious diseases, 
with the development of proposed quarantine rules for implementation by signatory 
countries.13  The proposed rules included, for example, requiring ships to present “bills of 
health” upon arrival in port; prohibiting port authorities to deny ships entry; providing 
different periods of quarantine depending upon disease; standardizing quarantine dues 
and fees; and appointing responsible officers to head up quarantine facilities.14 
 
Unfortunately, no meaningful consensus emerged until after the Seventh 
International Sanitary Conference in 1892. It concluded with a convention, eventually 
signed by many countries, containing recommendations and measures pertaining to the 
control of cholera in Egypt and Europe. Yet even these measures were not enough to 
arrest the next cholera epidemic in Europe, and so other conferences followed to address 
the ongoing weakness of communicable disease control. 
 
The Eleventh International Sanitary Conference, held in 1903 in Paris, adopted a 
broad range of measures to control plague and cholera.  These measures included prompt 
notification among countries of outbreaks, including reports of the course of epidemics; 
uniform measures of control by all countries in infected localities, including ports; 
publication of control measures and disinfection; maximum anti-epidemic measures that 
were to be uniform for all countries; and recommendations for the establishment of 
permanent medical organizations for supervision, management and observation over the 
ships and population of all ports, including isolation facilities for sick persons and 
suspected cases, disinfection facilities, bacteriology laboratories, supervision of water and 
sewage systems, and other related measures.15 
 
The Eleventh Sanitary Convention was seen as the “first comparatively effective 
international convention” that was credited with introducing meaningful uniformity for 
the control of epidemic diseases, and was also considered historically important for 
having led to the establishment of the first permanent international health organization, 
which became known as the International Office of Public Hygiene (IOPH) and which 
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functioned as an important international center for epidemiological information for many 
years.16  Although it became defunct as the result of World War II, the IOPH’s many 
functions and international focus were later assumed by the United Nations and the 
World Health Organization.17 
 
  2. United States 
 
Quarantine and isolation measures in the U.S. were at first similar to those used in 
Europe and were not uniform or coordinated.  The control of communicable diseases that 
were largely attributed to immigration or trade from abroad was  dealt with primarily by 
local authority, and only secondarily by state or federal authority.18  In Boston, for 
example, a city ordinance required that all ships attempting to disembark in the harbor 
first stop at the harbor entrance to be checked for sick persons; somewhat later, a “house” 
on Rainsford’s Island in the harbor was designated for the detention of persons with 
“contagious diseases.”19   
 
In New York City, a more elaborate system of medical inspection and detention 
was developed, centered off Staten Island, that included the inspection of all incoming 
ships, cargo, and passengers for contagion.  Persons considered to have a disease at the 
time considered “quarantinable” (e.g., cholera, yellow fever, plague, leprosy, smallpox) 
by a quarantine officer were admitted for mostly palliative care to an isolation hospital 
located at the quarantine station, staffed by physicians, nurses, and orderlies.20  Persons 
with less serious contagious diseases (e.g., measles, scarlet fever) were sent to a Marine 
Hospital on Ellis Island.21  The detention or isolation period was usually determined by 
the disease at issue, including what was known about the disease’s incubation period and 
degree of infectiousness.22  A similar disease control system was established by the New 
York City Health Department, with the department’s staff of inspectors, physicians, and 
special police force having the authority to inspect all persons within the city who were 
reported to be sick and to remove to the city’s quarantine island certain persons with 
contagious disease.23 
 
The early lack of federal involvement with quarantine does not mean that the 
federal government was without any concern about the control of epidemics or their 
effect upon commerce and trade.  In 1798, a federal law (titled “An Act for the Relief of 
Sick and Disabled Seamen”) was enacted requiring that every “master or owner of every 
ship or vessel of the United States” that arrived into a U.S. port from a foreign port first 
provide an account of the number of seamen, and pay a fee for every seaman aboard to 
the U.S. Secretary of Treasury to provide for the care of sick and disabled seamen in port 
or other hospitals or institutions.24  
 
In the late 1870s, the need for a more centralized or coordinated response to the 
persistent yellow fever epidemics resulted in the enactment of federal laws establishing a 
more prominent role for the federal government in controlling epidemics and instituting 
quarantine measures, including the passage in 1878 of “an Act to Prevent the Introduction 
of Contagious or Infectious Diseases in the United States.”25  This law prohibited the 
entry into a U.S. port or the passage across the U.S. border of any vessel or vehicle from 
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a country where “any contagious or infectious disease may exist,” or of a vessel or 
vehicle conveying any person, merchandise, or animal “affected with any infectious or 
contagious disease,” contrary to the quarantine law of the state into or through which the 
vessel or vehicle might pass or be destined.26  The law also charged the U.S. Marine 
Hospital Service (the forerunner of the U.S. Public Health Service) with responsibility for 
carrying out the provisions of the Act, including assisting in the enforcement of the 
national quarantine rules and regulations of the Surgeon General.27  To provide support to 
the individual states in their own quarantine efforts, the law also extended to the officers 
of any state or municipality’s quarantine system the authority and power to act as an 
agent of the federal government for “quarantine purposes.”28  Interestingly, and no doubt 
as an acknowledgement of traditional local and state control in these matters, the 1878 
Act stipulated that the federal law “shall not conflict with or impair any sanitary or 
quarantine laws or regulations of any State or municipal authorities now existing or 
which may hereafter be enacted,” and that there “shall be no interference [by federal 
officers or its agents] in any manner with any quarantine laws or regulations as they now 
exist or may hereafter be adopted under State laws.”29   
 
It was not until 1944, with the enactment of the Public Health Service Act, that 
the federal government assumed preeminent authority and power with regard to 
quarantine activities for the purposes of controlling the spread of communicable diseases. 
Under the Act, the U.S. Surgeon General is authorized to “make and enforce such 
regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or 
spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States . . . or from one 
State . . . into any other State. . . .”30  Legal authority and power with regard to the control 
of communicable diseases wholly within states, however, remains primarily the preserve 
of the states rather than the federal government.    
 
 B.  Modern Uses  
 
In the twentieth century there were many cases in which quarantine and 
isolation—including both mandatory and voluntary measures—were used by public 
health officials in the U.S. and other countries in an attempt to control communicable 
diseases.  Sometimes these measures were quite controversial.31  A sample of some of the 
more prominent cases illustrates the varying ways that public health officials have used 
quarantine and isolation. 
 
In 1907, an apparently healthy woman, Mary Mallon, was involuntarily admitted 
to the New York City Health Department’s Detention Hospital, and held there, with the 
subsequent affirmation of a New York court, for a total of three years based upon 
concerns about her infectious state for typhoid fever.32  The conditions for her release 
specified that she not engage in any occupation that would bring her into contact with 
food, but she accepted a job as a cook at a hospital, which later had dozens of cases of 
typhoid.  Mary Mallon was again involuntarily admitted to a number of New York area 
hospitals and institutions “without any prospect of again being released.”33  In Ms. 
Mallon’s case, public health officials concluded that only isolation for the remainder of 
her life would effectively control the risk of typhoid transmission. 
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 In the fall and winter of 1918, divergent approaches to quarantine and isolation 
were used in response to an influenza pandemic (often referred to as the “Spanish Flu”) 
that killed between 20 and 40 million persons worldwide, including hundreds of 
thousands in the U.S.34  Inconsistent control measures were implemented in most U.S. 
jurisdictions, including mass graves for the dead; suspension or closure of public 
gathering places (e.g., churches, schools, shops); prohibitions on public gatherings (e.g., 
funerals, meetings); ordinances against spitting, coughing, or sneezing in public; and the 
quarantine of suspected influenza cases or the isolation of sick persons.35  On the 
University of California-Berkeley campus, where 1,200–1,400 persons contracted 
influenza, for example, the fear of influenza led the supervisor of the campus-based 
volunteer Student’s Army Training Corps to involuntarily quarantine the entire corps, not 
just those suspected of having the illness.36  In other cities, irrationality about some of the 
control measures, such as orders to close some public gathering places (e.g., churches), 
but not others (e.g., saloons),37 appeared to undermine the public’s confidence in health 
officials and their policies.  
 
The prospect of venereal diseases being spread by persons convicted of 
prostitution also served as a basis for the use of involuntary quarantine-like measures by 
public health authorities, measures that were affirmed by criminal courts.  Under New 
York law, for example, persons charged with and convicted of vagrancy (then defined as 
including prostitution), and who pursuant to mandatory medical examination were found 
by a physician to be “afflicted with any venereal disease, which is contagious, infectious 
or communicable,” could be ordered by a criminal court to involuntary commitment to a 
public hospital for treatment until they were cured.38 
 
In other states, criminal conviction was not required before such confinement was 
effected.  Under the laws of Ohio in 1919, for example, courts found that persons who 
were neither charged with nor convicted of acts of prostitution could be ordered by public 
health authorities into quarantine by involuntary hospitalization “for the protection of the 
public health” if such persons have “been shown to be one of the class known as common 
prostitutes” and a health officer has a “reasonable belief that the person ordered into 
confinement is inflicted with a malignant, infectious or contagious disease.”39   
 
More recently, outbreaks of tuberculosis, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 
and even Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever have been cause for the quarantine and isolation of 
persons so infected.  In the case of tuberculosis and HIV, both mandatory and voluntary 
quarantine and isolation measures have been used, with the decisions of some courts, 
combined with public health policy, appearing to suggest that voluntary rather than 
mandatory measures may better further public health interests. 
 
For example, in State v. Snow,40 the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, albeit 
reluctantly, a lower court’s ruling that authorized the involuntary commitment of W. F. 
Snow to the Arkansas Tuberculosis Sanatorium under the state’s Act No. 161 (“an Act to 
Require Isolation of Recalcitrant Tuberculosis Patients”), who state and local health 
department officials had claimed had active tuberculosis, was unwilling to “voluntarily 
submit to medical treatment,” and was living at home under conditions not suitable for 
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isolation.41  The court, however, carefully noted that the evidence put forth by public 
health officials to support their claim for the involuntary commitment of Mr. Snow was 
“meager,” because the officials had failed to provide the evidence (chest x-ray, sputum 
tests, or other approved diagnostic procedures) required under the Act for ascertaining 
Mr. Snow’s “active tuberculosis.”42  Presumably, had Mr. Snow been able to show 
satisfactory voluntary adherence to tuberculosis treatment and acceptable isolation within 
his home, his involuntary hospitalization in the Arkansas Tuberculosis Sanatorium might 
have been avoided altogether. 
 
In the 1980 case of Greene v. Edwards,43 the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals decided an appeal brought by William Arthur Greene, who claimed that a lower 
court’s ordering his involuntarily confinement to the Pinecrest Hospital under the West 
Virginia Tuberculosis Control Act violated his rights under both the West Virginia and 
U.S. Constitutions.44  The court did not discuss whether sufficient evidence had been 
provided by public health officers to support Mr. Greene’s involuntary commitment to a 
state tuberculosis facility.  It concluded that the lower court proceedings that resulted in 
his confinement improperly denied Mr. Greene his rights under both the West Virginia 
and U.S. Constitutions, primarily because Mr. Greene’s attorney was appointed only after 
the commitment proceeding had begun, Mr. Greene and his appointed attorney were 
given no time to consult privately, and Mr. Greene’s attorney could not have been 
adequately prepared to defend him.45  On this basis, the court ordered Mr. Greene’s 
release from Pinecrest Hospital, but it was delayed for 30 days to provide the state with 
the opportunity to conduct further proceedings consistent with the court’s findings.46 
 
The Snow and Greene cases suggest that public health officers and the lower 
courts that approved the orders for involuntary commitment made little effort to examine 
the potential for pursuing voluntary isolation measures rather than involuntary 
commitment.  Examples of voluntary measures include the use of in-home isolation as an 
alternative to commitment to state or other public facilities, and the use of less restrictive 
means of treatment or control before the use of detention, which some states require.47        
 
The case of quarantine and isolation for persons with HIV is somewhat different 
than that of tuberculosis control, in that few persons with HIV in the U.S. (other than 
prisoners) have ever been involuntarily quarantined or isolated for the express purpose of 
controlling HIV transmission, and quarantine and isolation for persons with HIV or their 
contacts is generally not a recommended course of action.48  Some other countries, 
however, have been far more draconian in their response to HIV.  In Cuba, for example, a 
program of mass population screening for HIV was implemented in 1985, first with 
persons who had traveled out of the country, then with blood donors and persons whose 
work involved extensive travel, and when diagnostic kits became more widely available, 
with other persons including pregnant women, persons with sexually transmitted 
diseases, inpatients, prisoners, and other population subgroups.49  The most controversial 
aspect of Cuba’s response to HIV is the mandatory quarantine in the Santiago de las 
Vegas Sanatorium of persons who test positive for HIV, the benefits of which have been 
subject to much debate in the public health literature.  Nevertheless, some quarantined 
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“trustworthy” patients are permitted to leave the Sanatorium for brief periods of time, and 
eventually, patients may be discharged to their home.50 
 
In sum, modern uses of quarantine and isolation have often, but not always, varied 
by the location (or perhaps more accurately, jurisdiction) of the disease outbreak.  
Quarantine and isolation have usually been driven by the nature of the particular disease 
at issue and the degree of risk of transmission from the infected individual to others, as 
evidenced by the response to, first, tuberculosis, and later HIV.   
 
C. Quarantine and Isolation for SARS 
 
“The modern definition of quarantine is the restriction of activities of healthy 
persons who have been exposed to a communicable disease, during its period of 
communicability, to prevent transmission during the incubation period if infection should 
occur.”51  “In contrast, isolation is the separation, for the period of communicability, of 
known infected persons in such places and under such conditions as to prevent or limit 
the transmission of the infectious agent.”52  During the SARS epidemic, the nomenclature 
sometimes did not fit the established definitions, but the concepts were familiar.  For 
example, in Chinese, there is no word for quarantine; it is all “isolation.”  “Home 
isolation” and “home confinement” were used to refer to the confinement of 
asymptomatic contacts of infected persons. 
 
During the SARS outbreak, different types of quarantine and isolation measures 
were used by public health authorities to control SARS transmission. Isolation was used 
for persons who posed the greatest risk of transmission, persons who met the criteria used 
by public health officials for probable SARS cases.  Almost all probable SARS cases 
were isolated in health facilities, generally inpatient acute care hospitals, in which these 
individuals were actually diagnosed.53  Often, persons in quarantine, such as persons who 
met the criteria used by public health officials as suspect SARS cases (e.g., persons who 
may have been in recent contact with a probable SARS case and are experiencing fever 
and a cough or breathing difficulty),54 were subsequently placed in isolation when their 
symptoms met the criteria for probable SARS case.55  Unfortunately, many SARS cases 
were only diagnosed upon investigation of death or autopsy.  
 
 In contrast to isolation, quarantine methods varied greatly, often simply because a 
particular quarantine method appeared to be the most intuitive and timely response in 
light of how little was known about the actual risk of transmission.  For example, the 
quarantine of definitive “contact” cases56—or persons who were known to have been in 
close physical proximity and who had inadequate or no protection from possible exposure 
to a probable SARS case or setting—such as household or family members, was perhaps 
the most intuitive, and in retrospect, rational measure, given what became known about 
the likely route of transmission (i.e., droplets).  This was often referred to as home 
quarantine or “home isolation,” in which the contact cases were urged to remain at home 




 The quarantine of contact cases was also used for health care workers (e.g., 
emergency medical services or ambulance personnel), under circumstances in which 
health care workers may have had “either an exposure to a SARS patient or a setting 
where SARS has been transmitted” while lacking adequate protection from such 
exposure.  These quarantines were called “work quarantines.” Health care workers could 
continue to work in the health facility where they were exposed as long as they remained 
well.  Persons who were subject to work quarantine were required to follow home 
quarantine rules during the time they were not at work.58  Persons who were not health 
care workers but who may have been exposed within a health care facility were also 
subject to quarantine.  For example, any person who entered Toronto’s Scarborough 
Hospital (Grace Division) after March 16, 2003 was asked to adhere to a 10-day home 
quarantine due to their potential exposure to a probable or suspect SARS case before 
adequate infection control measures had been implemented.  Similar quarantines were 
imposed on other worksites where persons who, although not in the position of providing 
health care services, were nonetheless known to have been in proximity to and had 
inadequate or no protection from possible exposure to a probable SARS case.  Persons 
were required to remain in quarantine for the 10-day period, and in some cases, their 
workplaces were closed for business. 
 
 In situations where persons’ proximity or possible exposure to probable or suspect 
SARS cases was less certain, less coercive measures were used.  These quarantine 
methods included “snow days,” the closure of schools, child care facilities, or other 
buildings or locations at which large numbers of people usually gathered (e.g., markets, 
public services, homeless shelters), and the cancellation or postponement of public 
events.59  At the other extreme, highly restrictive measures were used in China, including 
the cordoning off of certain neighborhoods and villages and restrictions on travel, 
including the closure of public transit.60 
 
 While legal authority may have existed or was thought to exist for these 
quarantine methods, the use of so many different quarantine measures, often without 
apparent regard to the particularized risk for which control was sought, may have served 
to undermine public credibility.  It is clear that a more considered, careful, and evidence-
based approach to quarantine and isolation is needed.  
  
Regardless of the wisdom of quarantine and isolation in particular circumstances, 
these measures are only part of the public health response to an epidemic.  Typically the 
ordering of quarantine for SARS triggered a whole system of public health measures.  
Contact tracing was an essential part of the strategy, and this required a staff of trained 
epidemiologists, public health nurses, and other professionals.  Quarantine orders had to 
be served, and public health officers and law enforcement personnel were used in the 
countries we studied.  Some individuals did not want to stay at home during quarantine 
because they were afraid of infecting family members.  In Singapore, individuals under 
quarantine had a choice of staying at home or at a designated center (a resort taken over 
by the government).  Taiwan used a public housing center that had not yet opened, 
military facilities, and a home for the elderly as quarantine facilities.  In Hong Kong, 
“holiday camps” were used for homeless people and those who did not want home 
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confinement.  On the other hand, some people did not want to leave their homes because 
there would be nobody to care for their pets.  Every country developed a system for 
providing meals and other social services.  
 
The vast majority of people under quarantine in all of the countries obeyed 
requests to stay at home without requiring a court order.  Some individuals, however, 
attempted to escape their confinement, and a variety of means were needed to ensure 
compliance.  For example, in Singapore, three telephone calls were made per day to the 
home of each individual in quarantine to confirm that the individual was there.  People 
who were known to work at night were called at night.  Electronic cameras were used to 
verify that people were at home, and people in quarantine were required to take their 
temperature on camera.  Anyone initially violating quarantine had an electronic tag put 
on his or her leg (there were 26 cases).  In all of the countries, police officers were 
charged with locating and confining individuals who violated quarantine.   
 
D. Political Aspects 
 
 Isolation is relatively straightforward scientifically, politically, and socially.  It 
seems to make sense to confine individuals who are ill with a communicable disease and 
to limit their contacts.  Neither the affected individuals nor potential contacts of the 
person are likely to object to such measures.  Similarly, it will not be complicated to 
decide whom to isolate, where to do so, or for how long.  Quarantine, however, is very 
complicated, and it raises a series of difficult questions of public health, public health 
law, and public policy. 
 
 At the outset, it should be clear that the purpose of quarantine is not to stop 
immediately all transmission of infection.  Not only is this likely to be nearly impossible, 
but the severity of the measures needed would be extremely unpopular and therefore the 
necessary level of compliance would be difficult to achieve.  The purpose of quarantine is 
to reduce the incidence of new cases to below the total rate of deaths plus patients who 
have recovered.  As a result, the total number of infected individuals will peak, decline, 
and then reach zero. 
 
 The contours of quarantine will vary depending on a variety of factors, including 
the mode of transmission (e.g., close contact, airborne), the likelihood of transmission per 
contact event, the length of communicability, and the recovery rate.  In the case of SARS, 
as a new infection, quarantine policy needed to be designed and implemented in the 
absence of definitive scientific information about the infection rate or the course of the 
illness. 
 
 Although scientific considerations will inform the policy decisions surrounding 
quarantine, they should not necessarily dictate the results.  For example, as the definition 
of “close contact” is broadened, more people will be quarantined.  As the criteria for 
quarantine are broadened, the absolute number of infected (presymptomatic) people in 
quarantine will increase, but the percentage of infected people in quarantine will decline.  
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This is analogous to a screening test with a high degree of sensitivity and a low degree of 
specificity generating numerous false positives. 
 
Putting large numbers of people in quarantine may be politically unpopular.61  It 
also strains the resources of health care, public health, social service, and law 
enforcement agencies and may seriously damage the local and national economy.  The 
length of the quarantine period, both on an individual and jurisdictional basis, also is 
more than a narrow issue of infection control.  As the time for quarantine is increased, the 
rate of compliance will decline.  Furthermore, a long period of quarantine may lead to 
substantial morbidity and mortality from the inability to provide health care services for 
other conditions. 
 
There seems to be general public support for quarantine if it is applied fairly and 
reasonably.  A complicating factor, however, is that it is often impossible to tell when the 
need for quarantine will end.  Thus, in Toronto, the second wave of quarantine was the 
most difficult for a variety of psychological and social reasons. 
 
A lack of alternatives made the use of quarantine and isolation an important 
element of controlling SARS in Canada, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Vietnam.  These jurisdictions had a high rate of compliance with quarantine and 
isolation.  It is not clear whether the United States would have the same compliance rate 
in a comparable epidemic.  Many of the Asian countries are well known for their 
communitarian culture, and Canada is also known for its commitment to social solidarity 
as evidenced by its health care system.  By contrast, the United States is a heterogeneous 
society with a strong tradition of individualism and skepticism about government.   
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II. GOVERNMENTAL ROLES IN SARS 
  
 A. WHO  
 
  1. Background 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) was established in 1948 under the 
auspices of the United Nations.  The United Nations Charter and the WHO Constitution 
grant WHO the authority to monitor world health.  The WHO Constitution allows WHO 
to address various public health issues by adopting conventions, agreements, and 
regulations through its supreme decision-making body, the World Health Assembly 
(Health Assembly).62  Any member of the United Nations may become a member of 
WHO by accepting its Constitution.  Membership is available to other countries by 
application, if approval is given by a majority vote of the Health Assembly.  There are 
currently 192 WHO member countries.63 
 
 Each WHO member sends a delegation to meetings of the Health Assembly, 
typically held in Geneva in May of each year.64  A 32-member Executive Board meets in 
January to set the agenda for the upcoming meeting. The Secretariat of WHO is 
responsible for implementation. The Secretariat has a staff of approximately 3500 at its 
Geneva headquarters, in six regional offices, and in specific countries.  Its head is the 
Director-General, who is appointed by the Health Assembly on the nomination of the 
Executive Board. 
 
Articles 19-22 of the WHO Constitution delineate the specific areas of authority 
of the Health Assembly.  Article 21 empowers the Health Assembly to adopt regulations 
in areas including sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to 
prevent the international spread of disease; nomenclature with respect to diseases, causes 
of death and public health practices; and standards for diagnostic procedures.  After 
notice of adoption is given, regulations come into force for all member countries, with the 
caveat that the notice of adoption will specify a period for members to reject or register 
reservations with the Director-General.65  The member countries are bound by a set of 
regulations, and any reservations are typically listed in annexes to the official text. 
 
The control of infectious diseases is one of the areas in which international law 
has been developed and implemented by WHO.  These efforts have culminated in the 
body of regulations referred to as the International Health Regulations (IHRs).  The 
precursors of today’s IHRs were adopted in 1951 as the International Sanitary 
Regulations (which had existed in one form or another since 1851) and were given their 
current name in 1969. The IHRs have been modified twice since their enactment, in 1973 
and in 1981.  The IHRs are intended to maximize security against the global spread of 
disease while minimizing interference with global movement.   
 
The IHRs require member countries to notify WHO of all cases of certain 
infectious diseases in humans.  Currently, the list of notifiable diseases is limited to 
cholera, plague, and yellow fever.  The IHRs also provide health-related rules for travel 
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and commerce; require health documentation of those traveling from infected to non-
infected places; require other travel documentation, such as maritime declaration of 
health; and establish guidelines for deratting, disinfecting, and adopting other hygiene 
measures related to travel and commerce.  The IHRs not only mandate certain public 
health activities; they also set limits on the measures member countries may take to 
protect public health, especially if these impede international traffic.66  For example, with 
respect to quarantine, the IHRs allow for surveillance or isolation of infected persons 
only for the duration of the incubation period based on the date of last exposure or 
arrival.67   
 
 A number of revisions to the IHRs have been recommended that are intended to 
enhance the capabilities of the global public health network in areas such as the early 
detection of unusual disease events.68  Proposed changes include establishment of a real-
time event management system and development and enhancement of national core 
surveillance capacities.  The revisions would also broaden the IHRs beyond the three 
diseases of current focus to encompass all public health emergencies of international 
concern; projects subsumed under this heading include the refinement and 
implementation of an instrument that will aid member states in assessing the notifiability 
of an event.   
 
In addition, in a resolution adopted at its May 2003 meeting, the Health Assembly 
urged member countries: 
 
Establish immediately a national standing task force or equivalent group and, 
within it, to designate an official or officials having operational responsibilities 
and accessible at all times by telephone or electronic communication, to ensure 
the speed, particularly during emergencies, of both reporting to WHO and 
consultation with national authorities when urgent decisions must be made[.]69 
 
Further, requests have been made to the Director-General to accept all sources of 
information regarding disease outbreaks with potential for international impact and to 
collaborate with national governments in handling and devising control measures as well 
as communicating rapidly with the international community. 
 
For many years, there has been debate on the need to revise and strengthen the 
IHRs to reflect the current concerns about the rapidity with which infectious disease can 
spread under contemporary social conditions as well as the emergence of new and 
dormant infections.70  The SARS outbreak has given a new impetus to the effort needed 
to update provisions and standards related to reporting and controlling infectious disease 
on a global level. 
 
2. The Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance and 
Response (CSR) and the Global Outbreak Alert and Response 
Network (GOARN)  
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 The Department of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response (CSR) at 
WHO houses its global alert and response activities.  The mission of CSR is to provide 
support for global health security and epidemic alert and response.71  The strategy of CSR 
is threefold: contain known risks; respond to the unexpected; and improve preparedness.  
The IHRs provide the basic framework for CSR and are the only “set of binding 
international legal rules on infectious disease control.”72  During the SARS outbreak, the 
WHO CSR division worked closely with the WHO Western Pacific Regional Office.  
The Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) was established by 
WHO in 2000 with the assistance of the Canadian government.  GOARN is a 
collaboration of institutions and networks around the world that provides coordination 
and logistical support in the form of standardized protocols, agreed standards, procedures 
for alert and verifications process, communications, coordination of response, specialist 
equipment, medical supplies, emergency evacuation, research, evaluation, and relations 
with media.  It is supported administratively by the office of Alert and Response 
Operations within CSR. Through GOARN “WHO and partners aim to enhance the 
coordinated delivery of international assistance in support of local efforts; strengthen 
local infrastructure and capacity to reduce illness, death and prevent disease spread; and 
to make a difference to those affected by outbreaks by initiating long term local and 
national preparedness and capacity building projects.”73   
 
GOARN provides “an operational framework to link this expertise and skill to 
keep the international community constantly alert to the threat of outbreaks and ready to 
respond.”74  The specific objectives of the network are to fight the international spread of 
outbreaks; ensure that appropriate technical assistance is provided to affected countries; 
and contribute to the long-term epidemic preparedness and capacity building.75  GOARN 
functions under guiding principles developed through international consensus with the 
IHRs as the overarching framework.  Protocols are developed for specific operational 
issues.   
 
Although GOARN has played a central role in keeping the global community 
informed and updated as to changes and progress regarding SARS, its effectiveness has 
been limited by the voluntary nature of country reporting beyond the three notifiable 
diseases under the IHRs.  As discussed below, China failed to report the early cases of 
atypical pneumonia and therefore delayed a global response to a new infectious disease.  
This experience has again highlighted the need to update the IHRs and to adapt the 
existing detection and reporting networks to the challenges created by communicable 
diseases in an interconnected global community.   
 
 WHO maintains a number of specific mechanisms that assist member countries 
in detecting, responding to, and sharing information about disease outbreaks.  The Global 
Public Health Intelligence Network is an electronic system that continuously searches 
websites, newswires and media sites, public health e-mail services, national government 
websites, public health institutions, non-governmental organizations, and specialized 
discussion groups to identify information regarding epidemic threats and rumors.  WHO 
has developed six criteria to determine if an outbreak constitutes an international concern: 
unknown disease; potential for spread beyond national borders; serious health impact or 
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unexpectedly high rates of illness or death; potential for interference with international 
travel or trade; strength of national capacity to contain the outbreak; and suspected 
accidental or deliberate release.   
 
 Support for effective response to threats comes from Global Alert and Response 
Teams, which draw on the expertise of personnel from WHO country offices, WHO 
regional response teams, alert and response operation center teams, and disease 
specialists.  Under the heading of technical assistance, WHO can provide rapid assistance 
to affected states at a level according to need, hold daily response coordination of 
meetings, and offer advice and supplies.  Specific support may include on-the-spot 
investigations and assistance with confirmation of diagnosis, handling of dangerous 
pathogens, case detection, patient management, containment measures, and logistics. 
 
Information sharing is facilitated by a number of publications. Three are of 
particular importance.  The Outbreak Verification List is a weekly electronic report of 
confirmed and unconfirmed reports of outbreaks of international public health 
importance.  Recipients of this report include key public health officials of the 192 WHO 
member countries, disease experts, institutions, agencies, and laboratories.  The Disease 
Outbreak News is a web-based system providing public information about officially 
confirmed outbreaks of international importance.  The Weekly Epidemiological Record is 
a bi-lingual (French/English) weekly publication available in print and electronically.  It 
provides information on cases and outbreaks of diseases covered by the IHRs as well as 
other infectious diseases of public health importance. 
 
  3. WHO Responses to SARS 
 
On March 12, 2003, WHO issued a global SARS alert in response to information 
generated by its alert and response systems.  On March 15, WHO issued an emergency 
travel advisory; such advisories are extremely rare.   On March 17, WHO convened a 
Collaborative Multi-Center Research Project on SARS Diagnosis, which consists of 11 
laboratories in nine countries working on a diagnostic test for SARS.76 The group is using 
various communication methods to share data from SARS cases in real time.77   
 
 WHO’s response to SARS represented a new level of assertiveness in controlling 
an international epidemic.   
 
Typically, WHO refrains from publicly criticizing its member states 
because such criticism puts the intergovernmental organization in a difficult 
position in its work with member governments.  WHO’s public criticism of the 
Chinese government [in April 2003, for insufficient reporting on the scale of the 
epidemic] represented a radical break with the traditional diplomacy that 
characterizes relations between the Organization and member states.78  
 
WHO received broad support for its aggressive stance, and the Chinese government 
changed its policy.  WHO appears to have assumed the essential, but possibly expanded, 
role of not only assisting member states to control the spread of epidemics, but also 
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assessing the adequacy of control measures and the forthrightness of surveillance and 
reporting.  
 
At its May 2003 meeting, the Health Assembly approved a resolution on SARS, 
prepared by an informal drafting group made up of representatives of 37 member 
countries.  The resolution urges member countries: 
 
(1) to commit fully to controlling SARS and other emerging and re-
emerging infectious diseases, through political leadership, the provision of 
adequate resources, including through international cooperation, 
intensified multisectoral collaboration and public information; 
(2) to apply WHO recommended guidelines on surveillance, including 
case definitions, case management and international travel; 
(3) to report cases promptly and transparently and to provide requested 
information to WHO; 
(4) to enhance collaboration with WHO and other international and 
regional organizations in order to support epidemiological and laboratory 
surveillance systems, and to foster effective and rapid responses to contain 
the disease; 
(5) to strengthen, to the extent possible, capacity for SARS surveillance 
and control by developing or enhancing existing national programmes for 
communicable disease control; 
(6) to ensure that those with operational responsibilities can be contacted 
by telephone or through electronic communications at all times; 
(7) to continue to collaborate with and, when appropriate, provide 
assistance to WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network as the 
operational arm of the global response; 
(8) to request the support of WHO when appropriate, and particularly 
when control measures employed are ineffective in halting the spread of 
disease; 
 (9) to use their experience with SARS preparedness and response to 
strengthen epidemiological and laboratory capacity as part of preparedness 
plans for responding to the next emerging infection, the next influenza 
pandemic, and the possible deliberate use of a biological agent to cause 
harm; 
(10) to exchange information and experience on epidemics and the 
prevention and control of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases in 
a timely manner, including among countries sharing land borders; [and] 
(11) to mitigate the adverse impact of the SARS epidemic on the health of 
the population, health systems and socioeconomic development[.]79   
 
 The resolution further states that the Director General should “collaborate with 
Member States in their efforts to mobilize financial and human resources on technical 
support in order to develop or enhance national, regional and global systems for 
epidemiological surveillance and to ensure effective responses to emerging and re-
emerging diseases, including SARS.”80  
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GOARN has been of particular significance during the SARS outbreak. It has 
provided “an operational platform to mobilize clinicians, data mangers, infectious disease 
experts, epidemiologists, laboratory experts, logistics experts, medical epidemiologists, 
microbiologists, media experts, pathologists, public health specialists and virologists as 
part of the international effort to address [a] global public health emergency.”81  It has 
coordinated the provision of essential supplies and assistance to hospitals caring for 
SARS patients.  It has flown experts into countries requesting help in areas such as field 
support and logistics coordination.  Its networks of electronically-connected clinical and 
laboratory experts have worked on the development of case definitions for SARS and 
identification of the causative agent, development of diagnostic tests, generation of 
knowledge concerning the mode of transmission, and development of treatments.  
GOARN has developed and disseminated specific and detailed measures for surveillance 
of SARS, and it receives daily reports on the disease situation in affected countries.  It 
has also issued advice to travelers. 
 
 In addition, a public-private initiative on surveillance has been created by WHO 
in response to SARS in order to build capacity in surveillance, epidemiology, and public 
health laboratories in Asia.  The initiative was funded through the business community 
with interests in Asia. 
 
 B.  National Public Health Agencies  
 
  1. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
  
  Although the United States has not experienced a major outbreak or epidemic of 
SARS cases, the CDC has played a vital role in informing the U.S. public and in 
providing technical assistance as well as resources to countries affected by SARS.  
Nationally, the CDC has set up a public response hotline; held daily response team 
briefings and conference calls; coordinated a number of SARS satellite broadcasts; and 
made a SARS webpage available with constant updates.  A total of 84 employees from a 
variety of disciplines traveled to SARS-affected countries.  The CDC has also 
collaborated with WHO to provide laboratory assistance in the search for the pathogen 
responsible for SARS and in confirming cases of SARS.   
 
 Were the U.S. to experience a major outbreak, the federal system in the U.S. 
would present a challenge, since “the CDC has no regulatory powers to implement 
prevention and control measures outside the national quarantine system, as those powers 
reside with the states.”82  In most countries affected by SARS, the central government 
had the power to implement and enforce control measures such as quarantine and 
isolation at the local as well as national level.  In the U.S., individual states are 
responsible for public health control measures within their borders as part of the police 
power recognized by the U.S. Constitution.  Significant variation exists among states and 
localities in terms of laws governing quarantine and isolation measures.83  The fact that 
state and local authorities have power over quarantine and isolation within their borders 
but the federal government is responsible for interstate and international control of the 
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spread of disease makes cooperation and clear communication among the various levels 
of government essential to effective management of an infectious disease outbreak.   
 
Title 42 U.S.C. Section 264 (Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act) gives 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services responsibility for preventing the 
introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries 
into the U.S. and within the U.S. and its territories/possessions, and CDC has the 
authority to “detain, medically examine, or conditionally release individuals suspected of 
carrying a communicable disease”84 under regulations found at 42 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 
71. Violation of a quarantine and isolation order is a federal criminal misdemeanor.85  In 
response to the SARS outbreak, and by recommendation of the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, President Bush added SARS to the list of reportable diseases on April 4, 
2003.  Executive Order 13295 effectively revised the existing list of quarantinable 
communicable diseases by adding SARS to cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, 
plague, smallpox, yellow fever, and viral hemorrhagic fevers.86  During the 2003 
outbreak, the CDC recommended, but did not compel, the isolation of individuals with 
SARS.87   
 
The CDC’s Global Migration and Quarantine Division has coordinated efforts to 
prevent and control the spread of infectious diseases with other federal agencies, state and 
local health departments, the travel industry, and other organizations.  The Division has 
eight permanent quarantine stations at major points of entry staffed by 30 permanent 
quarantine inspectors.  During the SARS outbreak staffing and presence were augmented 
to 23 quarantine stations (15 new ports of entry) and 150 additional staff in order to 
provide information to travelers arriving from SARS-affected countries via airplanes, 
ships or land; distributing health alerts to travelers with information regarding symptoms 
of SARS and what to do if they should develop SARS-like symptoms; examining 
travelers aboard airplanes and ships who have been reported as being ill with SARS-like 
symptoms; providing updates to other government agencies; and working with the CDC 
SARS investigation team and local and state health departments.  SARS-specific yellow 
health alert cards were distributed to over 2.7 million arriving passengers disembarking 
from over 11,000 flights and 62 ships over a three-month period.    
  
The CDC has issued a number of guidelines for the management of SARS cases.  
The following are some of the guidelines provided by the CDC and available through the 
CDC website: Interim Guidelines for Air Medical Transport; Interim Guidance for 
Airline Disinfection and Cleaning; Interim Guidance About SARS for Airline Crew 
Members; Interim Travel Advice for Flight Crews Who Lay Over in Areas Affected by 
SARS; Interim Guidance About SARS for Transportation Security Administration 
Personnel; Interim Guidelines About SARS for Bureau of Customs and Border Patrol; 
Interim Guidelines about SARS for Persons in the General Workplace Environment; 
Health-Care Workers; Laboratory Safety; and Human Remains.  Also, the CDC (along 
with state and local health departments) has a free registry system, the Health Alert 




  2. Other Countries   
 
The United Kingdom Health Protection Agency issued a report called “Legal 
Powers That Would Assist in Controlling Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 
England and Wales: Would Making SARS Notifiable Assist?” exploring the issues raised 
by the SARS epidemic.88 According to the report, in a May 2003 survey conducted by the 
European Commission, 17 European Community countries reported making SARS a 
notifiable condition.  The level of certainty required to trigger the notice requirement, i.e., 
whether  cases had to be confirmed or merely suspected or probable in order to be 
notifiable, was not assessed by the survey.  Additionally, 15 countries reported that they 
had some form of legal provision for implementing quarantine. 
 
The European Commission has formed a SARS expert group with 
multidisciplinary membership to advise the Commission and national authorities on 
issues regarding and related to SARS and issued two reports regarding the SARS 
situation, “Measures Taken by Member States and Accession Countries to Control the 
Outbreak of SARS” and “Employment, Social Policy, Health, and Consumer Affairs.”  
The first report was undertaken in response to a Health Council request for information 
regarding member states’ actions in response to SARS.  The report relied on a survey of 
27 countries prepared by the European Union Expert Group on SARS.  The survey found 
that “on the whole, European countries have adopted rapid and consistent measures on 
early detection of cases, implementation of isolation measures and guidance to health 
professionals, and the public on the identification of possible SARS cases.”89  It also 
found that information was made available to health professionals electronically and on 
paper; that public information had been widely and rapidly distributed; and that travel 
advice was more or less consistent among European countries.  As a response to SARS, 
some European countries have included mandatory quarantine measures in their legal 
framework, and others are currently working on modifying their legislation.90  Other 
measures adopted in European countries as a result of the SARS epidemic addressed 
research, humanitarian assistance, anti-discrimination actions, mass gatherings, and 
import-export of goods.91  Specifically, the report found that 22 countries added SARS to 
their list of diseases with obligatory reporting.  Nineteen countries added quarantine as a 
mandatory measure in their national legislation.  The second report includes a checklist 
on SARS that enumerates the areas of action for national authorities.92  
 
 It is apparent that numerous national and international measures are necessary to 
prevent, detect, and control infectious disease outbreaks.  National and international 
measures need to be coordinated and the free flow of information is imperative to achieve 
coordination.  Additionally, a strong and effective public health infrastructure is essential.  
A July 2003 report from the U.S. General Accounting Office concludes that although the 
level of international scientific cooperation was strong and unprecedented during the 
SARS outbreak, lessons learned should be applied now in preparation for a future 
outbreak.  The report names early identification of cases and their contacts, safety 
precautions and protective measures for health care workers, control measures—
including quarantine and isolation, and “swift and unfettered communication among 
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health care workers, public health officials, government agencies, as well as the public” 
as key in the effort to contain an infectious disease.93 
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 III. LAW OF QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION   
 
A.  United States 
 
 On April 4, 2003, at the request of the CDC, President Bush signed Executive 
Order 13295, adding SARS to the list of communicable diseases for which federal 
isolation and quarantine is authorized.94  Thus, SARS joined cholera, diphtheria, 
infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, and viral hemorrhagic fevers as 
communicable diseases detainable by the federal government.    
 
 Although public health law is generally thought of as a state function within the 
United States federal system, SARS is an example where the flexibility of federal law 
allowed the CDC to exercise leadership.  With only 164 total confirmed, suspected, or 
probable SARS cases in the entire country, the United States relied heavily on “public 
education” and “voluntary” quarantine and isolation to contain the outbreak.  The legal 
system for implementing quarantine and isolation in the United States, however, may 
become more important if an outbreak of SARS or another disease became more 
widespread. 
 
  1. Federal Authority 
  
   a. Statutory Authority  
 
 Under Section 361(b) of the Public Health Service Act,95 the list of diseases for 
which quarantine or isolation is legally authorized must be specified in an Executive 
Order signed by the President.96  With the signing of the executive order on April 4, 2003 
the federal government created the legal authority to prevent the introduction, 
transmission, or spread of suspected cases of SARS in the United States through control 
of entry at its borders.  With this grant of power, the CDC established a set of interim 
rules regarding interstate and foreign quarantine to include SARS.  These rules allow the 
CDC to “ isolate, quarantine, or place the person under surveillance and may order 
disinfection” based on a reasonable belief that a person arriving in the United States or 
traveling in interstate commerce is infected or may have been exposed to SARS.97    
These interim rules were in place by April 10, 2003, a little more than a week after the 
WHO issued a global health alert on April 2, 2003. 
 
 The “interstate commerce” jurisdiction of the CDC gives it the authority to 
intervene in what might be a local outbreak or case of SARS on the theory that the 
infected individuals are likely to move across state lines.  The statute authorizes the CDC 
to promulgate regulations that provide “for the apprehension and examination of any 
individual reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease … and (A) to 
be moving or about to move from a State to another State; or (B) to be a probable source 
of infection to individuals who, while infected with such disease…, will be moving from 
a State to another State.” 98  The interim rules thus gave the CDC ample legal authority to 
respond to a SARS outbreak anywhere in the country.  For that authority to be effective, 
federal resources would have to be increased in the event of a SARS epidemic. 
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 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1978 in a 
government reorganization, in which the function of agencies from the Departments of 
Defense, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, and the General Services 
Administration were merged into one new agency. Under regulations for securing FEMA 
assistance,99 when an “incident occurs or threatens to occur in a State” that would not 
qualify as a major disaster (generally a natural catastrophe), a Governor of a State may 
request that the President of the United States declare an “emergency.”100  An 
“emergency” is defined as “any occasion or instance, for which, in the determination of 
the President, [f]ederal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and 
capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety . . . .”101  
The basis for a governor’s request must include, among other information, the finding 
that the situation is of “such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the 
capability of the State and the affected local government(s),” and that the situation 
requires “supplementary Federal emergency assistance to save lives and to protect 
property, public health and safety . . . .”102  If an epidemic meets these and other 
conditions, the epidemic would almost certainly constitute an “emergency.” 
 
Once the President makes an emergency declaration in response to a governor’s 
request, the FEMA Associate Director or Regional Director “may provide assistance,” 
including directing “any federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its 
authorities and the resources granted to it under federal law (including personnel, 
equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical and advisory services) in 
support of State and local emergency assistance efforts to save lives, protect property and 
public health and safety … .”103  Available assistance also may include, for example, 
provision of health and safety measures; management, control, and reduction of 
immediate threats to public health and safety; and emergency assistance under the 
Stafford Act through federal agencies.104 
 
Closely mirroring FEMA regulations, the Stafford Act105 authorizes the President, 
pursuant to a declaration of an emergency, to direct any federal agency to use its 
authority and resources granted to it under federal law to, among other things, support 
state and local emergency assistance efforts; coordinate all relief assistance; provide 
technical and advisory assistance; and provide emergency assistance through federal 
agencies.106  Neither the federal statute nor regulations limit or otherwise specifically 
define such “support” or “emergency assistance” to mean only non-financial support.  
Presumably, a federal agency may exercise its discretion to provide state and local 
governments with financial support in lieu of or in addition to other types of assistance 
authorized under the law.  It may be important to note that the Stafford Act specifically 
provides for financial support to state and local governments, as well as individuals and 
businesses, in cases of major disasters and emergency preparedness.  Similar reference to 
financial support is not included in sections of the Stafford Act pertaining to 
“emergency” situations, but this omission has apparently not been interpreted to limit 
assistance in “emergency” situations under the Stafford Act to non-financial assistance.107 
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Finally, under the Stafford Act, whenever the federal assistance in an 
“emergency” may be “inadequate,” the President may also provide “assistance with 
respect to efforts to save lives, protect property and public health and safety, and lessen 
or avert the threat of a catastrophe.”108  The intent of this provision is to permit the 
President to authorize any other assistance necessary, conceivably including financial 
assistance.  
 
 The Department of Health and Human Services, through the CDC, has the 
primary responsibility within the federal government for tracking and overall 
management of the public health response in the event of an outbreak of SARS or 
comparable public health threat.   However, the CDC will support rather than supplant 
the disease surveillance, epidemiologic response, diagnostic laboratory services, and 
efforts of containment of state and local public health agencies.109  Because of the CDC’s 
concurrent jurisdiction with the states on quarantine and isolation, it will play a back-up 
role as a safety net where the state fails to act, but the CDC and U.S. attorneys’ offices 
(which would be responsible for obtaining judicial orders) lack the staff to replace the 
states in leading quarantine and isolation efforts.  In other words, if a state is unable to 
obtain an order of quarantine or isolation against an individual in a state court, the CDC 
actng through the local U.S. attorney, would have the legal authority to obtain such an 
order in federal court under federal law, but the federal government does not have the 
resources to replace state public health officials to obtain and enforce (via the federal 
marshal service) numerous orders.   
 
 2. Constitutional Issues 
  
 There is little basis to question the constitutionality of the revised CDC 
regulations regarding SARS, at least as directed at non-United States citizens seeking 
entry into the country.  The federal government’s authority to exclude non-citizens 
attempting to enter the United States through recognized ports of entry is quite broad.110  
The only constitutional challenge to the federal government’s power to control 
immigration is a procedural due process claim,111 such as lack of notice, hearing, or 
statutory authority.  At present, the CDC could detain and order medical examination of 
any alien suspected of having SARS seeking entry into the United States without 
violating the Constitution because of President Bush’s Executive Order of April 4, 2003.  
Ironically, those individuals in the country illegally would have more standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of a detention or deportation order than those seeking to 
enter the United States legally because once in the country the alien is treated more like a 
citizen or permanent resident.112 
 
 Efforts to control the interstate spread of SARS would likely have to clear two 
kinds of constitutional hurdles.  First, the federal government, like the states, has to 
exercise its broad public health power to detain individuals in a manner consistent with 
the constitutional protections afforded individuals. The United States Supreme Court’s 
landmark 1905 decision of  Jacobson v. Massachusetts113 is significant not only for its 
upholding the constitutionality of compulsory vaccination, but also for the Court’s 
statement about the need for a scientific basis for the use of coercive public health 
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measures.  In the case of SARS, this implies that the power to detain individuals must be 
utilized carefully and consistent with the best available scientific knowledge.  An 
example of how such power was carefully utilized in the past, in the case of an American 
couple who visited Sweden during an outbreak of smallpox in the 1960s, is one of the 
few cases where an individual challenged a federal detention order in federal district 
court.  The district court judge upheld an isolation order in a public health hospital 
against the wife who had not been vaccinated, but not against the husband who the court 
noted had been vaccinated.114  
 
 A second issue, not yet resolved, is at what point the federal government’s power 
to prevent the spread of SARS among the states preempts the traditional police power of 
states with respect to public health.  This is both a theoretical and a practical issue in the 
event of a large outbreak of SARS or other pathogens in the United States.  There is 
probably concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state health authorities, for instance, 
when a person suspected of having SARS lives in one state, for instance, New Jersey, but 
works in New York City.  We know of no reported instances where the issue of 
federalism had to be resolved.  At a practical level, the federal and state public health 
officials would depend on each other in the face of a widespread SARS-like outbreak.  If 
the federal government issued a detention order against such a hypothetical commuter, it 
is not clear how and by whom the order would be enforced.  Federal statutes authorize 
the Coast Guard and customs agents to aid in the enforcement of federal quarantine rules 
and regulations.115  The CDC is authorized to seek the assistance of state and local 
officials in the enforcement of federal quarantine orders,116 and probably would do so.  
 
 Involuntary detention by the federal government for SARS or any communicable 
disease would have to consider a possible constitutional challenge.  With notions of 
liberty and privacy protected by the United States Supreme Court as constitutional 
rights,117 federal and state officials must apply quarantine and isolation laws with an eye 
towards a constitutional challenge by an individual.  At a minimum, there must be, in the 
case of involuntary isolation, a written order directed at the individual.  There must be 
adequate evidence to justify the conclusion that the individual represents a threat and 
meets a previously established “case definition.”  For instance, an order might use the 
CDC guidelines to allege the person is a “probable case” of SARS because of recent 
travel to a SARS-infected area and symptoms such as a fever and cough.  The requested 
order must be specific and time-limited, and there must be an opportunity to be heard by 
a neutral fact-finder and eventually a judge.  It is probably constitutional for the hearing 
to follow detention in the case of isolation of a probable infected person, provided the 
hearing is held promptly after detention and the detainee has the right to representation 
and appeal to a court.118 
 
 Quarantine, on the other hand, requires a slightly more complicated constitutional 
analysis because of two factors.  First, the individual, by definition, is not yet infected.  
Second, quarantine could apply to a large number of people, rather than focus on a 
particular individual.  Courts also might apply greater scrutiny to quarantine orders 
because at least some justices have recently used a broader “liberty” analysis rather than 
the more limited fundamental rights analysis to invalidate a state criminal statute.119   
 40
 
 B. State and Local Law 
 
  Protection of patient privacy seems to have guided the few reports of the actual 
use of quarantine and isolation by state and local officials in the United States to contain 
the spread of SARS.  According to media reports, New York City public health officials 
involuntarily detained a tourist who became sick with flu-like symptoms in early April 
2003.  The tourist had stopped in Hong Kong on his way to New York and refused to 
remain in a hospital in New York where he received treatment.  It is significant that the 
public health officials never released the name of the individual, the hospital, or the 
man’s country of origin in an attempt to protect his privacy.  This was only the second 
time in over 25 years that the New York City Public Health Department involuntarily 
detained a person suspected of having a communicable disease other than tuberculosis.  
At the time of the incident, New York City had 18 suspected cases and two probable 
cases of SARS, using the CDC definitions.  Unresolved, however, was who would pay 
for the tourist/patient’s 10 days of involuntary detention and isolation in a New York City 
hospital.120  No one in the media has yet asked, what would happen if the undisclosed 
New York hospital had demanded payment in advance before accepting the detained 
tourist as an involuntary patient? 
 
 The answer to that question in New York City or elsewhere in this country would 
require examining New York state and city ordinances to determine if public health 
officials have the authority to “seize” a hospital and perhaps compensate later.  By 
coincidence, at the time of the SARS outbreak, New York City was in the process of 
revising its public health code to deal with a possible bioterrorist attack.  These 
amendments clarify the authority to detain suspected cases of diseases in either their  
home or a hospital and provide some procedural protections for those detained.  
Consistent with U.S. notions of due process, these regulations are built on the assumption 
that individual orders will be issued to restrict movement.121 
 
 These New York City rules could be adopted because the Charter of the City of 
New York grants the Board of Health the authority to amend the rules.  It is unlikely that 
all local boards across the country have such rulemaking authority because of the great 
variation among state and local laws regarding quarantine and isolation. Utah’s code, for 
instance, grants the health commissioner the authority “to require quarantine, vaccination 
or treatment of any individual when he determines any such measures to be necessary to 
control the spread of any disease of public importance.”122  Indiana, by contrast, has a 
very detailed statute for determining when involuntary treatment, isolation, and 
quarantine can be used, with authority vested in local health departments.123 Some states 
have detailed regulations for each disease, along with concurrent jurisdiction between the 
state and local legislative bodies.  It is not clear in some of those jurisdictions whether the 
New York-type detention of a suspected case of SARS would be possible without 
interpreting old statutes and new regulations, none of which refer to SARS.  
 
 Lawyers for public health departments at the state and local levels who draft 
quarantine and isolation orders that conform to statutory and constitutional requirements 
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face another obstacle.  The rules of procedures of trial and appellate courts in many 
states, even provisions for expedited proceedings, could lead to unacceptable delays.  For 
example, if a trial judge refused to sign an order for quarantine or isolation, it is not clear 
how long it would take for the public health authorities to appeal.  If the normal time for 
an “expedited appeal” in the state is seven days, this may be totally inadequate to contain 
the spread of infection (in the case of a wrongfully denied order) or to redress a 
deprivation of liberty (in the case of wrongfully issued order).   Because quarantine and 
isolation case law in most jurisdictions is so old, today’s judges may be unaware of the 
time needs of effective public health containment in a global economy.  More generally, 
the role of the judiciary in state public health law needs careful study because courts are 
crucial in ensuring the proper balance between public health needs and the civil liberties 
and dignity of individuals and the community. 
 
 In the end, quarantine and isolation in the United States must be studied from the 
perspective of state administrative law.  Principles of delegation and the scope of judicial 
review may be used to limit an overly broad public health statute or to bring coherence to 
an overly detailed one. The overlap between state and local jurisdiction in public health 
matters in a given state is not simply a matter of municipal law, but require reading into 
any decision involving quarantine and isolation principles of constitutional law that 
balance the rights of individuals with the community’s interest in public health.   Thus, 
whether a local public health official could legally detain a person suspected of having 
SARS and seek judicial review after the detention is a matter of untangling statutory 
authority, principles of state administrative law, and constitutional principles that 
constrain government control over individuals.124 
 
 C.        Travel 
  
 The spread of SARS from China to the rest of the world, largely through travelers 
staying at a single hotel in Hong Kong, demonstrates the importance of limiting the 
mobility of infected individuals.  As noted in Section II, under the Public Health Service 
Act,125  the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine of the Center for Infectious 
Diseases of CDC has been delegated the responsibility for preventing the introduction, 
transmission, and spread of communicable diseases into the U.S.  CDC health officers are 
stationed in major gateway cities throughout the world to assess the health of travelers 
before they enter the U.S.  The CDC is also responsible for operating quarantine stations 
in Atlanta, Chicago, Honolulu, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, and 
Seattle. 
 
 During the SARS epidemic, widespread efforts were made to identify 
symptomatic international travelers and to prevent them from entering the U.S. and 
infecting others.  This was accomplished through temperature checks of passengers at 
airports upon arrival, in some countries through the use of thermal imaging of passengers, 
and information given to all arriving international passengers to monitor their health and 
promptly report any symptoms to public health authorities.  Similar measures were 
undertaken for maritime crews, passengers on cruise ships and ferries, as well as 
individuals at border crossings.     
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 Despite best efforts, it may not be possible to identify all infected individuals 
before they enter the country.  Once identified, however, as when they become 
symptomatic, it is imperative that public health officials have the ability to respond 
quickly to isolate or quarantine the individual’s contacts.  It is essential that the CDC and 
other public health authorities have access to complete, contemporaneous passenger 
manifests for international flights in electronic form.  Past attempts to do this, involving 
tuberculosis, were complicated.  At present, legal restrictions limit such access to law 
enforcement and national security agencies.  It will also be necessary to coordinate 
contact tracing and intervention activities with state and local public health authorities, 
and such arrangements must be firmly in place before any serious public health event.  
 
 D. Eminent Domain 
 
 Public health measures to deal with SARS have required the governments in 
affected countries to have the exclusive use of certain health care and related facilities.  
For example, in Toronto, during the second wave of the epidemic, four hospitals were 
designated as SARS hospitals, and patients with other health problems were forced to 
seek medical care elsewhere.  Residential facilities also were needed for quarantined 
individuals who were homeless or who were away from home at the time of their 
exposure to SARS.  Requisitioning of private facilities for public health purposes is not, 
of course, unique to SARS.  In Paris, in August 2003, after 11,000 deaths were caused by 
a heat wave, the government took over refrigerated warehouses and similar facilities to 
use as temporary morgues.  These actions lead to the question of what U.S. legal 
principles would apply to the compelled public use of private property in a public health 
emergency. 
 
 All sovereign states possess the power of eminent domain, the power to 
appropriate private property for public use.  The power is based on the natural law 
principle of necessity, and it is recognized in all states as well as the federal government.  
The key constitutional provision is the “takings clause” of the Fifth Amendment, 
applicable to the federal government, and extended to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  These provisions set the three constitutional prerequisites for application of 
eminent domain: (1) public use; (2) just compensation; and (3) procedural due process 
surrounding the taking.  The purpose of the takings clause is to prevent the government 
from forcing some people to bear the entire responsibility of a public burden that should 
be borne by the public as a whole. 
 
 The first requirement of a public use would be easy to establish in the case of the 
taking of a hospital or building to fight an epidemic of infectious disease.  With an 
occupied hospital, however, the “taking” involves a serious dislocation.  The use of 
property need not be permanent to qualify as a “taking” for constitutional purposes.126  
The second requirement, just compensation, is based on the market value of the property 
taken.  Depending on the size of the epidemic and the amount of property taken, this 
could be a substantial amount of money.  Third, procedural due process requires the 
property owner to have a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issue of the 
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compensation, but a trial-type hearing is not constitutionally required and the hearing 
need not precede the taking.        
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  1. Introduction 
 
Canada was among the countries hardest hit by SARS.  Only the People’s 
Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan had more probable SARS cases.  Toronto 
was the Canadian city most affected the outbreak.127  The first (index) SARS case in 
Toronto was a 78-year-old woman, Mrs. K, who returned home to Toronto on February 
23, 2003 from a trip to Hong Kong to visit relatives.  Mrs. K, who was never 
hospitalized, died on March 5 after the onset of an illness later determined to be SARS.  
Her son, Mr. T, became ill on February 27, was admitted to Scarborough Hospital (Grace 
Division) on March 7, and died on March 13.128  Transmission of SARS traceable to Mrs. 
K is thought to have included 224 other persons in Toronto alone.  In all of Canada, there 
were 438 SARS cases, including 251 probable (1 active) and 187 suspect (0 active) 
cases.129  All of the probable cases were reported in two provinces, Ontario, which 
includes Toronto, and British Columbia.  Suspect cases were reported in four other 
provinces (Alberta, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan).   
 
In an apparent (but in retrospect, premature) sign that the SARS situation had 
stabilized, Premier Eves of Ontario lifted the SARS provincial emergency on May 17, 
stating that “Toronto, and Ontario, are safe places to live, work and visit.”130  
Unfortunately, on May 23, the second phase of the SARS outbreak began.  Opinions 
differ about the capability of the Canadian government to respond to SARS or other 
SARS-like outbreaks.  As one commentator stated, “I have a concern about whether or 
not in the long run our public health-care system will be able to meet the demands placed 
by new illnesses like SARS…. [N]o one is directly accountable or responsible for public 
health.”131  Concerns like this may be related, in part, to the decentralized nature of 
Canadian public health governance, with authority formally delegated to a multitude of 
federal, provincial, and local entities.  
 
   
2.  Political and Legal Systems 
 
Canada is somewhat larger geographically than the U.S., but its population is only 
slightly more than a tenth the size of the U.S.132  Canada is a confederation of 13 
provinces and territories, with powers delineated among the federal (or national) and 
provincial governments.  The powers of government are established by the Constitution 
Act of 1867 (“Constitution Act”).  Under the Constitution Act, a number of powers are 
exclusively reserved to the provincial governments; matters not exclusively vested with 
provincial governments are by default conferred upon the federal government.133   
 
Canada is also a constitutional monarchy in which both provincial and federal 
executive authority rests with the British Crown (currently the Queen of England, who is 
also designated the Queen of Canada), but which is exercised by democratically elected 
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provincial and federal executive governments (or “cabinets”).   The provincial and 
federal executive governments are formed by the political party that wins the largest 
number of seats in the provincial legislative assembly (or “provincial parliament”) or 
federal legislative House of Commons, respectively.134  Generally, the leader of the 
majority political party is designated as the Prime Minister (federal executive 
government) or premier (provincial executive government).  Both the Prime Minister of 
Canada and the provincial premiers appoint members of their cabinets, who will in turn 
head up the various ministries.  The British Crown is represented in Canada by the 
Governor General, and in the provinces by Lieutenant Governors, without whose royal 
assent neither federal nor provincial legislation may become law.  Acts of the executive 
government are undertaken in the name of the Queen, although authority for executive 
government acts is said to derive from the Canadian people.  At the federal level, 
legislative authority rests with the Parliament, consisting of a Senate and House of 
Commons, while legislative authority at the provincial level rests with the legislative 
assemblies. 
 
The Canadian judicial system is divided into four different levels, including the 
provincial courts (which hear the majority of cases that come into the judicial system, and 
which often have more specific names based upon their subject matter jurisdiction); 
provincial and territorial superior courts (whose jurisdiction covers more serious crimes 
as well as appeals from the provincial courts, and which usually have subject matter 
divisions), as well as the Trial Division of the Federal Court (considered to be on the 
same level as the provincial and territorial superior courts but has jurisdiction for 
different issues, and is basically a superior court with civil jurisdiction); the provincial 
courts of appeal and the Federal Court of Appeal (whose jurisdiction includes appeals 
from the lower superior courts or Federal Court—Trial Division, respectively); and the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the final court of appeal from all other Canadian courts.135  
   
 
 3. Public Health Structure and Laws 
 
 a. Federal level 
 
The Constitution Act does not specifically address public health.  However, the 
Constitution Act does provide for the national Parliament’s exclusive legislative authority 
for matters of “Quarantine and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine 
Hospitals.”136  Pursuant to its authority, the federal government has enacted two statutes 
with significant public health implications, the Department of Health Act137 and the 
Quarantine Act.138 
 
The Department of Health Act establishes the executive branch’s Department of 
Health, including the position of Minister of Health, and provides that the “powers, duties 
and functions of the Minister extend to and include all matters over which Parliament has 
jurisdiction relating to the promotion and preservation of the health of the people of 
Canada not by law assigned to any other department, board or agency of the Government 
of Canada.”139  These powers, duties, and functions include, but are not limited to, the 
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following: “the protection of the people of Canada against risks to health and the 
spreading of disease”;140 “investigation and research into public health, including the 
monitoring of diseases”;141 “the protection of public health on railways, ships, aircraft 
and all other methods of transportation, and their ancillary services”;142 and “cooperation 
with provincial authorities with a view to the coordination of efforts made or proposed 
for preserving and improving public health.”143 
 
The executive branch of the federal government, through the Governor in 
Council, is empowered to “make regulations that give effect to and carry out the objects” 
of the Department of Health Act; persons who “contravene” these regulations are “guilty 
of an offence punishable on summary conviction.”144  The Department of Health Act 
further provides that neither the Minister nor any other officer or employee of the 
Department may exercise jurisdiction or control over the health authorities of the 
provinces.145  Consistent with the affirmative grant of the power to regulate, the 
Department of Health (now generally referred to as “Health Canada”), has the 
responsibility for administering a number of health laws and health related programs, 
including, for example, laws pertaining to food, drug, and medical device safety, 
regulation of tobacco products, the federal health insurance (Canada Health Act) 
program, control of hazardous workplace products, and reduction of the incidence of 
disease.   
 
As part of its many ministerial responsibilities related to public health, the 
Department of Health has established the Population and Public Health Branch.  The 
diverse activities of the branch include injury surveillance, prevention and control of 
sexually transmitted diseases, field epidemiology training, and biosafety.  Within the 
branch is the Center for Emergency Preparedness and Response, charged with 
coordinating public health security issues by developing national emergency response 
plans, assessing public health emergency risks, developing federal rules for quarantine, 
and collaborating with other international, federal, and provincial agencies. 
 
As a product of the constitutional structure of the Canadian government and 
contemporaneous but delineated authority among the federal, provincial, and local 
governments in matters related to public health, the legal authority for quarantine and 
isolation for purposes of public health may rest with federal, provincial, and/or municipal 
governments, depending upon the specific activity or context in which a public health 
issue is raised.  For the federal government, the legal authority for quarantine and 
isolation appears limited to public health risks posed by travel or trade into or out of 
Canada, while for provincial and municipal governments, quarantine and isolation for 
purposes of public health are based on their broad police power over persons, businesses, 
or other entities that reside in or are located within their jurisdictions. 
 
Canada’s single most comprehensive law related to the control and prevention of 
contagious disease may be the Quarantine Act.146  The purpose of the Quarantine Act is 
to “prevent the introduction into Canada of infectious or contagious diseases.147  Under 
section 5 of the Quarantine Act, a duly designated quarantine officer is authorized to 
board any conveyance (air, train, motor vehicle, ship) arriving into or departing from 
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Canada to inspect for infectious or contagious diseases (enumerated on a schedule of 
diseases that included cholera, plague, smallpox, and yellow fever, and that now includes 
SARS), and to inspect persons arriving into Canada for “dangerous diseases” (discussed 
below).  The Quarantine Act does not apply to persons who are not at a Canadian point of 
entry or departure. 
 
Under section 8(1) of the Quarantine Act, a quarantine officer may request that a 
person arriving into or departing from Canada undergo a medical examination if the 
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that: such person is ill; may have or may be the 
carrier of an infectious or contagious disease; is infested with insects that may be carriers 
of an infectious or contagious disease; or has recently been in close proximity to a person 
who may have or may be the carrier of an infectious or contagious disease.148  Detention 
must take place in a designated quarantine station, hospital, or other place having suitable 
quarantine facilities or, for persons arriving into Canada on a vessel, on that vessel.149  
The period of detention may not to exceed the prescribed incubation period for the 
disease at issue.150  In lieu of detention, a quarantine officer may permit the person to 
proceed directly to his or her destination in Canada, but only if the person agrees in a 
signed writing to be placed under surveillance by a duly designated public health officer 
for the destination location for a period not exceeding the prescribed incubation period 
for the disease at issue.151   
 
Under section 8(2), a quarantine officer may detain persons who refuse a 
quarantine officer’s request to undergo a medical examination; persons who undergo the 
medical examination and who the quarantine officer suspects have an infectious or 
contagious disease; persons arriving into Canada who are unable to produce the requisite 
and satisfactory evidence of immunization for an infectious or contagious disease; or 
other persons at the port of entry who the quarantine officer believes on reasonable 
grounds have been in close proximity to a person fitting the description in section 8(1).152 
Persons detained pursuant to section 8(2) who are later determined by a quarantine 
officer to have an infectious or contagious disease may be detained “until the quarantine 
officer is satisfied that that person is not capable of infecting any other person with that 
[infectious or contagious] disease.”153  Any person detained under section 8(2) must be 
immediately informed by the quarantine officer of the reason for the detention, and the 
person’s right to appeal to the Deputy Minister of Health or his or her designate.154 
 
Under section 13, a quarantine officer may detain—in a quarantine station, 
hospital or other place with suitable quarantine facilities, or, in the case of persons 
arriving into Canada on a vessel, on that vessel—any person arriving into or departing 
from Canada who the officer determines has an infectious or contagious disease.  In line 
with the standard set forth for section 8(2) detentions with a later determination of 
disease, and unlike section 8(1) detentions (limited to the incubation period), section 13 
detentions may continue “until the quarantine officer is satisfied that that person is not 
capable of infecting any other person with that [infectious or contagious] disease.”155   
 
The detention procedure is somewhat different for cases involving a “dangerous 
disease,” defined under the Quarantine Act as “any disease, other than a disease included 
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in the schedule, the introduction of which into Canada would, in the opinion of the 
quarantine officer concerned, constitute a grave danger to public health in Canada.”156  
Under section 11, a quarantine officer may request that persons arriving in Canada 
undergo a medical examination where the quarantine officer believes on reasonable 
grounds that such persons may have or may be the carrier of a dangerous disease, or have 
recently been in close proximity to a person who may have or may be the carrier of a 
dangerous disease.157  A quarantine officer may detain—for a period of time not to 
exceed 14 days—any person described under section 11 who refuses the medical 
examination, or a person who undergoes the medical examination and who the quarantine 
officer suspects has a dangerous disease.158 
 
A quarantine officer who intends to detain a person under section 11 must, subject 
to the Minister of Health’s approval, “make an order in prescribed form for the 
detention.”159  For detentions longer than 48 hours, a quarantine officer must provide the 
detainee with a copy of the order, and inform the detainee of the right to a hearing.160  
Additionally, the Minister of Health must within 48 hours of the order make an 
application with notice in writing (with a copy served upon the detainee) to a judge of a 
superior court of the province in which the detainee is held, to confirm the quarantine 
officer’s order of detention.161  The judge must hear the application within one day of the 
application, and must make an order to revoke, vary, or conform the detention order.162  
If the application is not made within the requisite 48-hour period, the quarantine officer 
must immediately release the detainee.163 
 
In lieu of detention, a quarantine officer may permit the person described in 
section 11(1) to proceed directly to his or her destination in Canada, but only if the 
person agrees in writing to surveillance by a public health officer for the destination 
location for a period not exceeding 14 days; submits to being vaccinated against the 
dangerous disease; or both.164  However, vaccination is not an option if it is apparent to 
the quarantine officer that the person should not be vaccinated, or if the quarantine officer 
has been informed that there are medical reasons not to vaccinate, and the quarantine 
officer is of the opinion that the person should not be vaccinated.165 
 
If required by a quarantine officer to enforce any provision under the Quarantine 
Act, “peace officers” must provide necessary assistance.166  Persons who violate any 
provision of the Quarantine Act or any regulation made under the Quarantine Act, for 
example, by failing to comply with any order of a quarantine officer made under the Act 
or failing to comply with the signed undertaking (in lieu of detention), is guilty of an 
offense punishable on conviction. 
 
 b. Provincial level 
 
One of the exclusive powers of the provinces under the Constitution Act relates to 
public health.  Provinces have authority over “[t]he Establishment, Maintenance, and 
Management of Hospitals, Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for 
the Province, other than Marine Hospitals.”167  Consistent with these constitutional 
powers, each of the provincial governments has enacted its own body of laws pertaining 
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to public health.  These laws operate independently of the laws of the other provinces.  
For example, each of the provinces has enacted a statute to create a distinct provincial 
public health authority, as well as statutes or regulations that address specific public 
health matters. 
 
Ontario, the epicenter of the SARS outbreak in Canada, enacted the Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care Act168 and the Health Protection and Promotion Act.169  The 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Act provides for the establishment of a 
provincial Ministry of Health and the office of the Minister of Health.  One of the 
functions of the Minister of Health is to “oversee and promote the health and the physical 
and mental well-being of the people of Ontario.”170  The minister also has the power to 
enact regulations necessary to carry out the ministry’s functions.  These include 
regulations to “prescribe and govern the standards” for health care facilities and 
regulations to govern the establishment and use of, and the treatment provided in, 
facilities for tuberculosis diagnosis, surveillance and treatment, as well as “facilities for 
the diagnosis and surveillance of other respiratory diseases.”171   
 
The Ministry of Health of Ontario has established a number of offices and 
programs to pursue its public health functions.  Some of these offices and programs have 
responsibility for the regulation of hospitals, nursing homes, and medical laboratories.  
Others are charged with carrying out health promotion and disease prevention activities.  
The ministry also provides or coordinates health insurance and drug benefits. Other 
Canadian provinces have similar ministries responsible for public health matters within 
their respective provinces and political subunits.  In British Columbia, for example, the 
Health Act provides for the appointment of a provincial health officer and other staff as 
may be “necessary for the supervision and enforcement of this [Health] Act and the 
regulations.”172  The Lieutenant Governor of Council is provided with the broad authority 
to make regulations for the “prevention, treatment, mitigation and suppression of 
disease,” including regulations covering the isolation and quarantine, reporting by 
medical practitioners, and compulsory examination and treatment.173  
 
The Health Protection and Promotion Act, Ontario’s most important source of 
public health authority, is intended to “provide for the organization and delivery of public 
health programs and services, the prevention of the spread of disease and the promotion 
and protection of the health of the people of Ontario.”174  Under the Act, local boards of 
health are required to provide certain programs and services in health promotion, health 
protection, and disease and injury prevention.175  The Act provides for, among other 
things, the reporting of communicable diseases by physicians, hospital administrators, 
and school principals.  It grants the provincial Minister of Health the authority to make 
regulations specifying diseases as communicable diseases.  It authorizes the provincial 
Lieutenant Governor to make additional regulations governing the handling of bodies of 
persons who have died of a communicable disease and local medical officers to order 
isolation and treatment.  It also addresses enforcement and penalties for persons who 
contravene an order or regulation. 
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Under the Health Protection and Promotion Act, a local medical officer of health 
(who must be a physician, has the requisite qualifications to hold the position, and is 
appointed by the Minister of Health)176 is vested with considerable authority with regard 
to communicable disease management.  This authority may be executed through the use 
of a “written order,” by which the medical officer of health may “require a person (or a 
class of persons) to take or to refrain from taking any action that is specified in the order 
in respect of a communicable disease.”177  A medical officer of health’s use of a written 
order to compel a person is discretionary, not obligatory.  The use of a written order 
under these circumstances is conditioned upon reasonable and probable grounds, that (1) 
a communicable disease exists or may exist, or that there is an immediate risk of an 
outbreak of a communicable disease within the medical officer of health’s jurisdiction; 
(2) the communicable disease presents a risk to the health of persons within the medical 
officer of health’s jurisdiction; and (3) the requirements specified in the written order (to 
which requirements the person who is subject to the order must conform) are necessary to 
mitigate the health risk posed by the communicable disease.178 
 
A medical officer of health’s written order may include isolation from other 
persons (note that the term “quarantine” is not used in the Health Protection and 
Promotion Act) and medical examination by a physician for purposes of determining 
communicable disease status.  An order may also contain an instruction to act so as not to 
expose other persons to infection.179 For persons with a “virulent disease,”180 care and 
treatment by a physician may be required.  The Health Care Consent Act of  1996, which 
generally prohibits the administration of treatment in the absence of a patient’s consent, 
does not apply to a physician’s examination or care and treatment of a person pursuant to 
a written order.181 
 
 A medical officer of health’s written order may be directed to persons who reside 
or are present at or own or occupy certain premises or are engaged in or administer an 
enterprise or activity in a health unit served by the medical officer of health.182  An order 
may be directed to a class of persons instead of each member of a class of persons, but 
notice of the order must be provided to each class member where the provision of such a 
notice is practicable and can be carried out in a reasonable amount of time.183  If 
providing a written order to each individual is likely to cause a delay that could 
significantly increase the risk to the health of any person, then a general notice to the 
class may be provided through any “appropriate” communications media and posted at a 
location “most likely to bring the notice to the attention” of members of the class.184  
Parents or legal guardians must ensure compliance with orders directed to their children 
or wards who are less than 16 years of age.185 
 
Orders must contain sufficient information so that members of the class 
understand that the order is directed to them, including: the reason for the order; the terms 
or requirements of the order, including the period within, by or for which compliance 
with the order is required; and information about where inquiries about the order may be 
directed, such as information about how to request a hearing.186  Persons to whom an 
order is directed, including members of a class who are the subject of an order, have a 
right to a hearing by the Board of Health under whose jurisdiction the medical officer of 
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health’s order was issued, but must request such a hearing in writing within 15 days of 
receiving the order.187  The Act provides additional details related to hearings, including 
requirements for extending a hearing, matters of evidence, and the appeal process.188    
 
In addition to serving an order, a medical officer of health may also require others 
to act with regard to a person who is the subject of the medical officer of health’s order.  
For example, a medical officer of health may direct persons who also work for or who are 
agents of the board of health for the medical officer of health’s jurisdiction to take such 
actions as the medical officer of health may determine are necessary, if the “medical 
officer of health is of the opinion, [based] upon reasonable and probable grounds, that a 
communicable disease exists” and the person who is the subject of the order (1) has 
refused to comply or is not complying with an order; (2) is not likely to promptly comply 
with an order; (3) cannot be readily identified or located and as a result the order would 
not be promptly carried out; or (4) requests the assistance of the medical officer of 
health.189 
 
Special provisions may apply where persons fail to comply with orders with 
regard to the specifically enumerated virulent diseases.   These circumstances would 
include a person’s: (1) failure to isolate himself or herself and remain in isolation from 
other persons; (2) failure to submit to a medical examination; (3) failure to place himself 
or herself under the care and treatment of a physician; or (4) failure to conduct himself or 
herself in such a manner as to avoid exposing another person to infection. 190 In such a 
case, a medical officer of health may apply to the Ontario Court of Justice for an order 
that the person be taken into custody and detained in a hospital or other facility; be 
examined by a physician to determine if the person is infected with a virulent disease; 
and, if found to be infected, be treated for the disease.191  It is interesting to note that a 
judge may not name a specific hospital or other facility in an order unless the court is 
satisfied that the hospital or facility is able to provide the requisite detention, care, and 
treatment.192  Applications to the court automatically stay or halt proceedings regarding 
the same matter before the Board of Health until the judge has disposed of the 
application.193 
 
An order made pursuant to section 35 of the Act provides “any person” (which 
term is not further defined or clarified) with the authority to locate and apprehend a 
person who is the subject of the order, or to deliver such a person to a hospital or facility 
named in the order.194  The order may also be provided to a law enforcement agency for 
purposes of locating, apprehending, and delivering the person who is the subject of the 
order.195  Without specifically indicating the class of persons to whom such authority is 
granted (but presumably meaning health care providers), an order issued under section 35 
also provides the authority to “detain,” “care for,” “examine,” and “treat the person” 
subject to the order consistent with “generally accepted medical practice.”196 
 
The period of detention and treatment specified in an order may not exceed four 
months.197  However, if, upon motion by the medical officer of health, a court is satisfied 
that a person continues to be infected by a virulent disease and that the person’s discharge 
would present “a significant risk to the health of the public,” a judge of the Ontario 
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Superior Court may by order extend a period of detention and treatment, including 
subsequent periods of detention and treatment, for up to four months.198  The Act 
provides that a person detained based upon a court order shall be released upon receipt of 
a medical officer of health’s certificate authorizing release, and such a certificate must be 
issued as soon as the medical officer of health is “of the opinion that the person is no 
longer infected with a virulent disease or that release will not present a significant risk to 
public health.”199  As with a written order prepared by a medical officer of health, the 
Health Care Consent Act, which generally prohibits the administration of treatment in the 
absence of a patient’s consent, does not apply to a court order made under section 35.200  
 
An order issued by a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice may be appealed to the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice; however, the appeal does not stay (or halt) the lower 
court’s order unless a judge of the Superior Court of Justice so decides.201  In turn, a 
decision on a question of law made by the Superior Court of Justice may be appealed by 
any party to the lower court proceeding to the Ontario Court of Appeal, but no leave for 
the appeal may be granted unless a judge of the Court of Appeal determines that granting 
a leave is “essential in the public interest or for the due administration of justice.”202 
 
Finally, the Health Protection and Promotion Act provides sanctions.  Any person 
who fails to obey an order made under the Act, or otherwise contravenes a regulation 
promulgated under the Act, is guilty of an offense, and is liable upon conviction to a fine 
of not more than $5000 (Canadian) for every day or part of a day on which the offense 
occurs or continues.203 
 
British Columbia, the Canadian province with the second highest number of 
probable or suspect SARS cases (n=50, with 4 probable cases and 46 suspect cases), had 
many fewer SARS cases than did Ontario.  No other province had any probable SARS 
cases.  Alberta, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Saskatchewan had among 
them a dozen or so suspect cases.204  Because of the similarity of these provinces’ public 
health laws to those of Ontario, we have omitted any discussion of these provinces’ legal 
authority for quarantine and isolation. Nonetheless, each of the Canadian provinces’ laws 
on matters related to public health, including regulations, provide provincial and local 
public health officials with the means to isolate and essentially quarantine persons with 
certain communicable diseases within their respective jurisdictions.   
 
  c. Local level 
 
Local governments below the provincial level, such as municipal governments, 
may also be authorized by provincial law under certain conditions to act in the interest of 
public health.  For example, the government of Ontario, under the Municipal Act, 2001, 
provides that “a municipality may regulate matters not specifically provided for by this 
[Municipal] Act or any other Act for purposes related to the health, safety and well-being 
of the inhabitants of the municipality.”205  This is done largely through the use of “by-
laws” passed by municipal (city) councils, sometimes upon the advice of municipal 
executive officers or entities.  However, the Municipal Act only came into force on 
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January 1, 2003, and it is not clear that any municipality in Ontario has taken action 
pursuant to this statute.   
 
Other relevant law empowers specific municipalities.  The City of Toronto Act, in 
addition to establishing the powers of the various governmental entities of the City of 
Toronto, provides for the establishment of Toronto’s Board of Health and its jurisdiction, 
which is deemed a board of health established under Ontario’s Health Protection and 
Promotion Act.206  The City of Toronto Act also requires the Toronto City Council to 
establish the Board’s size through by-law and provide the Board with the staff, including 
public health nurses, necessary to carry out its functions.207  Those functions are 
established in the Health Protections and Promotion Act.208    
 
 4. SARS Response 
 
 a. Amendments to laws and guidance documents 
 
On June 12, 2003, SARS was added to the Quarantine Act’s schedule of 
infectious and contagious diseases, together with an established incubation period, 
thereby bringing SARS cases within the ambit of federal public health authority.209  As 
described above, the Act provides the Minister of Health with a multitude of powers 
related to the control of infectious disease.  One important means of exercising public 
health authority in the wake of the SARS outbreak was to develop, coordinate, and 
provide specific guidance for both public and private entities, including public health 
workers and health professionals, in identifying and managing SARS cases and related 
health matters within their jurisdictions.  At the federal level, the Department of Health 
has developed a large number of guidance documents intended to assist both public and 
private entities respond to specific SARS-related health matters.  These include the 
following: definition of persons under SARS investigation;210 definition of a SARS 
case;211 interim guidelines for public health authorities in the management of probable 
and suspect SARS cases;212 definitions of geo-linked persons for hospital surveillance for 
SARS;213 public health protocol for persons meeting the “geo-linked person” 
definition;214 recommended laboratory testing for probable SARS cases and SARS 
contact cases;215 advisory for laboratory biosafety;216 guidelines for health care providers 
in the identification, diagnosis, and treatment of adults with SARS;217 guidelines for the 
use of respirators (masks) among health care workers;218 and recommendations and 
guidelines for public health officials for managing probable or suspect SARS cases 
among air travelers.219 
 
On April 1, 2003, British Columbia amended its Health Act Communicable 
Disease Regulation by means of an order-in-Council, adding SARS to the regulation’s 
schedule of reportable communicable diseases.220  The province of Newfoundland and 
Labrador has a similar Communicable Diseases Act, and has also recently added SARS 
to the regulation’s schedule of communicable diseases.221  By most appearances, the 
different provincial and local governments’ responses have been proportionate to the 
prevalence of SARS cases within their respective jurisdictions, with little evidence of 
formal government activity in provinces or municipalities with no SARS cases.  In 
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contrast to other provincial and local governments—with the exception of British 
Columbia and to a lesser extent Alberta—only Ontario and the municipality of Toronto 
have had to invoke their public health authority in a significant and large-scale manner to 
respond to the SARS outbreak within their jurisdictions.   
 
There are many examples of efforts to provide guidance at the provincial and 
federal levels.  In Ontario, the Ministry of Health and Long Term Care developed and 
distributed: a memorandum to hospital administrators regarding reportable disease 
requirements, including the reporting of SARS cases;222 a screening tool for all patients 
entering health care facilities, including a Chinese language version;223 a clinical decision 
guide for community clinicians in the diagnosis of SARS;224 directives and procedures 
for community health care agencies and other health care providers;225 and transition 
directives and procedures for acute care facilities, addressing matters such as screening, 
protective equipment, visitors, and physical plant.226  Other, extensive SARS-related 
information was made available to health professionals and the public through provincial 
and municipal government web sites, including web sites for the Ontario Ministry of 
Health,227 the Municipality of Toronto’s Board of Health,228 and Toronto’s Department of 
Community and Neighbourhood Services (which subsumes Toronto’s Public Health 
Service).229   
 
In British Columbia, the Office of the Provincial Health Officer and a provincial 
SARS Scientific Committee developed and distributed: guidelines for managing SARS 
cases in acute care settings;230 a list of frequently asked questions together with detailed 
answers about SARS;231 and guidelines for infection control in the use of respiratory 
equipment.232  Similar to Ontario, other SARS-related information was made available by 
both provincial and municipal governments in British Columbia to health professionals 
and the public through web sites, including web sites for the British Columbia Ministry 
of Health Planning,233 the British Columbia Centre for Disease Control,234 and 
Vancouver Coastal Health (the municipality of Vancouver’s public health authority, 
including the Vancouver Health Board).235 
 
  b. Use of quarantine and isolation 
 
On March 25, 2003, in the face of a rising number of SARS cases in the Toronto 
area, the Ontario government took the critical step of designating SARS as a reportable, 
communicable, and virulent disease under the province’s Health Protection and 
Promotion Act, which authorized public health authorities to issue orders to detain and 
isolate persons for purposes of preventing SARS transmission.236  Eventually, about 
30,000 persons in Toronto were quarantined.  That number is similar to the number of 
persons who were quarantined due to the SARS outbreak in Beijing, China, but for the 
latter the number of probable SARS cases (2,500) was ten times larger than Toronto’s 
(about 250).237 
 
Health facilities.  The first use of isolation in Toronto occurred early in the SARS 
outbreak, when the physician treating the index case’s son, Mr. T, had Mr. T placed in 
hospital isolation for suspected tuberculosis (at no time before Mr. T’s death was his 
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SARS established) and requested that other family members isolate themselves at home 
as they, too, might be at risk for tuberculosis infection.238 Unfortunately, these control 
measures occurred too late to contain the spread of SARS in Toronto.  Mr. T, who had 
entered Scarborough Hospital through the emergency department, was left in the 
emergency department for 18-20 hours despite a physician’s hospital admission order, 
and only later admitted to the hospital’s Intensive Care Unit (ICU).  When he was finally 
examined by a physician, a tuberculosis isolation order was issued and Toronto Public 
Health was notified as a routine matter of a possible tuberculosis case.239  During Mr. T’s 
long wait in the Scarborough Hospital emergency department for admission to the ICU 
and his short time in the ICU before tuberculosis was suspected, other patients and staff 
were exposed to SARS.  At the time there was no indication that these individuals were at 
risk of contracting or spreading any communicable disease, let alone SARS.240 
 
When tuberculosis was ruled out and public health officials and physicians began 
to understand the implications of Mr. T’s case, steps were taken to remove other 
members of Mrs. K’s family, some of whom were reporting illness, to negative pressure 
isolation rooms in other area hospitals.  These steps undoubtedly limited the spread of 
SARS.241  Combining the information from the WHO’s international health alert for 
atypical pneumonia with reports of the Scarborough Hospital cases, both Toronto Public 
Health and provincial public health authorities activated their emergency response plans.  
A “Code Orange” (which required all area hospitals to go into emergency mode) was 
issued, under which area hospitals were required to suspend non-essential services, limit 
visitors, issue protective equipment for staff, and establish special isolation units for 
“potential SARS patients.”242  Asymptomatic contacts of SARS patients were not isolated 
within health facilities, but were asked to adhere to a 10-day home quarantine.243 
 
The risk of acquiring SARS was greatest for persons (staff, patients, and visitors) 
within rather than outside of health care facilities, including doctors’ offices; health care 
workers accounted for over 40% of all SARS patients in Toronto.244  Tragically, the early 
SARS patients who were seen in health care facilities were simply not identified in time 
to implement more rigorous infection control procedures.  Moreover, it is not clear that 
health care workers were always provided with uniform or consistent advice or guidelines 
regarding the quarantine or isolation of persons with or suspected of having SARS, that 
adequate protective equipment was provided to health care workers within these hospital 
or clinic settings, or that health care administrators or workers were diligent about 
adhering to infection control precautions or procedures.245  Concerns about a lack of 
uniform guidance for quarantine were expressed by an ad hoc Scientific Advisory 
Committee of volunteer experts, which found that “different public health units seemed 
to have different thresholds for the use of quarantine.”246 
 
  Directives issued by Ontario health authorities instructed hospitals to isolate all 
patients with fever and respiratory symptoms in the hospital or in the hospital emergency 
department until SARS had been ruled out.  Most hospitals took special precautions for 
inpatients with respiratory symptoms suggestive of infectious diseases.  In Phase I of the 
Toronto SARS outbreak (March 13-25, 2003), over 20 Toronto area hospitals admitted 
and cared for SARS patients.  No single facility was designated as a “SARS hospital,” 
 56
because both provincial and Toronto area officials feared that such a step would 
overwhelm the facility so designated.  For this reason, capacity for SARS clinical 
management, including isolation of SARS patients and adequate infection control 
measures, was built into multiple facilities throughout the Greater Toronto area.  Two 
hospitals (Sunnybrook and Woman’s) in the Greater Toronto area appeared to carry the 
largest volume of SARS patients during Phase I.  Unfortunately, many of these two 
hospitals’ physicians with relevant expertise or experience in SARS clinical management 
were themselves ill or in quarantine.  Despite the hospitals’ requests for staff support, 
other Toronto area hospitals were either unable or unwilling to provide assistance.  
Needed support was obtained only after provincial authorities retained a private 
placement agency to help with recruitment of health care workers.   
 
 In Phase II of the Toronto SARS outbreak (May 23-June 30, 2003), four hospitals 
(later termed the SARS Alliance) were designated as SARS facilities.  The “Code 
Orange” described above for Toronto area hospitals was later extended to all Ontario 
hospitals, meaning they, too, were required to suspend non-essential services, limit 
visitors, create isolation units for SARS patients, and issue protective equipment (gowns, 
masks, and goggles) for exposed staff.  Some concern was expressed over whether the 
Code Orange was justified or overly broad.247 
 
 Airports, ports and other entry points.  No persons in transit into or out of Canada 
were actually quarantined or isolated, although clearly the federal government has the 
authority to take such measures in appropriate cases.  In 2002, Health Canada transferred 
its airport quarantine responsibilities to the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, but at 
the time of the SARS outbreak, neither Health Canada nor the Customs and Revenue 
Agency appeared prepared to discharge their quarantine responsibilities under the federal 
Quarantine Act Regulations, which soon after the SARS outbreak in Canada had been 
amended to include SARS.248  For ships, particularly cruise ships, Health Canada’s 
protocol for handling SARS cases was not released until mid-June, after the SARS 
outbreak had begun to fade. 
 
 SARS screening for airline passengers took place at Canadian airports, but this 
screening relied primarily upon information cards that were distributed to and completed 
by both incoming and outbound passengers.  In-person screening questions and 
secondary assessments were conducted only as needed.  Thermal scanners were used in a 
pilot project at the Toronto and Vancouver (British Columbia) airports.  As of August 27, 
2003, 6.5 million screening transactions had taken place at Canadian airports, with about 
9,100 passengers referred for further SARS assessment by screening nurses or quarantine 
officers.  None of the passengers who underwent further assessment was found to meet 
the criteria for a probable or suspect SARS case.  The pilot thermal scanner screened 2.4 
million passengers, with 832 referred for further assessments, and none met the criteria 
for a probable or suspect SARS case.  
 
Workplace and home quarantine.  In Toronto, home and workplace quarantines 
were often imposed for what were definitive “contact” cases, meaning cases in which 
persons were known to have been in close physical proximity to a probable SARS case 
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with inadequate or no protection from possible exposure.  Contact cases included family 
and household members of SARS patients, hospital visitors and other non-SARS patients 
within hospitals who may have been exposed to SARS patients, health care staff who 
provided treatment to SARS patients without adequate protective equipment, and persons 
at workplaces who may have been exposed to co-workers with SARS.  Provided they 
were timely identified and contacted, these persons were urged to remain at home for a 
10-day period, with monitoring, usually by telephone, by a local public health worker. 
 
 5. Coordination Issues 
 
It should be noted that once the provincial emergency was declared by the Ontario 
Prime Minister’s office, provincial authorities assumed the lead for delivery of all main 
SARS messages to the public.  However, this public information function was often 
delegated by provincial authorities to the Toronto municipal government.  One concern 
among some commentators was that there were too many “talking heads,” including 
government officials, whose opinions on the SARS outbreak appeared to diverge.  
According to these critics, there often appeared to be no coherent official or 
governmental communications strategy aimed at “dispelling the sense of deepening 
crisis” posed by the SARS outbreak.  Interestingly, one of the most apt characterizations 
of the capacity of the federal and provincial governments to work collectively in their 
response to the SARS outbreak was provided by the Canadian federal government: 
 
Only weak mechanisms exist in public health for collaborative decision 
making or systematic data sharing across governments.  Furthermore, 
governments have not adequately sorted out their roles and responsibilities during 
a national health crisis.  The SARS outbreak has highlighted many areas where 
inter-jurisdictional collaboration is suboptimal; so far from being seamless, the 
public health system showed a number of serious gaps.249 
 
Given the acknowledged deficiencies in cross-jurisdictional coordination in the 
response to the SARS outbreak, it is quite likely that the coordination with the 
international community and the U.S. with respect to the SARS outbreak could likewise 
be considered suboptimal.  As the report further noted, it “is unlikely that most other 
provinces [aside from Ontario] are in a better position, and the federal capacity to support 
one or more provinces facing simultaneous health crises is limited.”250 
 
  6. Public Reaction 
 
 The federal, provincial, and local governments used a variety of means to convey 
up-to-date information regarding the SARS outbreak to the public, as well as to health 
professionals.  Features of the public health education and communication measures 
taken by the government generally and by public health authorities specifically included 
regular updates to their own websites.251  Additionally, Toronto Public Health established 
a SARS Hotline.  Hotline staff, primarily public health nurses, provided callers with 
health information and counseling and case and contact identification, and the recognition 
and follow-up of emerging issues in SARS-affected institutions and communities.  At the 
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height of the outbreak the Hotline had 46 staff on the day shift and 34 staff on the 
evening shift, including individuals with special language skills.  The Hotline received 
over 300,000 calls between March 15 and June 24, 2003, with a peak of 47,567 calls in a 
single day.  Most calls were complex, with three or more issues identified per call, 
including self reports of illness or SARS contact, needed access to emergency supplies of 
food, masks, and other supplies, and concerns about loss of income, loss of housing, and 
business failure.252  In addition, the agency convened local community meetings and 
conducted other community outreach to address specific concerns in schools, workplaces, 
and among community groups.   
 
 Toronto Public Health translated updated SARS information into 14 languages 
and posted this information on the City of Toronto’s official web site.  Both Health 
Canada and the Ontario Ministry of Health also set up and maintained web sites for the 
dissemination of SARS-related information for members of the public and health 
professionals.  In British Columbia, SARS-related information was made available to 
both the public and health professionals through web sites for the British Columbia 
Ministry of Health Planning, the British Columbia Centre for Disease Control, and the 
Vancouver Coastal Health authority.   
 
 Both federal (the Quarantine Act) and provincial laws (e.g., Ontario’s Health 
Protection and Promotion Act, British Columbia’s Health Act) regarding quarantine 
and/or isolation authorize—and may even require—law enforcement agencies to assist 
public health authorities to effect the quarantine and/or isolation of persons subject to 
quarantine orders.  During the SARS outbreak in Toronto, law enforcement personnel 
were used to enforce the quarantine of patients with SARS at area hospitals, serve orders 
as needed, and conduct “spot checks” on persons who were quarantined.  On at least one 
occasion, law enforcement personnel were also used to investigate and try to apprehend 
and charge a person who broke quarantine and subsequently infected a co-worker, but the 
person died from the illness.  Almost all persons who were asked to submit to quarantine 
did so voluntarily.  In only 27 cases was a written order mandating quarantine issued 
under Ontario’s Health Protection and Promotion Act. 
 
Certain actions taken by the federal and provincial governments may have had the 
effect of increasing public acceptance of SARS-control measures.  For example, the 
federal government has amended its employment insurance regulations under the 
Employment Insurance Act to remove the waiting period for sickness benefits for certain 
persons placed under SARS quarantine, as well as to remove the requirement that certain 
persons under SARS quarantine obtain a medical certificate as a condition of receiving 
sickness benefits.253  The federal government also provided special employment 
insurance coverage for health care workers who were unable to work because of SARS 
and who were not otherwise eligible for benefits under the government’s Employment 
Insurance Act, as well as tax and mortgage payment relief to persons who were facing 
difficulties making tax or mortgage payments because of SARS.254  The Ontario 
government enacted the SARS Assistance and Recovery Strategy Act,255 which provides 
certain qualified persons with unpaid leave in the event the person is unable to work due 
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to a SARS-related event, such as being under individual medical investigation or having 
to provide care for or assistance to a person due to a SARS-related matter. 
 
 7. Current Situation 
 
The use of quarantine and isolation measures in Toronto cannot be characterized 
as a uniform, coordinated (and perhaps optimal) response to the SARS outbreak, which is 
not surprising given the highly decentralized way in which public health functions in 
Canada are organized.  The recently released federal Canadian government report 
mentioned earlier, Learning from SARS: Renewal of Public Health Canada, appears to 
confirm this, stating, “[t]he SARS experience illustrated that Canada is not adequately 
prepared to deal with a true pandemic.”256  The report suggests comprehensive, large-
scale reorganization of public health systems within Canada, including the prospect of 
establishing a national, federal public health agency with the requisite authority to 
respond to disease outbreaks and emergencies similar to SARS, and with appropriate 
linkages to other government departments and agencies engaged in public health 
activities.257  However, concerning public health activities at the local level, it is argued 
by officials of Toronto Public Health that at least with respect to Toronto, the “isolation 
of people who were symptomatic with SARS (i.e., “cases”) served to protect the public 
from infection by separating those who were ill from those who were well.”258  The same 
might be said of the quarantine of persons who were not symptomatic with SARS but 




B. China (People’s Republic of China) 
   
  1. Introduction 
 
 The first case of what was reported among scientists as “atypical pneumonia,” 
later determined through blood and other diagnostic tests done in 2003 to be severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS), occurred in China in Guangdong Province on November 
22, 2002, in the city of Foshan.259   The second case occurred in the city of Heyuan on 
December 17, 2002.  The third case was in Zhongshan on December 26, 2002.  The first 
official report to public health officials of an atypical pneumonia was not made until 
January 21, 2003.  It is not clear if any report was sent to the central government as this 
was near the time of the Chinese New Year. At this point, over half the clinically 
recognized cases (13) in Zhongshan were among health care workers.  The further 
development of the SARS epidemic in China will be described in Section 4 below. 
 
 To learn from the use of quarantine and isolation in the PRC during the outbreak 
of SARS, it is necessary to understand the legal structure supporting the public health 
system.  Three contextual factors are especially significant.  First, the population density 
of the PRC has a dramatic impact on living conditions.  As of 2001, the population of the 
PRC was nearly 1.2 billion people living in a land area about the size of Canada that has, 
by comparison, 31.5 million people.  From a public health perspective, this population 
density means that most individuals in the PRC live in multiple-family dwellings.  
Beijing, where over 50% of the cases of SARS were reported, has a population of nearly 
13 million.  As a result, “When one talks about China, the numbers will always appear 
large, particularly to Westerners raised in the United States.”260 
  
 Second, the legal system of modern China is closer to the legal systems of France, 
Italy, or Germany than the common law-based legal systems of the United States, 
Canada, and England.  In addition, the legal structure governing public health in the PRC 
was refined under a peculiar form of socialism that is undergoing change.  Drawing 
“lessons learned” from the PRC requires an understanding of comparative law, an 
admittedly under-developed area in American legal education and public health law 
practice.    
  
 Third, globalization, particularly over the past quarter of a century, has caused the 
legal system and the public health infrastructure of the PRC to change.  Under the 
socialist regime led by Mao Tse-tung, the PRC made considerable efforts to deal with the 
conditions leading to the spread of infectious diseases such as cholera.  From 1946-1976, 
life expectancy increased from 35 years to 68 years without any appreciable increase in 
per capita income.  Market-oriented reforms during the 1980s and 1990s led to increased 
wealth and some dramatic improvements in health status.  For instance, during the 1990s, 
the infant mortality rate in urban areas dropped from 17.3 to 11.8 per 1,000.  Health 
status has also improved in rural areas, although the rural population suffers from general 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the urban population.  For example, between 1991 and 2000, the 
drop in the infant morality rate in rural areas was from 58.0 to 37.7.  At the same time, 
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these market-oriented reforms have also led to income inequalities comparable to the 
United States that translate into insecure or inadequate access to health care for much of 
the population.  The percentage of employment-based health insurance declined from 
68% to 53% in urban areas from 1993-1998.  In rural areas, insurance coverage that had 
been based on a collectivist economy nearly collapsed in the 1980s.  Only 8% of the rural 
population had health insurance by 1998.  While gains in health status and wealth have 
enhanced the capacity of the PRC to deal effectively with many infectious diseases, it 
now faces the challenge of dealing with chronic conditions among its population.261 
              
2. Political and Legal Systems 
  
 In the case of the PRC, familiarity with recent changes in the legal culture is key 
to understanding the current political and legal situation.  There was no formal 
organization of lawyers in the PRC as recently as 1959.  The Ministry of Justice had been 
abolished, and those few law schools remaining open following various political 
upheavals after 1949 could best be characterized as state sponsored schools of political 
administration.  The few students enrolled in these so-called law schools received very 
little in the way of professional legal training because law was viewed, at the time, as 
irrelevant to the future of the PRC.  The reestablishment of legal institutions was part of 
the economic, political, and cultural transformation taking place in the PRC in the 1980s. 
 
 The government began to reassemble the legal system in 1979.  The Ministry of 
Justice was re-established and law schools were re-opened.  Over 20 universities and 
institutes offered some form of four-year undergraduate legal training by 1982.  A 
massive codification project paralleled the re-opening and redevelopment of law schools.  
A seven-year process of discussion and study involving jurists and political officials led 
to the adoption of a Code of Civil Procedure in 1986.  A host of new substantive codes 
were enacted: the Marriage Law (1980); Economic Contract Law (1981); Trademark 
Law (1982); Patent Law (1984); and Inheritance Law (1985).262  The basic public health 
statute that provided the framework for the response to SARS, the Prevention and 
Treatment of Infectious Disease Law, discussed in detail in Section 3, was enacted in 
1989.  
 
 International law was a major focus of legal scholars and legal reforms during the 
early 1980s.263  A planning conference on the study of law listed international law as a 
priority area for China in March 1979.   Not a single article on international law was 
published in China in 1979; over 100 articles were published by 1984, and 20 senior 
Chinese jurists collaborated in publishing a definitive textbook on international law in 
1981.  This build up of legal capacity was important as the PRC began in the 1980s to 
participate in international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank.  An indication of China’s growing reliance on law and legal institutions 
during 1980s to deal with its future, as well as forces outside of China, is illustrated by 
the negotiations with Great Britain over the future of Hong Kong in 1983 and 1984.   
 
 The government of the PRC rests on a four-fold division at each of three 
hierarchical levels: national or central government, provincial government, and local 
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units.   This structure has significant impact on how political and legal authority is 
distributed and implemented.  This method of organizing governmental functions should 
be understood on its own terms, with no assumption that there are precise equivalents in 
China to the familiar legislative, executive, and judicial functions.  The importance of this 
point will become clear in the analysis of the government’s exercise of control over the 
movement of persons, goods, animals, and the provisions of services in the name of 
public health.   
 
 The national government consists of four institutions—the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), the State Council, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate—that are woven into a system of authority by provisions of the 
Constitution and statutes of the PRC.  The NPC theoretically has ultimate legislative 
authority, including the power to amend the Constitution.  This body, consisting of 
approximately 2,000 representatives, only meets once a year for two or three weeks.264  
During these yearly sessions, the NPC can enact basic statutory provisions governing the 
country.  The Standing Committee has the authority to “amend” laws enacted by the NPC 
and to enact other forms of legislation, but not to amend the Constitution.   As a 
subsidiary body of the NPC, the Standing Committee’s legislative enactments are likely 
to be in accordance with the prevailing wishes of the NPC.  The major codes of the 1980s 
were enacted through a combination of actions by the Standing Committee and the NPC.  
The Standing Committee enacted the Prevention and Treatment of Infectious Disease 
Law in 1989.  
  
 The State Council, headed by the Premier, is the major administrative arm of the 
central government.  The various ministries, such as the ministries of Health, Justice, and 
Public Security, are part of the State Council.  Within the framework of statutes enacted 
by the NPC or the Standing Committee, these ministries have the authority to enact 
regulations governing their respective areas of responsibility.    
 Judicial authority is lodged in the Supreme People’s Court in two forms.  First is 
the power to interpret what the law means in a particular case before the court.  Second is 
the power to give advisory opinions to provide guidance to lower courts.  On the one 
hand, some advisory opinions might limit the authority of lower courts to act, and thus 
remove constraints on individual actions.  On the other hand, this advisory power could 
be used to strengthen the power of state entities, as was the case during the SARS 
outbreak (see Section 4 below).   
 There are no provisions in the Constitution specifically authorizing courts to 
protect the “rights” of individuals against the state.  An individual’s ability to challenge a 
state ruling or action is governed by statutory enactments, rather than constitutional 
documents.  Under the Administrative Procedure Law enacted by the NPC in 1989, 
courts can examine the legality of certain administrative actions.  Article 2 of that statute 
specifically provides for a citizen or a legal corporation to challenge a concrete action of 
a governmental body, but the citizen or the corporation cannot challenge the 
administrative regulations.  
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 The Procuratorate, the fourth institution in the PRC system, was re-established by 
the Constitution of 1982 as an independent entity for supervising a number of 
governmental functions: (1) prosecuting crimes; (2) supervising the police and prisons; 
(3) representing the government in civil and administrative matters; (4) protecting the 
right of individuals to lodge complaints against state officials who violate the law as well 
as deal with citizen accusations against fellow citizens; and (5) appealing sentences and 
verdicts in criminal cases.   Conceptually, the Procuratorate is viewed as being 
independent of the Ministry for Public Security, the major law enforcement agency or 
police, for instance, and must carefully investigate before it acts.  In theory, the 
Procuratorate collaborates with other agencies, such as the police, even though the 
Procuratorate has responsibility for determining the legality of the actions of those 
agencies.  The authority to prosecute crimes is thus not an executive function, as it might 
be viewed in a common law system, but a purely legal function.265  The broad public 
functions of the Procuratorate in the government allowed it to participate along with the 
Supreme People’s Court in an important ruling during the SARS outbreak. 
 
 These four institutions share legal authority at the central level based on the 
theory that the law is embodied in certain specific legislative enactments, be they statutes 
or constitutional provisions.  Individual rights as such are given appropriate legal 
protection by ensuring that government action adheres to legal requjuirement. Thus, the 
notion of equality of all citizens before the law exists in the Chinese legal system, 
supported by a formal constitutional provision, section 2 of Article 33.  The use of 
governmental authority to constrain the movement of individuals, goods, or animals is 
thus mediated by a balance of power between four institutions—with the fourth branch, 
the Procuratorate—having an obligation to work with the other three institutions.    
 
 The four-part division of political and legal authority is reproduced at the next 
level of government—the provincial level.  (For convenience, the level of government 
directly responsible to the central government is called the “provincial level” because the 
PRC’s 23 provinces are the principal entities at this level.  But it is important to note that 
four municipalities— Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Beijing—have the same legal 
authority as any one of the 23 provinces, and thus have their own legislative, judicial, 
administrative, and procuracy units. Furthermore, the five autonomous regions—Inner 
Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, and Ningxia—have a greater degree of control than 
the 23 provinces or the four municipalities, but nonetheless are thought of as being at the 
same level vis-à-vis the central government.  The relationship among these various units 
is hierarchical with authority flowing from the central government downwards.  Finally, 
the two special administrative units of Hong Kong and Macao have greater authority than 
the provinces.   
 
 The local level consists of entities akin to counties and cities within the provinces, 
and within the cities, districts.  Essentially, the horizontal structure of administrative 
agencies, legislative bodies, courts, and the Procuratorate is replicated at the local level.  
Some of the People’s Congresses at the local level appear to have legislative authority.  
Certain big cities clearly have legislative authority, including the capitals of the 
provinces, for example, the capital of Guangdong province, Guangzhou.  Some special 
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economic zones, such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and those big cities approved by the 
State Council, also have legislative authority.  Thus, when asking the question of what 
regulations might be in place to control infectious diseases, one should consider the level 
of regulations—central, provincial, or local. 
 
  3. Public Health Structure and Laws 
 
 The first principle underlying the structure of the Law on Prevention and 
Treatment of Infectious Disease of 1989 (Prevention and Treatment Law266) is that 
prevention and control methods are disease-specific.  Article 3 classifies diseases into 
three basic categories: Type A, the most deadly of infectious diseases historically in 
China, which includes pestilence and cholera; Type B, which includes serious infectious 
diseases, such as hepatitis, dysentery, typhoid fever and paratyphoid, AIDS, gonorrhea, 
syphilis, poliomyelitis, epidemic encephalitis B; and Type C, which includes 
tuberculosis, measles, leprosy, influenza, mumps, and rubella.267  Not surprisingly, when 
there is an A or B type epidemic, Articles 24 and 26 of the law provide for the use of 
emergency measures including the quarantine of people, goods, and transportation 
vehicles and the declaration of epidemic zones with special control measures.  At the 
most basic level, the first question for public health law analysis in the PRC is: what type 
of infectious disease is in need of control or prevention measures? 
 
 The second principle underlying the Prevention and Treatment Law is that the 
infectious disease categories are dynamic and subject to change.  Thus, Article 3 also 
provides mechanisms for changing the classification of a particular infectious disease.  
The State Council as a whole can change the classification of Type A diseases without 
having to go back to a legislative body.   The Ministry of Health, an agency within the 
State Council, has the authority to change the classifications of types B and C diseases.  
This built-in flexibility implies that for new infectious diseases, the question is: which 
instrument of government has the legal authority to classify the infectious disease?    
 
 More important, the legislation is based on the assumption that the relationship 
among the three tiers of government is hierarchical.  Thus, national legislation can 
impose duties on provincial and local health departments without encountering problems 
of federalism.  The general rules found in Chapter 1 contain specific provisions (in 
Article 7) making all units of government and all individuals subject to inspection and 
verification of infectious diseases by public health authorities.  Furthermore, under the 
same provisions, any individual or unit of government can report violations of the 
Prevention and Treatment Law or any regulations adopted under the Law’s authority.  
These broad obligations under the public health law are constrained by the system of 
disease classification and the provisions for actually announcing the existence of an 
epidemic. 
 
The remaining chapters contain provisions on the prevention of diseases (Chapter 
2); the mechanisms for reporting epidemic situations (Chapter 3); the control measures 
that can be taken (Chapter 4); the supervision of those measures (Chapter 5); penalties for 
violations (Chapter 6); and authority to adopt implementing regulations (Chapter 7).   
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Health care workers and those engaged in disease prevention are required to report 
infectious diseases to local health departments in accordance with the Ministry of 
Health’s regulations.  Local public health officials are required to report the existence of 
the infectious disease to the local government and the higher levels of health 
administration.268  Both health care workers and public health officials are prohibited 
from giving false information or concealing information regarding infectious diseases.269  
Violations of any of these reporting and disclosure obligations can lead to a variety of 
sanctions under Article 39.270  Once this information has been reported to the central 
government, the Ministry of Health can either announce the existence of an epidemic or 
authorize officials at lower levels to make the announcement.271  This level of detail for 
how public health information should flow is an example of the legal system’s adaptation 
to the complex hierarchical and horizontal political structure. 
 
 Quarantine and isolation of individuals with various types of infectious diseases, 
and those suspected of having those diseases, are authorized in Article 24.  There are 
specific provisions allowing the local government to restrict assemblies, to close 
factories, stores, and schools, and to temporarily confiscate residential dwellings in the 
event of a properly declared emergency or epidemic.272  Provincial governments have the 
authority to stop the movement of goods and people during a declared outbreak.273  The 
law even has provisions dealing with human resource requirements during an outbreak 
(Article 27), the handling of corpses infected with diseases (Article 28), and for requiring 
pharmaceutical companies to supply medicine in a timely fashion (Article 29).  A host of 
prevention measures are outlined in Chapter 2 (Articles 9-20) that include everything 
from vaccination to sewage and designation of special hospitals for the treatment of 
infectious diseases. 
 
 This elaborate set of provisions for prevention and control of infectious diseases 
also contains measures for enforcement, ranging from administrative penalties (Articles 
32-34 in Chapter 5) to fines and criminal sanctions (Articles 35-39 in Chapter 6).  Article 
40 allows the Ministry of Health and, by implication, its counterparts at the two lower 
levels of government, to engage in ongoing development of public health measures by an 
explicit provision authorizing the enactment of implementing regulations.  
 
 There have been several implementing regulations over the past decade that 
provide a sense of the range of regulatory activity at the central level of government.  The 
Ministry of Health issued regulations on the prevention and treatment of tuberculosis in 
1991, and on statistical reporting in 1992.  In general, the regulations provide a 
modernized legal infrastructure for implementing public health measures.  Whether the 
existing public health law structure was adequate to deal with a deadly infectious agent of 
unknown origins such as SARS remains open to debate.  It is clear that a host of public 
health laws were adopted in response to SARS.  On the one hand, one could surmise that 
political leadership in the PRC, perhaps in response to international pressure, considered 
the existing laws inadequate.  On the other hand, the existing public health laws provided 
the infrastructure for contact tracing and other control measures that helped to stop the 
spread of SARS in China.   It is thus possible that emerging microbial infections require a 
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new approach to public health law in China and elsewhere that builds on, but moves 
beyond, established measures. 
 
 Legal analysis with respect to China should not be limited to the national level.  A 
few provinces, such as Sichuan (1985), had some form of public health measures even 
before 1989.274  With the passage of the Prevention and Treatment Law in 1989, more 
provinces (Hebei, Jiangsu, and Heilongjiang) enacted regulations on infectious disease 
control.275  Other provincial level governments, such as the city of Tianjin, issued a 
special notice on epidemic situations requiring any citizen or public health staff member 
to report an outbreak of a disease of unknown origin.276  Shanghai passed the Punishment 
for Supervision of Infectious Diseases Prevention and Treatment Law in 1995 (amended 
and reissued in 1997); this provincial law sets the administrative punishment for 
violations of the national law.277  Finally, at the local level, a few cities passed measures 
in the 1990s designed to implement the Prevention and Treatment Law: Guangzhou City 
of Guangdong Province; Hefei and Bangbu City of Anhui Province; Guiyang of Guizhou 
Province; Qingdao Municipality of Shandong Province; and Huhehote of Inner 
Mongolia.   
 
 Given the size of China, provincial and local measures to support public health 
measures exist in only a small percentage of the total number of provinces and local 
units.  It is impossible to determine if this small percentage is a function of lack of 
interest on the part of lower levels of government or the effective “preemption” of the 
field by the Prevention and Treatment Law.  The latter explanation seems most plausible, 
because the hierarchical legal structure allows for the central government to impose 
obligations on local officials and the basic public health statute is relatively recent.  It 
cannot be determined at this time whether this hierarchical and horizontal method of 
authorizing legal authority has enough flexibility for an infectious disease outbreak in 
modern China that now includes a major world transportation hub—Hong Kong.  
 
  4. Response to SARS 
 
 According to WHO, by July 14, 2003, there were reported cases of SARS in 
nearly every province and autonomous region in the PRC.  Only Hainan Province, 
Guizhou Province, Yunnan Province, Qinghai Province, Xinjiang, and Tibet Autonomous 
Regions did not report cases of SARS.278  Among those 26 provinces, Beijing, 
Guangdong Province, Shanxi Province, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Hebei 
Province, and Tianjin were the most heavily affected areas.  It is important to avoid 
“hindsight bias”279 in understanding the development and spread of SARS in China.   
  
 The investigation into the Zongshan outbreak led to several hypotheses by 
January 21, 2003.  First, the outbreak was caused by an unknown pathogen, probably of a 
viral nature.  Second, the disease was infectious, and family members and health care 
workers who had contact with an infected person were at the greatest risks.  Scientists 
investigating the outbreak in Zongshan recognized the importance of documenting how 
to treat and prevent the spread of the disease and recommended that a case reporting 
system for the unknown disease be established. 
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 Chinese scientists continued to engage in various methods of contact tracing and 
epidemiological studies in Guangdong Province.  On January 31, 2002, the eve of the 
Chinese New Year, the first case of the unknown illness outside of the hospital setting 
appeared in the city of Guangzhou.  Apparently this patient had visited Zongshan during 
the holiday travel period and was later determined to have infected more than 100 people 
before precautionary measures could be taken.  When this patient was admitted to a 
hospital on January 31, over 30 members of the medical staff were infected within 24 
hours.  When the patient was transferred to another hospital from February 1-8, he 
infected 26 members of that hospital staff before being transferred to the Guangzhou 
Infectious Disease Hospital, where apparently some precautions were taken to deal with a 
person with an infectious disease.  In the meantime, 19 family members and relatives of 
the patient became infected.  Between November 16, 2002 and February 9, 2003, there 
were 305 cases, later classified as SARS according to WHO standards, with five deaths.  
At the peak of the outbreak there were 50 new SARS cases reported on February 9, 30 
reported on February 12, and five reported on February 19, 2003.  It is possible that the 
declining figures were caused by precautions starting to arrest the spread of the disease. 
 
 Scientists from the University of Hong Kong began an investigation into the 
outbreak in Guangdong Province on February 11, 2003. (At about the same time, one of 
the physicians who had treated patients with the unknown illness in Guangdong Province 
made a trip to Hong Kong in order to attend a wedding.)  The research team started by 
asking whether there had been some type of transfer of the avian influenza (H5N1) virus 
to humans as in 1997.  The team obtained 18 patient samples on February 12, and an 
additional 22 patient samples on February 18.  These early efforts focusing on the H5N1 
influenza virus led to the isolation of the influenza virus in one Hong Kong family and in 
one of the later-determined SARS patients from Guangdong Province.  Although the 
scientists conducting the Guangdong Province investigation readily admit they failed to 
isolate the coronavirus, their efforts contributed to the work being done in Hong Kong 
and elsewhere.  These collaborative efforts eventually led to the isolation of the 
coronavirus in cell cultures from a nurse, hospital clerk, and physician.   
  
 Once the viral nature of the symptoms health care workers had been treating was 
established, the investigation turned to determining where this new coronavirus—a 
family of infections common among several domestic and wild animals and in humans—
came from.  The isolation of the genome of the virus through international scientific 
collaboration played an important role in the ability to work backwards from cases to the 
source(s). The following facts about the early cases supported the hypothesis that the 
virus originated in some wild animals: early cases developed independently, in five 
different cities in Guangdong Province; early patients were more likely to report living 
near agricultural markets, so called “wet markets,” where wild and domestic animals are 
slaughtered and sold as food; and 39% (9 of 23) of the early cases were individuals 
employed as food handlers in these markets. 
 
 Accordingly, eight different species of live domestic and wild animals being sold 
in markets in Shenzhen, a city in Guangdong Province, were tested on May 7, 2003.  Two 
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of the species were found to contain the same virus as the human patients.  Thus, this 
laboratory work in China, in conjunction with the work coordinated by the WHO, 
established a baseline of scientific knowledge about the disease, and more importantly 
what was not known about the disease.  With this growing level of knowledge (and 
uncertainty) about the nature of SARS, the Chinese were able to establish a number of 
specific control measures restricting the movement of individuals, goods, and animals in 
the spring of 2003.  Meanwhile, the disease had spread through the country, with Beijing 
having more than 5,000 cases of SARS. 
 
 The legal and political response to the spread of SARS was primarily national in 
scope.  After April 2003, a number of agencies within the State Council took actions to 
control the spread of SARS.   From a legal perspective, the most significant of these 
actions was the Ministry of Health’s approval of the listing of SARS as an infectious 
disease on April 8, 2003.280  As a result of this action by the Ministry of Health, all the 
provisions of the Prevention and Treatment Law could be used to control the spread of 
SARS through Decree 84 from the Ministry of Health.  That notice informed all public 
health departments and related agencies throughout the country of the listing of SARS 
and ordered the following four measures: (1) local governments should inspect and report 
the number of SARS cases on a daily basis and all medical institutions should take 
control measures when encountering patients suspected of having SARS; (2) SARS 
patients and those suspected of having SARS should be isolated for treatment and those 
having close contacts with either patients or suspects should be monitored; (3) the control 
measures under Article 24 of the Prevention and Treatment Law were authorized as 
necessary; (4) use of communication and education to achieve compliance with control 
measures was also authorized.  Given the vertical integration of health departments, this 
action by the Ministry of Health was the legal authority for all the measures taken to 
control SARS, including the use of quarantine and isolation. 
 
 After this notice and authorization, a number of other actions were taken by the 
central government.  The Ministries of Health, Finance, Railway, and Transportation and 
Civil Aviation took steps on April 12, 2003 to prevent the spread of SARS through the 
country’s transportation system.281   A government-issued notice instructed various 
governmental units to cooperate in order to prevent the spread of SARS through the 
transportation system.  The local governments, for instance, were instructed to establish 
quarantine stations at railway stations and airports for people suspected of having SARS.   
The transportation agencies were instructed to enact emergency procedures for handling 
SARS patients and those suspected of having SARS. Public health agencies were to 
provide the necessary training of the medical staffs and technical support to the local 
governmental and transportation officials.   Once a person with SARS was discovered in 
a vehicle or transportation station, those facilities and vehicles were to be disinfected 
immediately after the person or persons were removed.  Furthermore, the operators of the 
transportation systems were to discourage people with SARS from traveling and train 
their respective staffs about ways of preventing the spread of SARS. 
 
 The State Council enacted regulations for the Handling of Public Health 
Emergencies (Public Health Emergencies) on May 9, 2003.282  This ordinance differed 
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conceptually from the Prevention and Treatment Law, which sought to classify infectious 
diseases into three categories.  The Public Health Emergencies ordinance recognizes that 
public health situations can arise unexpectedly from mass food or occupational poisoning 
and other sources, and that diseases of unknown etiology exist.  Once an emergency as 
defined in the ordinance exists, the State Council and the provincial and local government 
must develop a coordinated approach to handling the emergency.   
 
 Provisions in the new ordinance referring specifically to “diseases of unknown 
origins” appear to reflect some of the “lessons learned” from the prior five months in 
China and elsewhere.  For instance, provincial and local governments were required to 
report the possible occurrence of infectious diseases of unknown origin to the central 
public health administration within one hour under Article 19.  Health care institutions 
were required to report to the appropriate level of government under Article 20.  Local 
government units were directed to investigate these reports under Article 22, as well as 
fulfilling their own obligations under Article 19.   Other provisions of the new ordinance 
require any unit of government or person to report the neglect of disease reporting duties 
by various instrumentalities of government under Article 24, as well as the neglect of 
obligations to provide timely information about the emergencies under Article 25. 
 
 This highly detailed set of provisions for dealing with emergencies, ideally based 
on the best scientific information available, is reinforced by a long list of sanctions for 
violations by public officials in Articles 45-52.  Failures of local public health officials to 
carry out their duties could lead to demotions or dismissals and to criminal charges in 
some limited circumstances.  Similar provisions establish possible sanctions for officials 
at the higher levels of government for dereliction of duties under the new ordinance. 
Health care and sanitation officials had a separate provision that allowed for the 
revocation of their licenses to practice as well as job sanctions and possible criminal 
sanctions (Article 50).  Finally, there were sanctions for failure to report and cooperate on 
the part of officials, and sanctions applicable to any person who spreads rumors, raises 
prices, or misleads customers during an emergency (Article 52). 
 
 The Ministry of Health used its authority under the ordinance on Public Health 
Emergencies and the Treatment and Prevention Law to take two important steps.  First, 
the Ministry issued a complex set of regulations dealing with the prevention and 
treatment of SARS.283  The effect of this regulation was to establish SARS, an infectious 
disease of unknown origins, as one of the statutory infectious diseases for which control 
measures are permissible.284  In addition to the measures regarding sanitation, there are 
several provisions dealing with health education and what is called “propaganda.”285  In 
this context, the term “propaganda” should be understood to be closer to its archaic 
meaning of “a group or movement organized for the spreading of ideas; a particular 
doctrine of systems of principles.”286  There is thus an entire chapter of the regulations 
(Articles 9-13) on reporting of SARS through the hierarchy of the government and the 
obligations on units of government and individuals to report information in a timely 
fashion and not to falsify any information about SARS.  These legal obligations are 
perhaps necessary in such a vast government with a massive population and are the 
backbone of the Prevention and Control Measures in Chapter III (Articles 14-22) and the 
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Treatment Measures in Chapter 4 (Articles 23-29).  Under the former, health care 
institutions are required to adopt control measures as soon as suspected cases of SARS 
appear at those facilities.287   Under the latter, health care facilities are required to treat 
without regard to the prospect of payment from a SARS patient or a person suspected of 
having SARS.288  These prevention and control measures, special treatment measures, 
and communication obligations for SARS are reinforced by the sanctions in Chapter 4 
(Articles 35-39). 
 
 Second, the Ministry of Health issued a set of standards on May 8, 2003, for 
defining persons with close contacts with SARS patients and thus subject to prevention 
and control measures.289  For instance, the standards for airplanes are different from the 
standards for trains, buses, railroads, and ships.  For airplanes, passengers within a certain 
number of rows are defined as having close contact, whereas on a ship, those sharing the 
same cabin are defined as having close contact.290  There are specific provisions for 
medical staffs, schools, cohabitants of SARS patients, and relatives and friends.291    
 
 The quarantine periods for those defined as having close contact is 14 days since 
the last contact with a patient or a suspected patient.   The notice provides a legal basis 
for what is called “collective quarantine” if the contact occurs after the patient 
demonstrates symptoms.  If the contact occurred before symptoms appeared, the person 
could be quarantined at home.   More significant are provisions for keeping records of 
those having contact with SARS patients in the transportation system and instructions to 
individuals with contacts with SARS patients to reduce their contacts with others and to 
take their temperature twice a day.          
 
 The Ministry of Health joined with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of 
Agriculture, National Development and Reform Commission, and National Population 
and Family Planning Commission to issue some special regulations for dealing with 
SARS in rural areas on May 20, 2003.292   These provisions, for instance, authorized the 
quarantining of entire villages in order to prevent the spread of the disease to other 
villages or towns, as occurred in Hebei Province from April 21 to May 13.  It is 
impossible to determine how effective such a quarantine order was, but a ruling by the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate and Supreme People’s Court allowed for the use of the 
police to enforce such quarantine orders. 
 
 On May 15, 2003, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Supreme People’s 
Court issued a judicial interpretation of how criminal law could be used by prosecutors 
and police to enforce the prevention and control measures established for emerging 
infectious diseases such as SARS. 293  The form of the ruling will appear to lawyers 
trained in a common law tradition as a set of regulations or codes, but given the statutory 
power of the Supreme Court and the inter-institutional role of the Purcuractory, the ruling 
establishes specific guidelines for when particular provisions of the criminal code can be 
used. For instance, infected persons or those suspected of having the disease who refuse 
voluntary isolation or quarantine can be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison under 
Article 114 of the Criminal Code if their spread of the pathogen is viewed as purposeful 
and endangers the public health.294  Even more stringent punishments are authorized for 
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those who sell fake prevention drugs or violate the national standards of medical 
production during an epidemic.295 Persons who obstruct state officials or Red Cross staff 
engaged in prevention and control activities, such as quarantine or forced isolation, can 
be imprisoned for up to three years.296    
 
 The controversial portion of Article 9, authorizing the death penalty in some 
instances, must be understood in the context of the statute.  Under Article 9, individuals 
who gather to engage in “beating, smashing, or looting” while measures to prevent and 
control the spread of an emerging infectious disease such as SARS are in place are 
subject to penalties increasing in severity with the seriousness of the offense.  The ring 
leaders of such “rioting”297 could be subject to the death penalty if their behavior 
otherwise constituted “capital murder” under the criminal code.  In other words, a person 
instigating a riot on a train quarantined during an epidemic might be sentenced to death if 
that person had destroyed property and used a gun to rob and kill someone during the 
disturbance.298  The more important point to remember is that this ruling provides 
guidance to prosecutors and the police for how to use the existing criminal code to 
enforce the public health measures taken to control and prevent the spread of SARS.    
 
 The number of instances in which law enforcement was actually involved in 
enforcement of the quarantine and isolation articles is difficult to determine without 
direct access to data in the PRC.  The enactment of regulations for emerging infections in 
May 2003 could represent an entirely new approach to public health law that creates 
some uncertainty as to how the various legal rules operate in practice.  The PRC may 
have adopted a two-tier approach towards control and prevention.  Were SARS to re-
emerge in the PRC, one would expect the May 2003 regulations to apply.  Once the 
nature of the disease and its cure and treatment are well established, the State Council and 
the Health Ministry might then classify the disease under the Prevention and Treatment 
Law of 1989.     
 
 By the end of May 2003, the central government had taken a number of steps to 
ensure that quarantine and isolation could be used to combat the spread of SARS.   The 
ruling from the Procuratorate and Supreme Court provided guidance to law enforcement 
officials on how to use the criminal law as a tool to enforce public health measures 
adopted by various state officials.  Acting first through the ministries under the State 
Council, all levels of government were, in theory, engaged in a systematic approach to 
control and prevent the outbreak of SARS.    
 
 It is perhaps not surprising that the provinces did little in terms of issuing formal 
regulations regarding SARS, given the exhaustive nature of the central government’s 
response.  Beijing—a municipality directly under the Central Government in the PRC—
did enact a number of regulations consistent with the national ordinances enacted by the 
State Council in the spring of 2003.  These include more detailed provisions for 
controlling the spread of SARS by restricting the movement of patients and suspected 
patients and establishing rules for quarantine and isolation measures for individuals 
coming in and out of the city.   Beijing, which had over 47% of all the cases of SARS in 
the country,299 also used its provincial authority to designate certain areas as isolation 
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areas for SARS.  According to the statistics provided by the Supervision Office of SARS 
Prevention and Control of Beijing City, 30,173 persons were isolated and quarantined in 
18 districts (counties) through June 21, 2003. Among them, 12,131 persons were isolated 
or quarantined collectively and 18,042 persons were isolated or quarantined individually.  
 
 From April 22 to the end of October 2003, four hospitals were isolated as 
seriously affected zones, People’s Hospital, Dongzhimen Hospital, Luhe Hospital of 
Tongzhou, and Herbalist Doctors’ Hospital.  Seven residential communities and buildings 
were totally isolated; two were residential buildings of the Beijing Science and 
Technology Research Institute, and the others were the residential community of People’s 
Hospital, Xita Building #29 of National Economics and Finance University (a student 
dormitory), the students’ residential building # ABC of Beifang Jiaotong University (now 
Beijing Jiaotong University),300 the residential courtyard #15 of Dongsishitiao, Gonghua 
Residential Community #1 section 2 of Shahe, and a residential community of Yanhua 
Corporation located in Pangshan District.  Also, seven construction sites were isolated: 
Jinggang Mansion construction site at Dongcheng District, Zhonghua Jiayuan 
construction site at Xuanwu District, alteration construction of Dewai Road at Xicheng 
District, Xiyuan construction site at Chongwen District, Yunchao Jiayuan construction 
site at Tongzhou District, Huguangshanshe construction site of the Second Engineering 
Bureau of China Irrigation and Electricity Company and Beimei Taidu (North American 
Attitude) construction project.   
 
 The Jinggang Mansion construction site was the first quarantined place in Beijing, 
from April 22 to May 18, 2003, affecting 399 persons in succession.  People’s Hospital, 
affiliated with Peking University, was isolated on April 24, 2003, and was the first unit 
isolated as a whole in Beijing,301 with 1,563 persons affected. According to news reports, 
the decision to isolate was made by the Xicheng District Government.302  A city like 
Beijing has the authority to set up districts or counties within the city with legislative, 
judicial, and other units of government. 
 
 By contrast, another city directly under the central government, Shanghai, used 
isolation and quarantine on an individual basis.  In addition, it is worth noting that 
Shanghai provided some mechanism for compensating those quarantined who were not in 
fact infected with SARS.  The Shanghai Labor and Social Security Bureau issued a notice 
that the suspected patients or people having close contact with patients who were 
quarantined or received medical examinations and later were found not to be SARS 
patients were to be treated as if they had worked during the quarantine period and were 
entitled to the wages and benefits for that period.  If the employers failed to provide the 
wages and benefits, the quarantined employees could sue the employer in the Labor 
Arbitration Commission.  A few other cities enacted local measures, but the central 
government was the main source of new legal measures to control SARS. 
 
  5. Coordination Issues 
 
 The nature of SARS as a global threat caused two extraordinary events in the 
PRC.  First, WHO took the unusual step in April 2003 of publicly challenging the PRC’s 
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report of the number of SARS cases in Beijing, even though in the past the WHO had 
refrained from criticizing member states.303  This public rebuke led to greater cooperation 
by the PRC.  By late April, political leaders in the Communist Party had declared war on 
SARS and several public officials, including the Mayor of Beijing and the Minister of 
Health, were removed from their Communist Party positions.   
 
 Second, in early May, the PRC allowed a WHO team to provide assistance with 
the SARS outbreak in Taiwan.  Early in the outbreak, the United States provided 
assistance to Taiwan because China had blocked WHO assistance.304  The visit by the 
WHO team was the first visit by any representatives of any UN-affiliated organization 
since the PRC took Taiwan’s UN seat 30 years before.  China’s willingness to bend its 
traditional notions of sovereignty in the face of the epidemiological facts and 
international political pressures was probably significant in its ability to stop the spread 
of the disease. 
 
 It is significant for a strictly legal analysis that China had no obligation under the 
WHO treaty to report anything regarding SARS to WHO.  Technically, the PRC’s 
obligation was to report only three diseases—cholera, plague, and yellow fever.  But 
international political and economic realities led the PRC to institute massive isolation 
and quarantine and other measures to contain the spread of SARS.  Despite rapid 
advances in the scientific understanding of the SARS virus, the PRC used traditional 
public health measures of isolation and quarantine on a massive scale to contain the 
disease.   
 
 6. Public Reaction 
 
 How public health officials in the PRC communicated information about SARS 
became a matter of considerable international media attention during the spring of 2003.  
The term “cover-up” may or may not be appropriate for the actions of PRC officials, but 
it is clear that government and public health officials in the PRC were not in control of 
how the general public in the PRC or the international community was supplied with 
essential public health information.  With the growth of the Internet and mobile phone 
communication within and outside of China, official announcements about the extent of 
the SARS outbreaks often followed non-governmental release of information to the 
media and WHO.305  The globalization and open communication needed to modernize the 
economy had a major effect on the government of the PRC to change the way it dealt 
with and reported about the SARS epidemic. 
 
 Although press reports document resistance to some of the measures implemented 
by the government, it is too early to determine the ultimate legal resolution of the 
prosecutions brought in many cases. The following selected case studies may provide the 
basis for researching the impact of these new SARS-based regulations for dealing with 
emerging pathogens while also providing a glimpse of how public health measures were 
enforced in the PRC. 
 
 Inner Mongolia 
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 Li Song was a doctor in the emergency room of Railway Hospital of Linhe City, 
Bayanchuoer Meng, Inner Mongolia.  He was infected with SARS while studying in a 
hospital in Beijing in the spring of 2003. He received treatment for several days in 
Beijing and returned to Linhe City on March 27, 2003.  He was the first SARS patient in 
Linhe City, where he was treated in the individual clinic managed by his father; he was 
later transferred to Ba Meng Hospital on March 30.  Ba Meng Hospital suspected that he 
was a SARS patient and isolated him for treatment. On April 8, Dr. Li, well aware of his 
disease, forced his way out of the Isolation Ward and went to the public area for eight 
hours. Dr. Li also violated the provisions for isolation and went out of the isolation ward. 
Because of Dr. Li’s behavior, many of his relatives became infected; his parents and wife 
died.  On May 1, 2003, the People’s Procuracy of Linhe City arrested Li Song, after 
investigation for violation of Article 114 (endangering public security with dangerous 
means) and Article 330 (violating infectious disease prevention and treatment) of the 
Criminal Law.  There is no report of the outcome of the prosecution.   
 
 Hebei Province 
 
 On April 24, 2003, the people’s government of Xiong County, Baoding City of 
Hebei Province set up a SARS medical inspection (quarantine) station in Xiongfeng 
Hotel of Guzhuang. In the afternoon of April 25, some villagers in Guzhuang assembled 
in the Hotel and obstructed the work of the government. A few people even set fires to 
and smashed government vehicles. On May 1, the public security bureau of Xiong 
County arrested six individuals on the basis of warrants issued by the Xiong County 
People’s Procuracy. On May 15, the Xiong County Court ruled that their conduct 
constituted the crime of group distribution of social orders, arson, and willfully damaging 
public and private properties, and sentenced them to fixed-term imprisonments for 
periods ranging from one to five years. 
 
 On May 3, 2003, Zhuozhou Municipality government dispatched a construction 
team to remodel Tongji Hotel in Dashiqiao Village of Shuangta District into a SARS 
quarantine station. Immediately after the construction began, some inhabitants of 
Dashiqiao village started obstructing the construction and hurt one construction worker. 
When the policemen arrived, villagers beat the policemen and damaged several police 
vehicles; nine villagers were later arrested on the basis of warrants issued by Zhuozhou 
Municipality People’s Procuracy.  
 
 On May 3, 2003, three individuals of Baimiao Village, Xuanhua District of 
Zhangjiakou District, Hebei Province led a crowd of nearly 300 villagers in obstructing 
the construction of a SARS hospital in the village. On June 8, the three leaders were 
convicted of the crime of obstructing the state official’s work and sentenced to fixed-term 
imprisonments of 1.5 years, one year, and six months respectively. 
 
 Jiangsu Province 
 
A resident of Ganyu County of Jiangsu Province returned from Beijing to Ganyu 
County on April 25, 2003.  He was quarantined until May 6, 2003. The staff at the 
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quarantine and isolation station told him explicitly that he would be quarantined at home 
for another few days. On May 10, 2003, he was found going out in violation of the 
quarantine regulation. When some government officials were trying to persuade him to 
go back, he threatened an official with a pair of scissors.  The Ganyu County Court found 
that the individual obstructed state officials from carrying out their duties and disturbed 
the SARS prevention and treatment work. He was convicted and sentenced to a fixed-




On May 1, 2003, a taxi driver drove his taxi back to Miyun County, Beijing from 
Huairou County, Beijing. He refused to wait in the line to be examined and disinfected at 
the SARS prevention and disinfection station, located on the “border” of Huairou and 
Miyun, and injured the policeman who was examining him.  The Miyun County Court 
found that the taxi driver did not comply with the instructions, refused to disinfect the 
taxi that he drove, and obstructed the state officials from carrying out their duties with 





Six individuals, residents of Dujiangyan City of Sichuan Province, were 
dissatisfied with the fact that their houses were located in the People’s Hospital of 
Dujiangyan, which belonged to an Isolation Region of Dujiangyan City. They spread 
disparaging words about the government and induced the public to obstruct the 
construction work at the hospital, which resulted in a three-hour traffic jam in the city and 
an economic loss of 14,000 yuan and aroused the public’s dread of SARS.  They were 
charged with the crime of defiance and affray. They were convicted and sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonments of 1 year, 8 months, and 2-3 months detention respectively. 
 
 Some Chinese legal scholars have questioned the legality of the new measures 
taken by the Ministry of Health to control SARS under the Prevention and Treatment of 
Infectious Diseases Law of 1989.  The basis of these objections is that the statute limits 
the use of certain types of control measures to Type A diseases or a limited number of 
Type B diseases.  Since only the State Council, rather than the Ministry of Health, can 
add to the Type A diseases, these critics have argued that the new regulations issued by 
the Ministry of Health are illegal.306  Until the SARS crisis, it is likely that very little 
scholarly attention was devoted to Chinese public health law.  In any event, these 
criticisms have not impeded the implementation of the measures.  Newspaper accounts of 
the use of quarantine and isolation in the SARS crisis indicate that the government treated 
the regulations as legitimate and acted accordingly. 
 
  7. Current Situation 
 
In China, the SARS notification system came back into effect on September 19, 
2003 after it was stopped on August 16, 2003, when there were no more SARS patients in 
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China.307  Since September 15, 2003, the major hospitals across the country have begun 
using the SARS case reporting system, which can report just-detected SARS patients or 
suspected patients to the Center for Disease Control of China and the Ministry of 
Health.308  Each province has submitted its preliminary plan for SARS prevention and 
control to the Ministry of Health.  In addition, the state will allocate 11 billion yuan to 
establishing a public health emergency treatment system. Different prevention measures 
have been taken in various provinces and cities.309  For example, Beijing adopted a 
preliminary plan for SARS prevention and control on August 28, 2003.310  Shanghai 
Bureau of Health issued an urgent notice providing that every suspected case is to be 
treated as SARS before being ruled out as SARS and summarizing six alerting situations 
for SARS so that officials can decide whether to trigger the SARS emergency handling 
system in a timely manner.311  
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  C. Hong Kong    
 
  1. Introduction 
 
  In March 2003, a physician who had been treating patients for atypical 
pneumonia at a hospital in Guangzhou traveled to Hong Kong and stayed in room 901 of 
the Metropole Hotel. It is thought that he was the first to transmit the SARS virus in 
Hong Kong.  Seven others staying on the same floor of the hotel also became infected 
with SARS.  This index patient was transferred to the Prince of Wales Hospital, where it 
is believed he spread the disease to nearly 100 hospital workers.  
 
 Another widespread outbreak of the virus occurred in April at the Amoy Gardens 
Apartment Complex where nearly 130 residents were diagnosed with SARS.312  An 
additional 241 residents, free from symptoms of the virus, were quarantined for 10 
days.313  The source of the virus is thought to have been a visitor to the Amoy Gardens 
who had previously received treatment at the Prince of Wales Hospital. These two 
incidents and the continued threat of the spread of the SARS virus led to a range of 
responses by the Hong Kong government.  In the case of Hong Kong, understanding of 
the response to SARS rests in part on knowledge of the complicated political and legal 
relationship between Hong Kong and China.  That relationship is addressed in the section 
that follows. 
 
2. Political and Legal Systems  
 
Located at the southeastern tip of China, Hong Kong is a Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China. On July 1, 1997, after 150 years of British 
rule, the PRC assumed sovereignty over Hong Kong, according to the Joint Declaration 
of 1984 between China and Great Britain.  Under the Joint Declaration, Hong Kong’s 
special status will be protected for a period of 50 years from the transfer of power.314  
This has led to the development of a government structure referred to as “one country, 
two systems.”   
 
Under the current division of power, the central government of the PRC exercises 
authority over foreign affairs and defense.  Annex III to what is referred to as the “Basic 
Law,” a constitutional document developed in connection with the transfer of 
sovereignty, details the laws that can be applied to Hong Kong.315  Authority over other 
areas of government rests with the Special Administrative Region.  For example, the 
Special Administrative Region is responsible for maintaining public order in Hong Kong.  
This arrangement allows for Hong Kong to retain a legal system based on English 
common law for internal affairs and certain external affairs, as well as its non-socialist 
economic system.   
 
The government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is broken 
down into two levels, central and district.  At the central level, authority is shared by the 
Chief Executive, the Executive Council, and the Legislative Council.  The Basic Law 
states that the Chief Executive is accountable to the Central People’s Government (the 
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government of the PRC) and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.  This dual 
responsibility is reflected in numerous aspects of the position.  The Chief Executive is 
selected by the Election Committee, a committee made up of residents of Hong Kong, but 
appointed by the Central People’s Government.  The Chief Executive’s charge to 
implement the Basic Law and legislation emerging from the Legislative Council is 
complemented by a charge to implement directives from the Central People’s 
Government. The Chief Executive not only implements; he or she has the power to make 
decisions about government policies, issue executive orders, and nominate or appoint 
other officials. The Chief Executive oversees a number of secretaries who head bureaus, 
including the Secretary of Health, Welfare, and Food, and the Secretary of Security.   
 
The Executive Council is appointed by the Chief Executive and advises the Chief 
Executive on important policy decisions.  The Legislative Council is responsible for 
legislating, monitoring the administration, and overseeing fiscal matters such as taxation 
and public expenditures.316  The Legislative Council is also charged with receiving and 
handling complaints from Hong Kong residents. At the district level, Hong Kong has 18 
district councils whose duties include advising the government on district-level issues; 
setting priorities for their district; and performing environmental, cultural, and 
community activities for their districts.   
 
As noted above, the legal system created during British occupation will remain 
largely undisturbed until 2047.  A legacy of British rule is a strong commitment to the 
rule of law.  The website for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region discusses the 
concept and proclaims: “The Rule of Law begins with individuals and their right to seek 
protection from the courts where justice is administered by impartial judges.”317  
Structurally, members of the judiciary are independent of both the executive and 
legislative branches, and judgments made in courts in Mainland China are not binding on 
Hong Kong.  Further, the Basic Law lays out fundamental rights to individuals which 
include the right to equality before the law; freedom of speech, of the press, and 
publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of processions, and of demonstration; 
and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike; freedom of 
movement; freedom of conscience; and freedom of religious belief.318   
 
  3. Public Health Structure and Laws 
 
 The Department of Health, under the Secretary for Health, Welfare, and Food, is 
the government’s health advisor and the government agency with authority to execute 
health-related policies and regulations.  The department provides a range of health 
promotion and prevention services as well as treatment and rehabilitation services.  The 
Hospital Authority is responsible for all public hospitals in Hong Kong.  It currently 
manages a head office, 43 public hospitals/institutions, 47 specialist outpatient clinics and 
13 general outpatient clinics. The Hospital Authority is independent of the Department of 
Health, but like the Department of Health is accountable to the Secretary for Health, 
Welfare, and Food.319  
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In July 2000, Hong Kong established the Disease Prevention and Control Division 
within the Department of Health.  The mission of this division is to create and implement 
strategies for surveillance, prevention, and control of communicable and non-
communicable diseases.  The division carries out this mission by developing intervention 
programs, conducting research and evaluation, and identifying health needs in the 
community.  The division is also constructing a public health information system, with 
completion anticipated by the end of 2003.  This system will collect, coordinate, analyze, 
and disseminate health information.  It is intended to improve the division’s ability to 
develop policies, allocate resources, and plan, implement and evaluate services and 
programs.320  The division also regularly conducts surveillance on 27 statutorily 
notifiable diseases and other infections of public health concern.321  The division works 
closely with the Hospital Authority, other government departments, and health 
professionals and authorities in other countries.322 
 
  4. Response to SARS  
 
 The Quarantine and Prevention of Disease Ordinance provides a framework for 
the quarantine and prevention of infectious diseases relevant to the public.  It is the basis 
for the Prevention of the Spread of Infectious Diseases Regulations.  Under Regulation 4, 
medical professionals must report suspected cases of notifiable diseases to the Director of 
Health.  Legal authority for quarantine and isolation is found in Chapter 141 of the 
Prevention of the Spread of Diseases Regulations.  Persons arriving from infected places 
other than by sea and air may be medically inspected or examined by a health officer (Ch. 
141, sec. 21).  Additionally, Section 22 allows any vessel arriving in Hong Kong to be 
visited by a health officer. A health officer has the discretionary authority to detain in a 
quarantine station any person seeking to land in Hong Kong who upon arrival is found to 
have an infectious disease (Ch. 141, sec. 38). The Commissioner of Police is directed to 
furnish assistance to any health officer for the purpose of enabling the exercise of these 
powers (Ch. 141, sec. 42). 
 
 On March 27, 2003, the First Schedule of the Quarantine and Prevention of 
Disease Ordinance was amended to include SARS on the list of infectious diseases.  
Another order was issued to amend the Prevention of the Spread of Infectious Diseases 
Regulations in 2003 to include SARS in the notification form for the reporting of 
infectious diseases.323  Surveillance has been enhanced through distribution of a clear 
case definition to all health care providers, active case contacting, and prompt laboratory 
investigation of virus samples.  Use of current technology, such as the Internet, an e-
SARS database, and a Major Incident Investigation and Disaster Support System 
(MIIDSS) has facilitated prompt case investigation and contact tracing.  MIIDSS allows 
linkage of the contact person, location, and event. 
 
 The government of Hong Kong also broadened and strengthened existing 
quarantine and isolation laws, and various agencies have been aggressive in using the 
powers granted under these laws.  Initially, visitors were allowed in hospitals where 
SARS patients were housed, which resulted in spread to the community. This led to a 
policy of isolation of patients.  Visitors were prohibited from entering SARS wards and 
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visitation to non-SARS wards was severely restricted and closely monitored.  Also, 
special training in infection control was provided to hospital staff and all hospital 
employees were required to wear protective gear.  Four medical centers were designated 
as treatment facilities for SARS patients.   
 
 The government also instituted home quarantine for households of individuals 
with SARS.  Further, close contacts of confirmed SARS patients were placed under a 10-
day home quarantine and monitored by public health nurses through telephone and 
unannounced home visits.  As an alternative to home quarantine, some close contacts 
were placed in isolation camps outside the city of Hong Kong.  The camps were holiday 
villages run by the Leisure Department of the government.324   
 
As noted in the introduction, the second major SARS outbreak in Hong Kong 
occurred at the Amoy Gardens housing complex. This was the first instance in which the 
government issued a quarantine order for an entire housing complex.325  Residents were 
not permitted to leave the complex without written permission from a Department of 
Health officer.326  At first, the Hong Kong government resorted to the use of barricades 
and tape to prevent residents from leaving.  Hundreds of residents of the Amoy Gardens 
were eventually relocated to isolation camps.327  Residents of Amoy Gardens who were 
under the 10-day quarantine were provided with three meals a day and with emotional 
and psychological support through a special hotline established by the Home Affairs 
Department.  Additional services were also available by calling a hotline set up by the 
Social Welfare Department.  Others under home quarantine were also provided with 
home treatment and assistance with provision of daily necessities including financial 
assistance.328 
 
 Because of their increased vulnerability to infection, the elderly received 
heightened attention.  Residential care homes were given special support in the form of 
written guidelines for infection control, training for caregivers, and a requirement that all 
residents recently discharged from the hospital be placed in isolation at the facility for 10 
days.  The government also closed schools and universities for three weeks. When 
students and teachers were permitted to return, they were asked to wear surgical masks 
and continue temperature screens on a daily basis.   
 
 Compliance with home quarantine was enforced by interdepartmental teams of 
police and officials from immigration, social welfare, home affairs, and the health 
department. Hong Kong imposed strict penalties for breaking quarantine orders.  
Penalties for violations include fines of HKD$2,500 plus HKD$250 for every day the 
offense continues. (HKD=1.29 USD.)  Increased penalties apply to subsequent offenses.  
If a second offense occurs within one year, imprisonment may result in lieu of or in 
addition to the fine.  Additionally, an individual may be stopped and detained by any 
health officer or police officer and if his or her name and address are not provided, he or 
she may be arrested. 
  
 Other measures taken to control SARS involved travelers and those crossing 
borders.  Screening, monitoring, and quarantining of vessels and arriving and departing 
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individuals was instituted at seaports and airports.  In mid-March, shortly after the initial 
outbreak of SARS, the government set up medical posts at all border points and began to 
require that all incoming visitors complete a health declaration.  By April, health control 
measures at border points were increased to include temperature checks for all airport 
passengers and travelers by land, train, and sea. Additionally, infrared devices were 
installed throughout points of entry in Hong Kong to assist with temperature screening.  
 
On April 17, 2003, the Director of Health, under the authority of Chapter 141 of 
the Prevention of the Spread of Diseases Regulations, granted immigration officers and 
members of the auxiliary medical service or civil aid service the power “to stop and 
detain any person seeking to leave Hong Kong in contravention of Regulation 27A…and 
remove the person to an infectious disease hospital….”329 Under Regulation 27A, persons 
cannot leave Hong Kong without receiving prior written permission from a health officer.  
Further, the Director of Health authorized any “member of the civil aid service on duty to 
take the body temperature of any person arriving in Hong Kong or leaving Hong 
Kong.”330  Medical practitioners or health officers are also authorized to perform medical 
examinations on anyone entering or leaving Hong Kong to curtail the spread of SARS.331 
 
 Hong Kong International Airport is one of the busiest in the world and a hub for 
many airlines, and therefore it was an important site for control efforts.  All in-bound, 
out-bound, and transit passengers had to undergo temperature checks.  In-bound and 
transit passengers had to complete a health declaration stating whether they had fever, 
cough, shortness of breath or breathing difficulties, and they were required to list all 
countries and cities they visited within 10 days of their arrival in Hong Kong.  Passengers 
with no fever or other symptoms were permitted to proceed to immigration.  Passengers 
with no fever but other symptoms were advised to consult with a physician and permitted 
to proceed to immigration.  Passengers with a fever were taken for a medical 
examination; if the examination revealed a suspicion of SARS, they were transported to a 
hospital selected by the Hospital Authority.  Out-bound passengers were asked by airline 
employees about fever and contact with persons having SARS.  Passengers with fever 
were sent to an airport medical clinic and were not permitted to proceed unless a 
certificate declaring them “fit for travel” was issued by a physician.  Those with close 
contact with a SARS patient were sent to the Airport Health Authority.  Hong Kong 
International Airport also implemented preventive health measures in terminals, 
including frequent air filter replacement, cleaning of courtesy and pay phones, daily 
cleaning of check-in counters, and sealing of drinking fountains.332   
 
 In Hong Kong, infection control efforts backed by the threat of force were 
complemented by voluntary measures. A public education program was aimed at 
increasing awareness of SARS symptoms and recommending prompt medical treatment 
for anyone experiencing any symptoms of SARS, and included elements such as a SARS 
information hotline.  Additionally, authorities in Hong Kong provided residents with 
disinfectant to use in their homes.333  The Hygiene Declaration of 2003 was the basis for 
a broad-based educational campaign.  The strategy under the declaration was location-
specific and addressed hygiene standards and measures in various categories and settings,  
such as the home, food supply, medical, school, industrial, hotel, and sewage.  The 
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objectives included setting standards and renewing a culture of public hygiene, instilling 
a sense of individual responsibility for hygiene, and improving the image of Hong Kong 
internationally.  Health and hygiene promotional materials addressing basic sanitary 
measures to reduce the spread of infectious disease include: “Health Advice for People 
Who Have Been in Contact with SARS Patients;” “Wearing Mask;” “Flush Toilet 
Properly;” and “Make Sure the Trap is Not Dry.” 
 
 Hong Kong also established multi-disciplinary response teams composed of those 
with expertise in public health, building management, and environmental issues.  The 
role of the teams was two-fold:  investigating buildings and drainage and other systems, 
and taking remedial actions including disinfection, pest control, and cleansing. 
 
The response to SARS was supported by large allocations of funds including: 
HKD$200 million for infectious disease prevention, public health, and treatment of 
disease; HKD$200 million for training and support for the welfare of health care 
workers; HKD$1.3 billion to strengthen public health work and research on infectious 
disease; and HKD$500 million to establish a CDC-type organization.334  As result of the 
impact that SARS had on employment, the Chief Executive has announced plans for a 
HKD$715 million job package to create over 30,000 short-term jobs and training 
opportunities.335   
 
  5. Coordination Issues 
  
 The Hospital Authority established a Central Task Force on Infection Control on 
SARS to make decisions regarding a range of professional and technical issues.  This 
group of experts also provided assistance in the implementation of hospital control 
measures and the enforcement of such measures.  A Central Task Force on Supplies was 
established to track the need for hospital supplies, oversee distribution of supplies, and 
assess the needs of various hospitals for protective gear and other precautionary items.336 
The SARS outbreak at the Amoy Gardens Housing Complex required the coordination of 
numerous government agencies. The Department of Health led the investigation in 
conjunction with eight other governmental entities.337   
 
Another example of coordination was the government’s use of various media 
outlets to provide broad outreach.  Television, radio, the Internet, and public 
presentations provided updated information for residents of as well as travelers to Hong 
Kong.  Radio and television announcements and billboards indicated how to wash hands 
properly, put on gloves, and wear masks.338  The mass-transit railway system joined with 
the medical faculty of the University of Hong Kong to implement a campaign on how to 
combat the disease, distributing informational brochures produced by the Department of 
Health and answering questions for the public.339  The campaign ran for two days at six 
of the busiest transit stations.340 
 
 Looking beyond its borders, the Hong Kong government participated in a meeting 
with the Shenzhen municipal government.  Shenzhen is the main transit point between 
Hong Kong and Mainland China.  The meeting was intended as a forum for the exchange 
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of experiences and ideas regarding border control points and the prevention of SARS.341 
Each government agreed to install infrared imaging at the Lowu control point and each 
side agreed to screen incoming passengers.  Both governments also agreed to hold regular 
meetings to exchange information. 
 
  An international group of experts was selected to review the Hong Kong 
government’s work in containing SARS.  Experts from the United Kingdom, United 
States, Australia, Hong Kong, and China comprised the committee that was charged with 
making recommendations for the improvement of Hong Kong’s public health and 
medical systems.342   In addition, Hong Kong recognized that to effectively control 
communicable diseases collaboration was required with China, neighboring countries, 
WHO, and other international bodies.343 
 
  6. Public Reaction 
  
 As noted above, the government of Hong Kong used public education as one of 
the key means for preventing the spread of SARS as well as to inform the public about 
individual responsibility in containing the spread of the virus.  Still, broad-based 
educational campaigns were not sufficient to ease public fears.  Government officials 
addressed public concerns about contamination, especially in large housing complexes, 
by making public the names of all buildings in which SARS cases were confirmed.344   
 
There is also some evidence of resistance to government policies, especially in the 
area of quarantine.  After the Amoy Gardens housing complex was quarantined, police 
discovered that more than half of the apartments were empty with residents having 
breached the 10-day quarantine order issued by the Secretary for Health, Welfare, and 
Food.  In order to locate the residents who left Amoy Gardens during the quarantine 
period, the police department formed a task force.345   
 
To some degree, the harsh effects of quarantine were mitigated by a law, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Ordinance, that obligated employers to make reasonable 
efforts to protect the health and safety of employees.346  This obligation is quite general, 
but it may have implications for the SARS epidemic.  Some legal experts maintain that 
under the Employment Ordinance, “where an employee has contracted the disease, he or 
she should be granted sick leave by the employer,” meaning the employee is entitled to 
receive payment of four-fifths of normal wages during the leave period.347  Additionally, 
the government recommended that employers not terminate employees during sick leave 
and that employers not dismiss employees because they had an affected family 
member.348 
 
 Additional information bearing on the public reaction to SARS and to government 
control efforts comes from an AC Nielsen Poll comparing the impact of SARS on Hong 
Kong and Singapore.  The survey found that 35% of Hong Kong residents cancelled or 
postponed travel plans due to concerns about the SARS outbreak.349 When respondents 
were asked “What have you done to protect yourself/family from contracting the SARS 
virus?” 65% of respondents said that they wore a mask, 58% had adopted a more cautious 
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approach toward personal hygiene, and 34% were avoiding crowded areas.350 The 
findings of this survey indicate that approximately 56% of Hong Kong residents found 
the SARS virus to be of most concern as compared to such things as the economy, 
unemployment, war in Iraq, and personal health.351  
 
  7. Current Situation 
 
 It is too soon to tell how effective Hong Kong’s strategies have been in combating 
the spread of SARS.  However, on June 23, 2003, WHO removed Hong Kong from the 
list of areas with a recent transmission.352  According to Professor Lee Shiu Hung of 
Hong Kong University, many of the measures taken (e.g., contact tracing, wearing of 
masks, strict personal hygiene measures, and temperature screening) were effective in 
raising the public awareness, but enforcement of some measures was an issue.353  
Professor Hung suggests that because the disease spread so rapidly, preparedness was an 
issue with shortages of masks and other protective gear for health workers, inadequate 
control measures, and poor communication with the public leading to panic.354 
 
Hong Kong suffered serious economic losses linked to SARS.  During the height 
of the outbreak, nearly 60,000 restaurant and hotel workers lost their jobs or were put on 
unpaid leave.355  The Standard & Poors Rating Agency estimated that SARS could cut 
Hong Kong’s gross domestic product as much as 1.5%. 
 
A memo issued by the Secretary of Health, Welfare, and Food on the day WHO 
removed Hong Kong from the list announced the need to prepare for future outbreaks. 
The need to strengthen the public health system and the management of infectious 
diseases was acknowledged, with “$200 million allocated for treatment of diseases, 
strengthening infection control, and public education.”356  Three committees were 
established to address certain issues based on the experience with SARS.  One committee 
was to work on overall cleaning campaigns and environmental improvements at housing 
complexes, another on developing plans and programs for economic redevelopment 
including promoting tourism, and a third on promoting community involvement in 
improving the physical, social, and economic environments of the city.357 
 
The international group of experts published its findings in a lengthy report.  The 
report delineated some of the shortcomings in Hong Kong’s response to the SARS 
epidemic.358  One problem identified was the inadequate communication between the 
Hospital Authority, the Department of Health, and university health experts.359  
Additionally, the report concluded that health care workers were not trained appropriately 
and facilities were not adequately equipped to deal with the outbreak.360 
 
Hong Kong has, however, developed a response mechanism to be better prepared 
if such an event occurs again.  The Hospital Authority established a three-stage SARS 
warning system to allow hospitals and outpatient facilities to detect SARS patients early 
and monitor the spread of the disease.361  Other plans include providing over 1,000 
isolation beds in public hospitals and ensuring a three-month supply of protective 
clothing and equipment for medical professionals.362 
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  D. Singapore  
 
  1. Introduction 
 
Singapore is a city-state located in Southeast Asia with a population just slightly 
over 4 million.  Singapore’s population is largely made up of descendents of Chinese, 
Malaysian, and Indian immigrants.  Although English is the official language of 
administration, numerous languages are spoken in Singapore, including Mandarin, 
Malay, and Tamil.  Singapore was first confronted with the SARS virus on March 14, 
2003, when the Ministry of Health was informed that six persons at Tan Tock Seng 
Hospital/ Communicable Disease Center (Tan Tock Seng) were admitted with atypical 
pneumonia.363  By the time the epidemic subsided, Singapore had a total of 238 cases of 
SARS with 32 deaths.  Three index cases were identified, all of whom had stayed at the 
Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong during the time that a SARS-infected person was a guest.  
Singapore found five SARS cases to be responsible for transmitting SARS to a larger 
than expected number of persons.  These people were named “superspreaders” and the 
fact that SARS could be spread to a large number of persons by one patient strengthened 
the government’s decision to take prompt and strong measures in containing the disease.  
Additionally, health officials in Singapore found evidence that casual contact, such as 
encounters in elevators, taxis, and hallways, had resulted in contagion.  Although most 
secondary spread of SARS was initially hospital-related, no additional nosocomial cases 
were observed after March 22 in Tan Tock Seng (the date when this hospital was 
designated the official SARS hospital) or after April 17 in other hospitals. 
 
The country’s actions and responses to SARS were widely publicized as a result 
of Singapore’s stringent and comprehensive approach to controlling the epidemic.  Of 
greater relevance here, the country’s ability to initiate rapid and sweeping public health 
and legal measures was facilitated by Singapore’s political and legal systems and, more 
particularly, its existing public health structures and laws. 
 
 2. Political and Legal Systems 
 
Singapore’s governmental structure is based on the British Westminster system, 
consisting of a democratically elected Parliament of 84 members, a Prime Minister who 
is appointed by the President, an elected President, and a Cabinet appointed by the 
President. The President and the Cabinet are vested with executive authority. 
 
The Cabinet is responsible for the general direction and control of the 
government, including the administration of the affairs of state.  It is responsible to the 
Prime Minister, and includes the ministers of Community Development and Sports, 
Defense, Education, the Environment, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Health, Home Affairs, 
Information, Communications and the Arts, Law, Manpower, National Development, 
Trade and Industry, and Transport. 
 
At the local level, community development councils (CDCs) function as a local 
administration of each district.  CDCs were implemented to devolve authority from the 
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national housing authority to the local level and are responsible for “initiating, planning 
and managing community program[me]s to promote community bonding and social 
cohesion.”364  CDCs are managed by a council consisting of anywhere from 12 to 80 
members and includes the mayor of the community.  CDCs are governed by the 
Community Development Council Rules of 1997 and were in charge of administering the 
SARS Home Quarantine Order Allowance Scheme.365 
 
The legal system of Singapore is based on English common law and customs.  
The Singapore Constitution provides the basis for the country’s laws and delineates the 
functions of the governmental organs including the judiciary. It also sets forth individual 
rights within the context of the authority of the state. 
 
 3. Public Health Structure and Laws 
 
The Ministry of Health enforces strict sanitation and public health regulations.  As 
a result, the health conditions and health infrastructure of Singapore are comparable to 
some developed countries.  The country has a broad-based system for surveillance of 
communicable diseases requiring that all infectious diseases reported to the Quarantine 
and Epidemiology Department of the Ministry of Environment be investigated.366  The 
Ministry of Health also has surveillance responsibilities as part of its disease outbreak 
prevention capacities.   
 
The Ministry of Health’s mission is to “promote good health and reduce illness; to 
ensure that Singaporeans have access to good and affordable healthcare that is 
appropriate to needs; and to pursue medical excellence.”367  Singapore provides public 
health services for its residents through three ministries—Ministry of Health, Ministry of 
the Environment, and Ministry of Manpower-- as well as the private sector. Health care 
services are provided through a dual system of delivery.  The public system is managed 
by the government and the private system is provided by private health facilities and 
providers.  Residents can choose between the two systems for their care and are provided 
with some level of subsidization for the public health care system.  The majority of 
primary health services in Singapore are provided by the private sector, whereas the 
majority of the hospital care is provided by the public sector.368  Emergency services are 
provided through the Accident and Emergency Departments at public hospitals.  Public 
hospitals and clinics receive subsidies from the government and the private sector is 
subject to regulation by way of licensing through the Ministry of Health.  There is no free 
health care in Singapore, and individuals are expected to provide co-payments for 
services.  Patients can choose among different levels of service but have to pay more out-
of-pocket for the higher level of care.  Additionally, the government requires all working 
people to contribute 6-8% of their income into the Medisave account that can be used to 
cover the cost of hospitalization by individuals or their immediate family.  In addition to 
Medisave, Medishield provides catastrophic illness insurance and Medifund provides 
coverage for the indigent so that no patient can be denied care by a public hospital for 
inability to pay.369 
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Singapore bases its authority to quarantine and isolate individuals on two key 
pieces of legislation, the Infectious Disease Act and the Environmental Public Health Act 
as amended in 2002.   
 
The Infectious Disease Act was enacted in 1976 to control and prevent the spread 
of scheduled infectious diseases.  The Act is administered jointly by the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of the Environment.  It allows for medical examinations and 
treatment, surveillance, and investigation of infectious diseases.  It also requires 
physicians to report specified infectious diseases to government authorities.370  According 
to the Ministry of Health’s official website: 
 
The Act empowers the Director of Medical Services to order the treatment 
of premises or vessels, destruction and disposal of infected food, animals, 
water and corpses, closure of food establishments if the establishment is 
suspected to be the source of or responsible for the transmission of 
infectious disease, or the prohibition of meetings and public entertainment 
if such gatherings are likely to increase the spread of the infectious 
disease.371 
 
Under the Infectious Disease Act, Chapter 137, the Minister of Health and the 
Minister of the Environment are empowered to declare an area to be an outbreak area in 
Singapore and elsewhere if a dangerous infectious disease could be introduced into 
Singapore.372  The Act allows for certain amendments by the relevant public officials.  
Section 69 states that the “appropriate Minister may, from time to time, by notification in 
the Gazette, amend any of the Schedules.”373   
 
The Environmental Health Act is administered by the Director-General of Public 
Health who is appointed by the Minister of the Environment.  The Environmental Public 
Health Act regulates, among other things, food stalls and vendors. More specifically, 
under Part IV of the Act:  
 
(1)  The Director-General [of Public Health] may require any person to 
whom a license has been issued under this Part . . . or any assistant or 
employee of the licensee or any applicant for a license under this Part to 
submit to medical examination. (2) If such licensee, assistant, employee or 
applicant is suffering from or is suspected to be suffering from an 
infectious disease or is suspected to be a carrier thereof, the Director-
General may require him to undergo treatment. (3) The Director-General 
may require treatment to be obtained at any hospital as he may think fit. 
(4)  The Director-General may require any licensee or any assistant or 
employee of the licensee to submit to immunization against any infectious 
disease.  (5)  Every licensee shall ensure that his assistant or any person 
employed by him is immunized against any infectious disease as required 
by the Director-General.   (6) The Director-General may, at any time, 
revoke or suspend any license issued under this Part if – (a) the licensee is 
suffering from an infectious disease; (b) the licensee knowingly employs 
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any person who is suffering from or suspected to be suffering from an 
infectious diseases; obtained at any hospital as he may think fit. . . . 374 
 
Under Part X of the Act, the Director-General may direct the immediate execution 
of any act which in the Director General’s opinion is necessary for public health or the 
safety of the public.  The Environmental Public Health Act has had a tremendous impact 
on curbing the spread of such infectious diseases as cholera, salmonella, and typhoid by 
requiring street vendors to move indoors.375   
 
 
 4. Response to SARS 
 
Singapore relied upon the Infectious Disease Act-- as amended in 2002-- and the 
Environmental Public Health Act in its effort to stem the spread of SARS.  Both the 
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of the Environment were instrumental in educating 
the public and in enforcing isolation and quarantine measures. 
 
In March 2003 the Minister of Health exercised the authority to amend the 
schedules to the Infectious Disease Act.  The Minister of Health, in a statement in support 
of his action, remarked that SARS presented “an unprecedented public health crisis.”376  
One of the key amendments was to include SARS on the list of First, Second, Fifth and 
Sixth Scheduled Infectious Diseases.  In fact, SARS is the first disease to be listed in the 
Fifth Schedule, which addresses diseases in relation to the control of occupation, trade, or 
business.  It is also the first disease listed in the Sixth Schedule, which allows information 
to be disclosed by the Director of Medical Services to a person to enable him to take 
steps to prevent the spread of disease.  
 
The process for issuing these amendments was expedited through Parliament with 
the use of a Certificate of Urgency, a special condition allowed for by the Constitution 
that makes it possible for vital legislation to be passed in one rather than two 
Parliamentary sittings.377  The amendments were made within five categories: home 
quarantine orders, quarantine of premises, prevention of persons acting irresponsibly in a 
manner leading to the spread of infectious disease, compliance with disease control 
measures, and the handling of corpses when SARS is the suspected cause of death. 
 
The Infectious Disease Act, as amended, gives the Minister of Health the power 
to quarantine any premises for the purpose of controlling or preventing the spread of any 
infectious disease; to make it an offense to refuse to cooperate with disease control 
measures or to provide false information and to allow for compounding of fines for 
offenses; to address disposal of a deceased’s remains when SARS is the suspected cause 
of death and to allow for post-mortem examinations of persons suspected of being a 
carrier or contact of an infectious disease; to allow for medical examination of persons if 
they are suspected of carrying an infectious disease; to allow disclosure of information to 
any person necessary to assist in the prevention of the spread of disease; to make the 
process of issuing home quarantine orders clearer, allowing for home quarantine of 
suspect cases, contacts, or carriers of  an infectious disease; and to make it an offense for 
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someone to “act irresponsibly” by exposing others to infection by his presence in a public 
place, with the exception of seeking medical treatment.  SARS is the first disease under 
this new civic responsibility provision allowing for a finding of irresponsibility for being 
in a public place while knowingly suffering from an infectious disease. 
 
On March 24, 2003, the Ministry of Health used its power under the Infectious 
Disease Act to quarantine persons to prevent the spread of SARS.378  The Ministry of 
Health developed a mechanism for obtaining home quarantine orders under Section 15(2) 
of the Infectious Disease Act.  Home quarantine was mandatory for 10 days for contacts 
of all probable and suspected cases of SARS and contacts of pneumonia patients who 
might turn out to be SARS cases.  Persons recovering from SARS or who had been 
treated for SARS were required to undergo a mandatory 14-day home quarantine.  
Discharged patients under home quarantine also were subject to check by hospital 
workers every day and were required to undergo a medical examination at Tan Tock 
Seng at the end of the quarantine period.  Persons with chronic diseases who were treated 
for a condition other than SARS in a hospital where SARS patients were treated were 
also served home quarantine orders as these patients could have SARS and present with 
atypical symptoms.379  Additionally, all patients discharged from a hospital where a 
SARS patient had been treated were monitored via telephone for 21 days.380 
 
During home quarantine persons were required to permit an electronic camera to 
be placed in their home and to be able to be contacted at all times.  The Ministry of 
Health contracted with CISCO, Singapore's leading commercial security firm, to serve 
the quarantine orders, install ePic web cameras in homes of those under quarantine, and 
provide some of the enforcement of home quarantine.  CISCO was initially established as 
a statutory board of the Ministry of Home Affairs to provide guard and escort services for 
commercial and industrial organizations.381  Persons under home quarantine were 
required to answer all calls from Ministry of Health officials, officers of CISCO, or 
persons acting on behalf of the Director of Medical Services.  Persons under home 
quarantine were called randomly and directed to turn on the web cameras to verify their 
presence at home.  This measure was in part taken in reaction to persons breaking home 
quarantine despite increased monetary penalties and the threat of jail time, as described 
below.  Random checks were also permitted under home quarantine.   
Persons under home quarantine were only allowed to come into contact with 
family members and others living in their household, healthcare workers under orders of 
the Director of Medical Services, CISCO officers, persons carrying out a statutory order 
or function, persons needing access to the house to complete any official work, and any 
other person with authorization from the Director of Medical Services.382  The home 
quarantine order issued by the Ministry of Health provided detailed instructions on what 
was required and what was prohibited during home quarantine, including information on 
keeping good hygiene practices at home, numbers to call for help, what to do if SARS 
symptoms develop, and when to wear a mask.  Quarantined persons were given a SARS 
toolkit and required to check and record their temperature twice a day.383  During home 
quarantine, all children under 18 also had to stay home.  Persons under home quarantine 
were given the option of having their children stay somewhere else for the duration of the 
quarantine so they could continue to attend school.  Quarantined persons could also 
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choose to stay at government facilities for a cost of SGD$25 per day.∗  Staying at 
government facilities would also allow household children to continue going to school.384   
 
A number of penalties were put in place through the amended Infectious Disease 
Act for breaking a home quarantine order.  The Ministry of Health put together a form 
addressing the breach of home quarantine orders.  The form specified that the breach of a 
home quarantine order is an offense under Section 15(3)b of the Infectious Disease Act; 
that anyone discovered breaking a home quarantine order will be required to wear an 
electronic monitoring tag at all times for the remainder of the home quarantine period; 
that the employer or person in quarantine will not be eligible for the Home Quarantine 
Allowance (discussed below under “Public Reaction”); and that a second violation of the 
quarantine order could result in detention and isolation in a hospital or other government-
assigned location.  Additionally, a person could be arrested without a warrant for 
breaking an order, and a first offense was punishable by a fine up to SGD$10,000 and/or 
imprisonment for six months.  Subsequent offenses could be punished by fines up to 
SGD$20,000 and/or imprisonment for up to one year. 
 
On April 20, 2003, the Minister of Health closed the Pasir Panjang Wholesale 
Centre for 15 days after a SARS infected worker failed to stay in place while a special 
ambulance was called to transport him to the hospital.385  Approximately 2400 merchants 
at the Wholesale Centre were put on home quarantine386 and contact tracing was initiated 
with approximately 1200 quarantine orders served to persons who might have been 
exposed to SARS at the Wholesale Centre.387  Additionally, the Ministry of Health 
advised those who might have been exposed at the Centre but did not receive quarantine 
orders to stay at home.388  
 
Following this closure, news accounts document that the Health Ministry asked 
all market associations in Singapore to initiate temperature screenings of hawkers,389 and 
as of April 28, 2003, all hawkers and food vendors were required to have their 
temperatures checked twice daily.390  National Environmental Agency officers were 
responsible for conducting these temperature screens and providing hawkers and food 
vendors with kits that included thermometers, record cards, informational brochures, and 
“fever-free” stickers.391   
 
 The general approach of the government of Singapore to SARS was “detect, 
isolate, and contain.”392  An underlying theme in government actions in response to 
SARS was that of social and civic responsibility on the part of residents of Singapore.  
Under this general approach the government engaged in a wide range of activities, 
including identifying cases as early as possible, isolating patients, tracing and monitoring 
contacts, and adopting and enforcing stringent infection control measures for health care 
workers and others in settings where the risk of transmission was high.  It also launched a 
number of public education campaigns, which will be discussed under “Public Reaction” 
below. 
 
                                                          
∗ US$1= SGE 1.7   
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 Concerning early identification of cases, Singapore adopted a case definition for 
SARS that was more comprehensive than the WHO case definition.393  Notification of 
suspect cases within 24 hours by email/fax by doctors was mandatory.  Doctors and 
hospitals were in turn notified of cases through circulars and the MedAlert system, a 
computerized messaging and information database.  According to the Director of Medical 
Services of the Ministry of Health, “intrahospital transmission is the most important 
amplifier of SARS infection.”394  On March 22 the government selected Tan Tock Seng 
as the sole hospital for suspected and probable SARS cases.395  When a probable SARS 
case was identified, that person was admitted for isolation and observation.  In addition, 
all acute public hospitals made preparations for creation of additional isolation facilities 
for SARS patients.  When patients were released from a hospital where a SARS case had 
been treated, they were placed under telephone surveillance for 21 days.  Additionally, as 
noted above, all discharged SARS patients were placed under mandatory home 
quarantine for 14 days.  Fever clinics were also set up at the various polyclinics in 
Singapore.   
 
 All persons having household, social, hospital, and work-related contacts with a 
SARS case during the 10 days of the incubation period (prior to symptom onset), as well 
as from the time of symptom onset to hospital admission, were identified and monitored 
under home quarantine.396  Contacts of SARS cases were called daily by National 
Environmental Agency officers.  All contacts with possible SARS symptoms were 
immediately brought to Tan Tock Seng for evaluation.   
 
 Other infection control measures included stringent temperature checks of all 
hospital staff and patients, use of protective gear (gloves, gowns, goggles, N95 or similar 
respirator) throughout all health care facilities, and isolation of staff working with SARS 
patients.  All health care workers had temperature checks twice a day beginning April 9, 
2003.397  No visitors were allowed at public health care institutions, except that one 
visitor was permitted in pediatric and obstetric cases.  Other patients were allowed 
contact with family and friends through videoconferencing.  Compliance with infection 
control measures was audited.398  The government also instituted hospital quarantine 
when clusters of health care workers or patients with fevers were identified in a particular 
work area.399  A dedicated ambulance transported suspected and probable SARS cases to 
the hospital.  This ambulance was also used to transport persons on home quarantine who 
developed SARS symptoms and persons coming from ports of entry with symptoms.   
 
 Temperature checks were also instituted at points of entry (e.g., airport thermal 
screeners) and community places and events.  Persons returning from SARS-affected 
countries with no symptoms were advised to monitor their health for 10 days, including 
twice-daily temperature checks.  Employers were allowed to impose a mandatory 10-day 
leave of absence for those returning from a SARS-affected country.400  
 
 According to the Director of Medical Services, the government actions with the 
most success during the SARS outbreak include the containment of hospital infections 
and prevention of community infections.401  In his view, the most effective measures for 
containing hospital infections were designating one hospital as the SARS hospital, 
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conducting temperature screens of all health care workers and patients, isolating staff 
caring for SARS patients, limiting and in most cases prohibiting hospital visitation, and 
enforcing use of protective gear in all health care facilities.  Because Singapore’s SARS 
cases were first identified in the hospital setting, keeping SARS out of the community 
was key to preventing its spread.  Strategies considered most effective in this area include 
a strong surveillance system, contact tracing, and enforcement of quarantine with 
penalties.  The surveillance system encompassed measures such as mandatory reporting 
of all suspected SARS cases by physicians within 24 hours, concentration of SARS cases 
at one hospital, monitoring fever clusters in hospitals and nursing homes, and temperature 
screens at community locales and events and all ports of entry.   
 
5. Coordination Issues 
 
 On March 15, 2003, the Ministry of Health set up a task force to monitor the 
SARS situation and take prompt, appropriate action.  The task force was chaired by the 
Director of Medical Services and members included various experts from the National 
Environmental Agency and hospitals.  In practice, the response to SARS in Singapore 
was orchestrated by a number of the ministries.  The Ministry of Health conducted 
telephone surveys with health care providers to assess their level of knowledge with 
respect to infection control.   Health care workers were kept continually appraised of the 
situation and case definitions via the MedAlert system.402  The Ministry of Environment 
raised standards of public health and hygiene.   
 
Action extended well beyond the two lead agencies under the Infection Control 
Act.  The Ministry of National Development and Housing, the Housing and Development 
Board, and the Town Councils instituted measures to improve cleanliness in housing 
estates.  The Ministry of Education implemented a four-pronged approach to SARS: 
Contain, Safeguard, Screen, and Isolate.403  The Ministry of Education instituted 
prevention and control measures at schools that included the closure of all primary and 
secondary schools and junior colleges and institutes from March 27 to April 6, 2003. The 
Ministry of Education further worked with the Ministry of Health in drafting its response 
measures to the isolated SARS case identified in September 2003.404  The Ministry of 
Education and the Ministry of Community Development and Sport instituted preventive 
procedures—such as temperature screening-- for child care centers and kindergartens.  
The Ministry of Defense instituted precautionary measures.  The Ministry of Manpower 
amended the Workmen’s Compensation Act to include SARS as a disease for which 
workers would be compensated and imposed a10-day quarantine on all Work Permit and 
Employment Pass workers entering Singapore from SARS-affected areas.  The Ministry 
of Home Affairs allowed illegal immigrants to receive medical care at polyclinics and 
announced they would not be prosecuted. 
 
 Also of note, the government of Singapore has committed SGD$230 million in an 
economic relief package to help businesses recover from the SARS outbreak.405   The 
relief package included money for the tourism and other tourism-related industries, and 
for the transportation sector.  The government also committed some funds for the health 
care sector through contributions to a “Courage Fund.”  The Courage Fund is a public-
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private partnership set up in April 2003 to provide financial assistance to SARS victims 
in the health care sector.406  The Courage Fund collected a total of SGD $28 million.407  
The Fund provided money to healthcare workers who had treated SARS patients.  As of 
October 27, 2003, SGD $5.5 million had been given to approximately 2,500 health care 
workers in Singapore.408  On July 1, 2003, the Minister of Health announced that 
Singapore’s government had spent SGD$300 million on SARS-related efforts.409  This 
amount does not include the SGD$230 million relief package. 
 
 International coordination and collaboration was also essential to Singapore’s 
success in controlling SARS.  From the beginning of the outbreak, laboratories in 
Singapore worked with WHO to identify and gain knowledge about the SARS virus.  
Singapore has also collaborated with laboratories in the U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention.   
 
 In addition to collaborating with WHO and the CDC, Singapore reached an 
agreement with Malaysia to cooperate in preventing the spread of SARS in eight 
particular areas through the formation of the Joint Cross-Border Health Committee. The 
focus of the agreement was to encourage the exchange of medical information relevant to 
the prevention of SARS.  The areas of focus included: epidemiology; laboratory 
investigations; public health measures; infection control practices; contact tracing and 
quarantine measures; aircraft and other vessels; citizens hospitalized with SARS; and 
status updates on SARS cases.410  Malaysia and Singapore have thus far held four 
bilateral meetings on SARS.  Both countries have agreed to expand cooperation on 
preventive measures for other infectious diseases. 
 
6. Public Reaction 
 
Public reaction to SARS control efforts in Singapore has been shaped by an 
extensive public education campaign initiated early on in the SARS outbreak.  The 
Ministry of Health provided general advice to the public regarding symptoms and the 
need to seek immediate medical attention.  Additionally, the Prime Minister delivered a 
number of public speeches on “Fighting SARS Together” and the civic duty and 
responsibility of Singaporeans to behave responsibly and abide by government measures.  
SARS toolkits were distributed by the Peoples’ Associations’ Constituency SARS Task 
Force to all residents of Singapore (containing digital thermometer, two surgical masks, 
and instruction pamphlets in four languages).  The Ministry of Health instituted a policy 
of releasing daily press statements to update the public on the status of the outbreak and 
established a SARS hotline.  The government also created an official SARS website with 
regular updates.  
 
A unique feature of the public outreach effort in Singapore was the development 
of a dedicated channel for SARS information by the Ministry of Home Affairs.  Media 
rivals joined together to launch the SARS Channel—a public service project running 
SARS information 12 hours a day (the other 12 hours consist of repeat programming).  
All programs were offered in the various languages spoken in Singapore.  
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The government also supported several campaigns aimed at improving hygiene 
and sanitation.  As information suggesting that SARS could be spread through mouth and 
nose excretions became available, the government began a campaign against spitting, 
with monetary fines for spitting in public.411  The Singapore Tourism Board’s COOL 
Singapore Campaign was launched at least in part to recognize and reward “best practices 
to ensure rigorous precautionary measures are being taken against SARS in tourist 
establishments.”412 
 
The potentially harsh economic effects of quarantine were mitigated by a Home 
Quarantine Order Allowance Scheme.  According to the official Singapore government 
SARS website, the program was administered by the Community Development Councils 
and was intended to defray the costs of home quarantine for self-employed persons and 
small businesses (those with 50 employees or less) that had to close as a result of SARS.  
The allowance because available on April 30, 2003, but all persons issued a home 
quarantine order either before or after this date were eligible.  Self-employed persons and 
employers were the only ones allowed to submit an application for the allowance.  
Employees of small businesses were required to submit their forms to their employers 
first.  Unemployed persons, those in large businesses, and persons arriving in Singapore 
on new work passes put in home quarantine were not eligible for the allowance.413   
  
The allowance consisted of a flat SGD$70 for self-employed persons, and daily 
salary up to SGD$70 for employees of small businesses closed down due to SARS and 
the absence of employees due to home quarantine.  The government advised employers 
that the home quarantine period should be treated as paid hospital leave for their 
employees under the Employment Act.  The allowance was given to self-employed 
persons in two installments: one at the beginning of the quarantine period and the second 
upon completion.  Employers were given the allowance for their employees at the end of 
the quarantine period.414  The government set aside SGD$5 million for the Home 
Quarantine Order Allowance Scheme program, and as of June 17, the government had 
spent SGD$1.2 million.415  The expectation was that many of those under home 
quarantine would not claim the allowance because they were unemployed, retired, or 
worked at home.416   
 
All individuals under home quarantine were offered assistance with grocery 
shopping, hotline numbers to call in case of emergencies or questions, and free 
transportation by a dedicated SARS ambulance should they develop SARS symptoms.  
The government provided all persons seeking treatment for SARS, including foreigners, 
with subsidized care at hospitals.417  The government also provided unspecified financial 
assistance to workers at the Pasir Panjang Wholesale Market.418 
 
 According to news reports, a total of 26 people broke quarantine. The 
government established special facilities for quarantine violators to spend the remainder 
of their quarantine period.  In at least some cases, penalties were imposed.  For example, 
one man was jailed for six months for twice leaving his home during the home quarantine 
period.419   
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A Gallup Poll conducted on April 2 and 3, 2003, surveyed 512 Singapore 
residents age 15 and above through face-to-face random sampling.  The poll found that 
the majority of people in Singapore acquired their information about SARS through 
television and newspaper accounts.  Peoples’ knowledge about SARS was high.  
Although the satisfaction with government responses was also high, fear regarding the 
spread of SARS was widespread.  The survey also inquired about behavioral changes 
during the SARS outbreak, revealing that more than half of the respondents avoided or 
minimized visits to crowded public places, one-fourth followed stringent personal 
hygiene measures, and 7% instituted self-imposed home quarantine.420 
  
In addition to the Gallup Poll, an AC Nielsen Poll was conducted to compare 
responses to SARS in Hong Kong and Singapore.  The findings of this survey indicate 
that approximately 45% of Singapore residents found the SARS virus to be of most 
concern as compared to such things as the economy, unemployment, war in Iraq, and 
personal health.421  It also showed that 38% of respondents cancelled or deferred travel 
plans as a result of the SARS outbreak.422 
 
7. Current Situation 
 
On May 31, 2003, WHO removed Singapore from its list of SARS-affected areas. 
The last reported case of SARS was on May 11, 2003, and the last probable SARS patient 
was discharged from the hospital on June 6, 2003.  No more suspected cases were 
admitted.  On July 1, 2003, the Ten Tock Seng Hospital Emergency Department resumed 
its regular operation.  Prior to July 1, the hospital was only treating SARS cases. 
Additionally, on June 13 the SARS hotline decreased operation to office hours, on July 
10 the SARS Channel stopped running, and on July 25 the Ministry of Health 
discontinued daily SARS press releases. 
 
Other measures discontinued since Singapore was removed from the WHO list 
include temperature screening in workplaces and buildings, at schools, childcare centers, 
and other children’s centers, food centers and markets, student hostels and tourism 
establishments, and government buildings.  Hospitals discontinued temperature screening 
on August 1, 2003.  Temperature monitoring of hospital staff and patients will continue 
indefinitely and arriving air, land, and sea travelers will still be screened.  Outbound 
travelers, though, will not be subject to temperature checks. 
 
Post-outbreak assessments have shown the impact of SARS on Singapore’s 
economy to be great. Visitors to the city-state fell by as much as 75%; hotel occupancy 
fell from an average of 75% to a low of 25%; and the Singapore stock market declined 
sharply both from the initial outbreak and the isolated case identified in September.423 
 
In early September, Singapore was shocked to identify a SARS case almost two 
months after WHO declared SARS to be under control and four months after Singapore’s 
last case.424  The patient was a young laboratory technician working in the National 
Environmental Health Institute laboratories.  He was quickly sent to Tan Tock Seng for 
isolation.  Additionally, 25 of the patient’s close contacts, including a provider of 
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traditional Chinese medicine, were put under home quarantine.425  Despite confirmation 
from Singapore’s Ministry of Health that this was a SARS case, and its treatment of the 
patient and his contacts as SARS cases and contacts, WHO did not find this case to be in 
line with the agency’s new guidelines.426  WHO’s new guidelines require at least two 
SARS cases to be identified in the same hospital in order to meet the post-outbreak case 
definition.427  The patient was, however, confirmed to be infected with the SARS 
coronavirus through two separate tests.428  At WHO’s urging, the Singaporean 
government sent samples to the CDC in Atlanta for analysis, where the presence of the 
SARS virus was confirmed.429   
 
The Ministry of Health put together a review panel headed by a WHO expert to 
investigate the new case.430  A Ministry of Health press release stated that the panel found 
that the most probable source of infection was the affected individual’s work at the 
Environmental Health Institute laboratories.431  As a precaution, the laboratories were 
closed for a night and disinfected and all staff that had been in contact with the patient 
were asked to voluntarily place themselves in home quarantine. 432 The government did 
not, however, issue home quarantine orders for all the staff that self-quarantined.  Panel 
recommendations included the implementation of a national legislative framework for 
“ensuring international standards in bio-safety”433 in laboratories throughout the country.  
Additionally, experts in biosafety from the CDC and WHO were sent to Singapore at the 
government’s request to examine the laboratories where the patient worked.434  WHO has 
issued a statement since the new case was identified specifying that Singapore is a safe 
travel destination and that travelers from Singapore pose no additional risk.435   
 
Intragovernmental as well as international cooperation was again evident during 
this latest SARS case.  Singapore’s early communication and seeking of advice and 
expertise from WHO and the CDC are consistent with the country’s record of open 
communication and cooperation.  Additionally, the Ministry of Health worked with the 
Ministry of Education,436 the Singapore Tourism Board, as well as other agencies and 
entities in the nation to educate the public and coordinate necessary actions to prevent a 
second wave of SARS cases.  Despite taking numerous precautionary measures, such as 
issuing 25 home quarantine orders, and openly announcing the case, the government of 
Singapore has declared this to be a case of low public health risk and definitely not an 
outbreak because it was limited to a single case, no contacts have fallen ill, and all 
necessary protective measures have been taken at the hospitals where the patient was 
treated.437     
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  E. Taiwan (Republic of China)  
  
  1. Introduction 
  
 The first suspected SARS case was a businessman who traveled to the Guangdong 
province of China in early February, returning to Taiwan through Hong Kong two weeks 
later.438  The man was not hospitalized until March 8, 2003, and his wife was later 
diagnosed with pneumonia.439 Taiwan took prompt action, receiving assistance from the 
U.S. CDC.  Although some Taiwanese researchers claim that their research with respect 
to the SARS virus was slowed by their exclusion from WHO, Taiwan was able to 
respond to the epidemic through a variety of mechanisms comparable to those 
recommended by WHO.440 
 
 Taiwan is a small island located off the southeastern coast of Mainland China. In 
1949, the Chinese national government fled to Taiwan when the Communist party took 
over China.  Since that time, China has refused to recognize the Taiwanese government, 
considering Taiwan to be a “renegade province.”441  Due to the strained relationship with 
China, Taiwan has no seat on the United Nations and has been denied membership in 
WHO since 1972, when the People’s Republic of China was admitted to the U.N.  This 
exclusion from WHO became significant during the SARS epidemic. 
 
 As of November 2002, Taiwan's total population was 22.51 million. Taiwan is 
densely populated and trails only Bangladesh in this category.  Kaohsiung City is 
Taiwan's most crowded urban area, with approximately 9,827 persons per square 
kilometer; Taipei City had 9,720 persons per square kilometer at the time of the last 
census.  Reflecting two major waves of immigration from Mainland China, one 
associated with famine in the sixteenth century and the other associated with defeats 
suffered by the Kuomintang (or Nationalist Party) at the hands of communist forces in the 
late 1940s, the Han Chinese form the largest ethnic group in Taiwan, making up roughly 
98% of the population. Taiwan's population also includes nearly 60 non-Han minorities, 
including several groups of indigenous peoples.  In 1949, after the Kuomintang 
established a capital in Taiwan, Mandarin became the official language.  However, recent 
“social pluralization” has been accompanied by a growing emphasis on native languages. 
The Ministry of Education is currently drafting a language equality law aimed at 
preserving 14 major languages and dialects: Mandarin, Taiwanese, Hakka, and 11 
indigenous languages. The draft law encourages both the government and private sectors 
to provide multilingual services.442 
 
  2. Political and Legal Systems  
 
Taiwan’s official name is the Republic of China (ROC).  Article 1 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of China states: "The Republic of China, founded on the 
Three Principles of the People, shall be a democratic republic of the people, to be 
governed by the people and for the people."443  The Three Principles of the People were 
first articulated by Kuomintang leader Sun Yat-sen and are usually translated as 
nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood.444  
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The government of the ROC is divided into three levels, the central, 
provincial/municipal, and county/city levels, each with specifically defined powers.    
The central government is composed of the Office of the President, the National 
Assembly, and five governing branches referred to as Yuans.445  The Yuans include the 
Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the 
Control Yuan. 
 
The President is the head of the executive branch of government.  On March 23, 
1996, Taiwan held its first direct presidential election with selection of a winner based on 
a plurality of the popular vote.  The inauguration of President Chen Shui-bian of the 
Democratic Progressive Party on May 20, 2000, representing an end to the Kuomintang’s 
50-year hold on the presidency, was an event of considerable national importance.446  
Among other things, the President has the power to appoint the president of the Executive 
Yuan (known as the Premier) and, with the consent of the Legislative Yuan, the 
president, vice president, and the grand justices of the Judicial Yuan; the president, vice 
president, and members of the Examination Yuan; and the president, vice president, 
auditor-general, and members of the Control Yuan. The Executive Yuan consists of 
various ministries and departments, including the Department of Health.447 
 
 Changes in the constitutional framework, culminating with amendments 
promulgated on April 25, 2000, terminated the sitting National Assembly and established 
a unicameral legislative system.  The National Assembly is now a non-standing body, 
and most of its functions have been transferred to the Legislative Yuan. The Legislative 
Yuan consists of representatives who serve for three years and are eligible for reelection.  
It presently has 225 members.  Of these, 168 are elected from the special municipalities, 
counties, and cities in the ROC (at least one member from each county and city), eight 
from the plains and mountain aborigines, eight from ROC citizens residing abroad, and 
41 from the nationwide constituency.448   
 
 The main responsibilities of the Legislative Yuan include deliberating and voting 
on legislation, budgets, emergency declarations, and other issues of national importance.  
The Legislative Yuan operates through full sessions, committees, and its secretariat. The 
first session lasts from February to the end of May, and the second from September to the 
end of December.  When necessary, a session may be extended.  If the Legislative Yuan 
disagrees with an important policy of the Executive Yuan, it may, by resolution, request 
the Executive Yuan to alter it. The Executive Yuan may, with the approval of the 
President, request reconsideration.  If after reconsideration one-half of the attending 
members of the Legislative Yuan uphold the original resolution, the Premier must either 
abide by the resolution or resign from office.449 
 
 The Council of Grand Justices interprets the Constitution and unifies the 
interpretation of laws and ordinances.  Under the Constitution of the ROC, the law cannot 
restrict Constitutional freedoms except under very limited circumstances such as when 
public order may be threatened.450 “Restrictions on constitutional freedoms are valid only 
if contained in legislation necessary to prevent restrictions against the freedom of others, 
 99
to respond to emergencies, to maintain social order, or to enhance social interest. In any 
case, arrest, trial, and punishment must be implemented strictly in accordance with proper 
legal procedures. If human rights are violated by the government, the victims are entitled 
to compensation by the state.”451   
 
 The ROC court system consists of three levels:  district courts, which hear civil 
and criminal cases at the first level; high courts at the intermediate level that hear 
appeals; and the Supreme Court at the highest appellate level, which reviews judgments 
by lower courts for compliance with pertinent laws or regulations. 452  A separate system 
exists for administrative litigation.  Any person who claims that his rights or legal 
interests are violated by an unlawful administrative action rendered by a government 
agency may institute administrative proceedings before one of three high administrative 
courts, with the possibility of appealing questions of law to the Supreme Administrative 
Court.453 
 
 The Control Yuan is responsible for monitoring the government and carrying out 
the audit function. It was formerly a parliamentary body, with its members elected by 
provincial and municipal councils.  Constitutional amendments in May 1992 transformed 
it into a quasi-judicial organization composed of the president, vice president, and 27 
other members.  The Examination Yuan is responsible for the civil service system.454   
 
The second level of government, the provincial/municipal, also has administrative 
responsibilities.  At present, only two provincial governments are operational -- the 
Taiwan Provincial Government and the Fuchien Provincial Government.  Taiwan is the 
only province completely under the effective control of the ROC; the Fuchien Provincial 
Government has delegated most of its powers to county governments.  The Taiwan 
Provincial Government has jurisdiction over the 16 counties in Taiwan and most of the 
cities with the exception of Taipei and Kaohsiung.  These two cities are considered to be 
special municipalities and are under the direct jurisdiction of the central government.  
The third level of government is the local level. The local level of government 
encompasses five cities and 16 counties.455 
 
  3. Public Health Structure and Laws 
 
From 1948 to 1972, WHO assisted Taiwan in developing the foundation of its 
public health structure.  In 1972, the People’s Republic of China was admitted to the 
United Nations forcing Taiwan out of WHO.456  To date, Taiwan’s efforts to reverse its 
exclusion from WHO have not been successful, which has been an issue of heightened 
concern to Taiwan during the SARS outbreak.  However, Taiwan has continued to 
enhance and expand its public health structure.  In fact, Taiwan presently has one of the 
highest life expectancies in Asia.457 
 
Medical care expenditures account for 5.4% of the Gross Domestic Product of 
Taiwan and the physician to individual ratio is 1/750. There are 700 hospitals; 17,000 
clinics as well as 43 acute beds/10,000 persons. To further enhance public health, in 1995 
Taiwan established a universal health insurance system providing equal access to care for 
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the entire population. Under this system, more than 96% of the population is covered by 
National Health Insurance and 96% of public and private medical care institutions have a 
contract with the National Health Insurance.458 
 
Health care policies for Taiwan are developed by the Department of Health, 
which is part of the Executive Yuan.  There are many subordinate agencies of the 
Department of Health including the Center for Disease Control, the Bureau of Health 
Promotion, the National Health Insurance Bureau, and the National Bureau of Controlled 
Drugs. The Department of Health has five key goals or areas of responsibility: (1) health 
insurance; (2) health promotion; (3) epidemic prevention; (4) consumer protection; and 
(5) international cooperation. 
 
One facet of the public health infrastructure of Taiwan is a communicable disease 
surveillance network comprised of over 450 doctors reporting weekly on a range of 
infectious diseases.459  Information from the network is made available to other 
physicians in a monthly publication, Epidemiology Bulletin.460  Prior to the SARS 
epidemic, Taiwan had established six disease surveillance centers and quarantine stations 
to control and prevent the spread of communicable diseases.461  The Department of 
Health is responsible for oversight of the nation’s quarantine stations and substations.   
  
 The Law on the Control of Communicable Diseases and the Regulations 
Governing Quarantine make up the major body of Taiwanese public health law relevant 
to the control of epidemics.  The law provides a range of measures that may be adopted 
by all levels of the government and describes measures to be taken by hospitals and 
medical personnel, the allocation of funds for actions taken pursuant to the law, and a 
range of penalties that may be imposed for violation of the law.  
 
 Article 1 of the law expresses its purpose: to “curtail the occurrence, infection 
and spread of infectious diseases.”   The law lists a number of diseases that must be 
reported.  Four categories of infectious diseases are addressed including “Type 4 
Infectious Diseases,” a catch-all which includes “[a]ny other infectious disease or 
emerging infectious disease which has been reckoned by central governing agency as 
necessary may be added to the list.”462   
 
The law gives the governing authorities of Taiwan at the central and local levels 
wide latitude to curb the spread of infectious disease.  Under Article 7, “Individuals who 
are infected with the antigen of an infectious disease and those suspected of probable 
infection who are regarded as infected patients, are bound…to undergo prescribed 
treatment and preventive measures.”463  The law further requires that affected areas be 
disinfected.  Additionally, the law grants local governing agencies discretionary authority 
in the event of an epidemic outbreak to ban or prohibit schools, meetings, banquets, or 
other types of group activities; limit the access to specific venues and place a limit on the 
number of persons that can be accommodated; and restrict part or all transportation to a 
diseased controlled area.464   
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The law also specifically addresses the issue of quarantine as a preventive 
measure.  Article 26 authorizes government agencies at all levels to quarantine and set up 
interim quarantine facilities.  Article 27 addresses quarantine for inbound and outbound 
travel, providing that “an international harbor and terminal quarantine may be conducted 
on a paid basis on all inbound and outbound transportation vehicles and the personnel and 
good on board….”465 The specifics of quarantine at ports are addressed more thoroughly 
in the Regulations Governing Quarantine. 
 
The Regulations Governing Quarantine were first promulgated by the Ministry of 
Health on June 28, 1930, and have been amended many times.  The regulations were 
developed pursuant to Article 27 of the Law on the Control of Communicable Diseases.  
Article 18 of the regulations allows for the quarantine and isolation of passengers on 
vessels and aircraft.  It provides that “the passengers . . . on board shall be kept in 
custody; and without permission of the quarantine authorities, shall not be in contact with 
other persons or commodities.”466  Passengers who have been transferred ashore to 
isolation are handled in the same manner. 
 
 4. Response to SARS 
 
To confront the threats posed by SARS, Interim Regulations on SARS Control 
were developed by the Department of Health based on the Law on the Control of 
Communicable Diseases and Regulations Governing Quarantine.  The Interim 
Regulations were designed to strengthen control during the SARS outbreak.467 
 
A variety of quarantine and isolation measures were undertaken in Taiwan to curb 
the spread of SARS.  Initially, Taiwan refused to impose health screening at immigration 
checkpoints, and quarantine measures were more lax than in other affected areas.  
Effective April 28, however, a mandatory 10-day quarantine was imposed on anyone 
arriving from Hong Kong, Mainland China, and other SARS-infected areas as designated 
by WHO.468  Taiwan’s measures were more stringent than  the WHO recommendations 
issued on May 15.  Those from SARS-affected areas were required to wear masks prior 
to boarding for departure for Taiwan and were not permitted to board if they did not do 
so.    Passengers arriving in Taiwan from an area unaffected by SARS, but with a change 
of planes in a SARS-infected area, were not subject to home quarantine if they had a 
normal temperature reading, but they were subject to enhanced monitoring. 
 
Arriving passengers were required to complete a SARS survey form and wear a 
surgical mask before deplaning.  Providing misinformation on the survey form is 
considered to be actionable under the law.  Temperature screening of all passengers was 
performed, and passengers were issued a “Notice of Compulsory Quarantine for Special 
Epidemic Prevention.”469  Passengers had the choice of undergoing quarantine at an 
airport transit hotel, at home, or at an employer-designated compulsory quarantine 
location.470   
 
If they selected quarantine at a transit hotel, passengers were provided with 
transportation on a chartered vehicle.471 The hotel notified Taiwan’s Center for Disease 
 102
Control, and it monitored those under quarantine according to the regulations detailed in 
the quarantine notice.472  Individuals were free to leave if they did not exhibit any 
symptoms after 10 days of quarantine.  
 
Those opting for home quarantine, referred to as Level B Home Quarantine, were 
asked to avoid public transportation and had to come to the public health office within 24 
hours.  The office then assumed responsibility for monitoring the individual.473  If the 
quarantined individual went outside of the quarantine area (with permission) the 
individual had to wear a mask at all times and was prohibited from using any public 
transportation.  After 10-days, if no symptoms developed the individual was released 
from supervision.  Those individuals who chose to be quarantined at an employer-
designated site were provided with room and board by the employer. The employer was 
responsible for monitoring the individual. Those employees under mandatory quarantine 
could not come in contact with employees not subject to quarantine, and all sites 
designated for quarantine needed to have good ventilation and not be connected to a 
central air-conditioning system.474 
 
Quarantine could also be mandated when a person was in close contact with 
someone diagnosed with SARS.  This is referred to as Level A Home Quarantine.475  
These individuals could not leave their home without prior written approval from a health 
authority.  If such authority was granted, the designated health authority was responsible 
for arranging for transportation for the individual.476  Very specific guidelines were 
issued with respect to the actions that must and must not be taken while under 
compulsory home quarantine.  For example, masks had to be worn to protect others, and 
if fever or respiratory symptoms occurred, the individual was required to seek medical 
attention immediately and provide details of all recent contacts.477  No matter what the 
level of quarantine, all persons subject to quarantine orders had to take and record their 
temperature two or three times daily.478 
In May 2003, the Department of Health published a review of the penalties 
imposed for violation of the Communicable Disease Control Act in an effort to tighten 
control over the spread of SARS.  According to the Government Information Office, the 
purpose of enforcing home quarantine was three-fold: (1) managing and supervising 
persons under home quarantine; (2) providing supportive services to those subject to 
home quarantine; and (3) communicating with those under quarantine and implementing 
community education.479  
  
 On May 6, 2003, the SARS Contingency Committee, Department of 
Health/Taiwanese CDC, published a list of common violations of SARS-related laws or 
regulations and their subsequent penalties.480  The list pertained to infractions by the 
general public, medical staff, and healthcare facilities.  It included: refusing, avoiding or 
hindering compliance with health screening measures, the execution of spot-checks by 
health authorities on passenger or cargo transportation, or the enforcement of home or 
group quarantine, failure to comply with an isolation treatment order or violation of 
instructions from the health authorities during the quarantine period and/or entering a 
designated isolation area without authorization; physician failure to report SARS cases 
within the time period designated by law; healthcare institution failure to inform referring 
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hospitals of the health condition of the referred patient, deliver proper care to patients 
with infectious diseases, and prevent infection, and/or turning people away without 
reason; medical personnel failure to adopt proper infection control while caring for 
patients, risking the spread of infection; failure to place the body of a deceased SARS 
patient in a closed coffin and cremate the body within 24 hours; refusal to work upon the 
request of the governments’ use of empty buildings, equipment, vehicles, ships, airplanes, 
etc. for disease control purposes; suspecting infection with SARS but failing to abide by 
government orders, risking the spread of disease to others; and violation of the inspection 
and importation regulations regarding the control of infectious diseases or spreading a 
virus in a manner that puts the public in danger. 
 
 Penalties for these violations include fines ranging amounts from NT $1,000 to 
NT $500,000∗ and/or prison terms up to a maximum of three years. For example, 
providing inaccurate information on a SARS survey form is punishable by fines NT $60 
to NT $300,000 according to Article 41 of the Law of Communicable Diseases Control 
and by incarceration for up to two years in accordance with Article 192 of the Criminal 
Code of the ROC.  Additionally, the Cabinet in Taipei City Government will punish 
medical personnel and institutions who do not cooperate with quarantine orders by 
imposing fines anywhere from NT $60,000 to NT $240,000.  Currently, medical 
personnel are required to report suspect cases of SARS within 24 hours.  Other penalties 
may include fines, jail time, and/or revocation of a medical license.481 
 
 Other enforcement measures were also instituted.  For example, violators of 
quarantine were assigned a site for compulsory group quarantine (in addition to fines and 
imprisonment).  Home quarantine was enforced through the use of web-based cameras at 
the height of the outbreak.  Additionally, because of the widespread panic of health care 
workers and the refusal of some to work with SARS patients or in facilities treating 
SARS patients, health officials considered firing staff nurses who refused to work and 
revoking licenses of many freelance nurses the hospitals often use as a way to save 
money. The Health Department fined three physicians NT $90,000 (US $2600) and three 
hospitals NT $1.5 million (US $43,000) each for covering up or delaying the reporting of 
possible SARS cases.  
 
 Health care institutions at risk of penalties provided incentives for health care 
workers to accept risks related to caring for actual or suspected SARS patients.  During 
the height of the epidemic nearly 160 health care workers resigned for fear of contracting 
SARS.  (It is worth noting that at least some resigned in the belief that hospital infection 
control measures were inadequate.)  Because so many doctors and nurses were resigning, 
hospitals were offering “danger pay” to those working in SARS wards.  
 
  5. Coordination Issues 
 
 At the central government level, the Taiwanese Center for Disease Control took 
several actions to control the SARS epidemic, including activating its Disease Outbreak 
                                                          
∗ At current exchange rates, NT $1 is roughly equivalent to US $0.03.  “NT” stands for New Taiwan 
(dollar). 
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Emergency Operations Center; conducting surveillance to detect probable cases of 
SARS; following WHO guidelines and reporting to WHO; investigating and evaluating 
reported cases of SARS; issuing guidelines and recommendations on clinical measures, 
laboratory testing, quarantine, isolation, infection control, and exposure management; 
strengthening airport quarantine; coordinating and providing support to local health 
authorities for local control centers; and educating members of the public on how to 
protect themselves.   At the central government level, the agency called for intersectoral 
cooperation among various departments and subdepartments of the Executive Yuan, 
specifically, the Council of Labor Affairs, the Mainland Affairs Council, the Civil 
Aeronautics Administration, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of 
Communications, and the Government Information Office. 
 
 Coordination of the various levels of government was no easy task in Taiwan.  
Because of an adversarial relationship between the President and the mayor of Taipei, 
coordination of efforts was quite difficult according to some reports.   The Department of 
Health and the local governments required support from the Ministry of Defense, the 
National Health Insurance Bureau, the Center for Disease Control, and the Taipei city 
government to establish fever screening stations.  
 
 Despite strained relations with WHO due to tensions with the PRC, Taiwan 
participated in the global WHO SARS conference held in Kuala Lumpur.  Before that 
meeting, the United States sent a team from the CDC to assist Taiwanese government 
health officials.  Additionally, on May 3, 2003, Mainland China provided permission for 
two investigators from WHO to visit Taiwan.  The investigators, however, were 
prohibited from contacting Taiwanese government officials.   An example of regional 
coordination was the invitation from the Taiwanese SARS Contingency Committee to 
Vietnamese representatives to share their experiences in dealing with SARS.  
 
  6. Public Reaction 
 
 The government of Taiwan recognized a need to educate members of the public to 
ensure that they would have an understanding of SARS, thus enabling them to prevent 
the spread of the epidemic.  In addition to conveying messages of good personal hygiene, 
the government also stressed the need for quarantine as a mechanism for epidemic 
prevention.   To accomplish this widespread education, the government emphasized the 
need for local governments to bring together health and social welfare personnel to 
provide lists of lectures and offer promotional materials and enhance education of 
teachers, students and other school personnel as well as the community.  
 
 The priority of public education was especially high given numerous complaints 
about panic-inducing reports in the news.   The Government Information Office called for 
non-government media outlets to exercise restraint in coverage of the epidemic.   
Additionally, the Premier ordered the Government Information Office to “monitor 
exaggerated or false SARS-related reports, clarify any false reports and demand that 
corrections are made” to ease the public’s concerns.  
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 To quell public fears about the spread of SARS, the Department of Health 
developed a news program entitled “SARS Front-line.”   The program was intended to 
provide the public with accurate information about SARS, inform the public about 
government policies relevant to the prevention of SARS, and educate the public about 
protective measures.   The show, hosted by an epidemiologist, aired during the evening 
news.  
 
 Taiwan implemented a number of other measures to protect the rights of those 
affected by isolation and quarantine and minimize resistance.  For example, guest 
workers who were quarantined were paid salaries and had their jobs secure and medical 
bills were paid by the Taiwanese government.  Additionally, families of workers who 
died from SARS at work were entitled to up to 45 months of salary, subject to approval 
by Taiwanese insurers and humanitarian aid.  For those under home quarantine the 
government provided a range of assistance.  Subjects were called at home and provided 
with as much psychological support as possible, and home care was provided to family 
members affected by home quarantine. Economic assistance, including stipends, was 
provided to those receiving a notice of home quarantine, complying with the regulations, 
and found to be uninfected with SARS. Those who completed the quarantine period were 
paid an amount equivalent to nearly US$150.   In some cases, other assistance was 
provided. “The additional assistance needs of persons under home quarantine will be 
evaluated and provided for through the use of public resources or by conveying such 
requirements to the competent authorities.” 482 
 
 To determine compliance with home quarantine orders, the Department of Health 
conducted a telephone survey of 100 individuals under quarantine.  The survey indicated 
that 85% of respondents were at home when called and 70% were found to have never 
left their homes. 483 
 
  7. Current Situation 
 
 Enforcement of Taiwan’s regulations with respect to SARS took a political toll - - 
both the Minister of Health and the director of the Center for Disease Control were forced 
to resign following allegations that their responses to the SARS outbreak were too slow, 
in particular in infection control measures in hospitals.   One theory on the resignation of 
the Minister of Health is that he did not respond to the city government’s call to declare 
SARS an infectious disease, resulting in less stringent measures being taken by medical 
personnel, which led to the spread of the virus within the health care setting.  
 
 A report by the U.S. CDC published in Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports 
reviewed the quarantine measures instituted in Taiwan to prevent the spread of SARS.  
The report indicated that only a small percentage (0.2%) of those quarantined were fined 
for violation of a quarantine order.484   Very few of those under quarantine were later 
diagnosed with probable or suspected SARS, and far fewer actually had a confirmed 
diagnosis of SARS. The report concluded that “more study is needed to determine 
whether the logistics and costs of quarantine warrants its use.”  
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 Similar analysis by the Department of Health no doubt led to its September 
announcement of its plans to modify the SARS quarantine policy.  The new approach 
adopted by the Taiwanese Center for Disease Control is “no fever, no quarantine.”   This 
action was taken based upon the fact that during the SARS outbreak, more than 95,000 
people were placed under quarantine and only 12 were found to be potential SARS cases, 
with only two being confirmed cases of SARS.   The enormous cost of such an approach 
led to the modification.  Under the new plan, arriving passengers to Taiwan will be 
hospitalized for observation for three days if they are found to be running a fever.  
 
 In addition to modification of quarantine measures, Taiwan also announced SARS 
prevention measures in preparation for a resurgence.  These include infection control 
measures for health care facilities and oversight of medical supplies, as well as better 
coordination of government agencies.  For example, during the height of the flu season, 
individuals with fever will be diagnosed in a hospital to ensure that they are not suffering 





  F. Socialist Republic of Vietnam  
 
  1. Introduction 
 
  Vietnam, located on the Indochinese Peninsula in southeast Asia, is a country 
with a rich and tumultuous history.  It is a predominantly mountainous country with 
challenging topography—only 20% of the country is level land—and seven distinct 
geographical areas.486 Seventy-five percent of Vietnam’s almost 80 million inhabitants 
live in rural areas. The main urban centers are Hanoi (capital) and Ho Chi Minh City.  
Vietnamese is the official language, with a significant French language presence and a 
number of Chinese dialects and tribal languages also spoken.487  
 
 On February 28, 2003, Vietnam reported its first case of SARS.  A Chinese-
American businessman coming from southern China was admitted to the Hanoi French 
Hospital.  A WHO infectious disease expert, Dr. Carlo Urbani, was contacted.  Dr. 
Urbani promptly alerted the Vietnamese government of the disease and eventually coined 
the term “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.”  The SARS epidemic in Vietnam was 
primarily hospital-based and all cases were traced to the initial index case.  The hospital, 
a small 60-bed facility, immediately isolated the patient and staff working in the ward.  
Five of the physicians in the ward died of SARS.  The rest remained in self-imposed 
quarantine to prevent the spread of SARS. 
 
 The last SARS patient was released on May 2, 2003, bringing the total of all 
SARS patients in Vietnam to 68, with five fatalities between January 11, 2003 and June 
7, 2003.  The last probable SARS case was reported on April 28.  Vietnam’s clinical 
management of SARS patients was somewhat different from other countries.  Because of 
the newness of the disease, each country evaluated cases to ascertain various important 
disease characteristics, such as incubation period, mode of transmission, and type and 
severity of symptoms.  In Vietnam, the incubation period was found to be 4-5 days, as 
opposed to the 10 days cited by WHO.  Additionally, all cases in Vietnam could be traced 
to the initial index case mentioned above.  After the index case, all new cases were 
nosocomial and limited to hospital staff.  Vietnam was the first country to contain the 
spread of the SARS virus and to be pronounced SARS-free by the World Health 
Organization.   
 
 The experience of Vietnam with SARS is particularly interesting because of 
Vietnam’s limited resources relative to the other affected countries.   
 
  
  2. Political and Legal Systems 
 
 Vietnam has survived various invasions and conquests culminating in its 
declaration of independence in 1945 and thus becoming the first independent republic in 
southeast Asia.488  In 1954, however, the Geneva Accords divided Vietnam into a 
Communist north and a U.S.-supported south prompting a long, drawn-out war with U.S. 
involvement until the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement.489  In 1975, the country reunified and 
 108
was renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.  Today, Vietnam is governed by a single 
party, the Communist Party, but like China it has changed significantly in recent years.  
In 1986, the Vietnamese government announced a new strategy of doi moi—or 
renovation—committing itself to both internal reforms and expanded external 
relationships.   As a result, Vietnam has adopted market-oriented policies, creating a 
socialist market-economy under state management.  This shift has, in turn, affected its 
political structure by way of the country’s increasing participation in the international 
economy.490   
 
 The country is divided into 53 provincial administrative units, which are in turn 
further divided into districts and communes. The government is divided into four levels: 
the central level, the provincial and urban authorities, the urban precincts and rural 
districts, and the urban wards and rural communes.  The primary governing body in 
Vietnam at the central level is the unicameral National Assembly, the country’s 
legislature.  The National Assembly was established in 1992 when the country’s 
Constitution was rewritten.  The National Assembly is charged with electing the 
President, the Prime Minister, the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People’s Court, and 
the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People’s Office of Supervision and Control.  
Further, the National Assembly has both constitutional and legislative power and is 
charged with making both domestic and foreign policy, including addressing matters of 
social and economic welfare and national defense and security.  The National Assembly 
is composed of 498 members elected by popular vote.491  The National Assembly 
membership is open to both Communist Party members and nonmembers, although in 
practice, approximately 90% of the members belong to the Communist Party.492 
 
 The President serves as the representative of Vietnam internationally and is the 
commander in chief of the armed forces.  The Prime Minister is the head of the executive 
arm of the National Assembly and carries out the political, social, cultural, economic, 
national security and foreign duties of the government   assisted by five deputy prime 
ministers and the cabinet.  Vietnam currently has 17 ministries and nine state 
committees.493 
 
 The main judicial institutions in Vietnam are the Supreme People’s Court and the 
Supreme People’s Procuracy.  The Supreme People’s Court is Vietnam’s highest court 
and its responsibilities include “organization and implementation of all stages of judicial 
work, including hearing appeals, reviewing judgments, supervising the implementation of 
sentences passed by lower-level courts; the organization and conducting of professional 
training of judges, jurors and other court staff; providing professional guidance for 
drafting legal documents as requested by the National Assembly; providing professional 
guidance to local courts; and carrying out a review of judicial practice.”494   The Supreme 
People’s Procuracy is responsible for enforcing adherence to the law by all ministries, 
other entities of the government, social organizations, and all citizens, and has the power 
to initiate public prosecution.  Other judicial bodies include the People’s Courts, military 
tribunals, and other tribunals set up by the National Assembly for special situations.495   
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 Although local government is subordinate to and controlled by the central 
government, each local administrative unit has a People’s Council which serves as its 
legislative body and a People’s Committee which serves as its executive body.  People’s 
Committees are charged with maintaining law and order, carrying out budgetary policies, 
implementing policies from higher administrative levels, and developing socio-economic 
plans.496   People’s Councils are responsible for implementing basic social services and 
issuing plans and decisions.  Provincial and district level administrative units also have 
People’s Courts and People’s Procuraries.  
 
 Vietnam’s legal system is based on Communist legal theory and the French civil 
law system.  The 1992 Constitution guarantees all citizens fundamental rights including 
freedom of speech, press, demonstration, assembly, association, belief, religion and non-
belief, equal rights between men and women, and rights to education and health care.  
The 1992 Constitution also emphasizes the importance of the “law-based state” and 
making the law the “primary regulatory instrument.”497  In addition to the Constitution, 
Vietnam has a total of 90 laws and ordinances.  Laws in Vietnam “tend to be phrased in 
broad and general terms,” meaning ministries and local agencies must develop 
implementing regulations and guidelines without clear legislative guidance.498 
 
 An important feature of Vietnam’s Constitution is a stress on the responsibilities 
as well as rights associated with citizenship.  Article 51 of the 1992 Constitution states:  
“[A] citizen’s rights are inseparable from his duties.  The State guarantees the rights of 
the citizen; the citizen must fulfill his duties to the State and society.  The citizen’s rights 
and duties are determined by the Constitution and the law.”499  In Article 61 a statement 
that all citizens are “entitled to a regime of health protection”500 is complemented by a 
statement that all citizens have the duty to “observe all regulations on disease prevention 
and public hygiene.”501   
 
  3. Public Health Structure and Laws 
 
 The government of Vietnam provides health care to its citizens through a network 
of state-run facilities at the various government levels: central, provincial, district, and 
commune. The Ministry of Health provides health care management at the central level 
and is also in charge of delineating policy at all levels.  The Provincial and District 
Health Bureaus provide health care management at their respective levels.  The situation 
varies at the commune level, with some communes receiving health care administration 
from the district level and others relying solely on the staff at the commune health 
stations.  The commune level receives financial support from the Ministry of Health.  All 
levels of health care are under the control of the central government and the People’s 
Committees at the appropriate level.  However, the Ministry of Health has little to no 
control over budgetary issues at the provincial level as such issues are decided by the 
Provincial People’s Committees.502    
 
 Vietnam’s health infrastructure has grown tremendously in the past decades.  In 
1945, there were 47 hospitals in the country, by the late 1970s there were about 713 
hospitals, and today there are approximately 800 hospitals.503  Although these hospitals 
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are predominantly government-owned, the Ministry of Health only controls about 18% of 
them.504  Some of the other hospitals are controlled by the Ministry of Defense and the 
Ministry of the Interior and are intended for use by government officials and the central 
leadership.505  In addition, many hospitals at the district level are supported by Overseas 
Development Aid.506  A more recent development, particularly in larger cities, is the 
inclusion of private, for-profit clinics within publicly-owned hospitals.507  Despite this 
growth, however, “hospital services are still limited”508 by Western standards. 
 
Vietnam’s predominantly rural population poses a great challenge to access to 
health care services.  To address this challenge, Vietnam has developed a vast community 
health care network.  District health centers and district hospitals are now available in all 
districts and most communes have a health center as well.509  According to the World 
Bank, approximately 97% of the rural population has access to a public health center 
within their commune.510   
 
 Recently, private health care was made legal, although the central government 
still maintains some control over prices.511  There are approximately 11,000 medical 
facilities, and the ratio of physicians to population is one physician/1,000 persons.512  
Because Vietnam is largely a poor country, it depends on international aid to the Ministry 
of Health for much of its health expenditures.513  Traditional medicine plays a significant 
role in Vietnam’s health care services and it is a goal of the central government to 
“promote and develop” traditional medicine.514  
 
 The public health legislation in Vietnam, the “Law on People’s Health 
Protection,” was approved by the National Assembly in 1989.   
 
  4. Response to SARS 
 
 Although the SARS epidemic did not prompt any amendments to the Law on 
People’s Health Protection, the Departments of Health Legislation, Preventive Medicine, 
and HIV/AIDS Control under the Ministry of Health are considering possible changes to 
the legislation in light of the events surrounding the SARS epidemic.515 
 
 The Vietnamese government’s response to SARS was prompt and included public 
acknowledgement of the epidemic from the outset.  The use of isolation and quarantine 
was a key measure to the containment of the spread of SARS.  The Law on People’s 
Health Protection governs public health practice in Vietnam, but the specific procedures 
for quarantine and isolation are not available and it has not been possible to access the 
actual legislation.516  The Ministry of Health enforces quarantine and isolation; the Health 
Quarantine Service is housed in the Ministry of Health.  Ministries and other government 
agencies are allowed to issue ordinances and regulations.  It is possible that the authority 
for quarantine and isolation comes from a regulation or ordinance issued by the Ministry 
of Health and/or from the Law on People’s Health Protection.  Because details regarding 
the legislative authority is not known for quarantine and isolation in Vietnam, no detailed 
information on enforcement is available.   
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 The government of Vietnam took the approach that “SARS is a political 
challenge”517 when handling the containment of the epidemic.  Even before the first case 
in Vietnam the government took action based on reports of cases of atypical pneumonia 
in southern China.  Soon after the reports began appearing, the Ministry of Health alerted 
hospitals and officials in the provinces bordering China about the possibility of SARS 
entering Vietnam through its borders.518   
 
 Vietnam’s efforts to contain SARS included identification of persons with SARS, 
their movements and contacts; isolation of SARS patients in hospitals; protection of 
medical staff treating these patients; identification and isolation of suspected SARS 
cases; exit screening of international travelers; and reporting and sharing information 
with other authorities and/or governments.519  For example, the Ministry of Health 
developed preventive guidelines, “Ten Measures for Prevention Against SARS,” that 
were distributed to communities and to local medical workers.520  The 10 guidelines 
were: (1) Minimize close contact with patients.  If contact is necessary, use protective 
gear such as gloves and masks.  (2)  Isolate source of disease.  Sterilize, clean disease 
area with Chlormin B.  Sterilize all used equipment, garments, etc.  (3) Understand the 
symptoms of the disease to identify early, accurately and completely the death of patients 
and cases of people who are ill but without symptoms.  Then organize the isolation and 
treatment immediately.  Control each individual, each family. (4) Do not gather or have 
meetings, unless necessary, in an area where SARS is suspected.  (5) Set up isolation 
areas in hospitals or clinics that have patients in treatment.  Circulate air in schools and 
hospital rooms.  Increase space between working areas.  (6) Use antibiotics or a 
combination of antibiotics to treat respiratory problems.  (7) Patients with respiratory 
symptoms need to be observed and treated immediately.  (8) All clinics, preventive 
clinics, Pasteur Institute, hospitals for infectious disease, and emergency rooms need to 
be prepared for any situation.  (9) Promote daily personal hygiene; hygiene for nose and 
throat using antibacterial liquid, use a combination of antibiotics to protect the respiratory 
system.  (10) Apply all procedures to prevent an epidemic; report cases according to the 
Order dated December 6, 2002 from the Health Department.521  
 
These guidelines were supplemented by a number of training initiatives.  The 
Ministry of Health and the Vietnam National Administration of Tourism (VNAT) joined 
together to provide a training course for tourism agencies and others in the tourism 
industry on ways to prevent SARS.522 The VNAT also established a SARS Steering 
Committee to coordinate actions to prevent, detect, and control SARS.  The committee 
worked with the media to inform travelers and was charged with setting both short- and 
long-term plans for the tourism industry to deal with SARS.  The Ministry of Public 
Health was asked by the Prime Minister to begin training courses at the local level to 
educate people in border areas and other high-risk areas in the prevention of SARS.523  In 
early May, the National SARS Steering Committee held a training workshop for the six 
northern border provinces to discuss ways to prevent SARS from re-entering the country 
from China.524  In May 2003, a two-day workshop for health workers, police, soldiers,  
and border guards on SARS detection, treatment, and quarantine was held in Quang Ninh 
province, which borders China.525  Further, many local governments held training for 
medical and health workers on the prevention and control of SARS. 
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 Vietnam implemented strict quarantine and isolation measures from the beginning 
of the SARS outbreak.  The Ministry of Health posted on its website the definitions of 
SARS suspicious cases and SARS cases consistent with information from WHO.526  The 
Ministry also made available information sheets for those who had close contacts and 
social contacts of SARS patients or anyone who had been in a SARS-affected country.  
These sheets provided information on voluntary isolation at home (10 days and under 
monitoring by local health workers) and for monitoring only.527  Family members of 
SARS patients and others who had close contacts with SARS patients were located and 
monitored by health workers.528  The Ministry of Health set up six SARS Mobile Teams 
to detect, prevent, and treat SARS cases.  These teams were composed of physicians, 
nurses, medical workers, and drivers.  The teams were equipped with medicines and the 
necessary vehicles to transport and isolate SARS cases.529   
 
 The government selected two hospitals for isolation of SARS cases—the Hanoi 
French Hospital and the Tropical Medicine Institute of the Bach Mai Hospital.  On March 
11, the Hanoi French Hospital stopped admitting new patients and prohibited visitors 
from entering to prevent the spread of SARS.530  Two other hospitals were prepared to 
serve as isolation centers should the need arise.531  The Military Hygiene and 
Epidemiology Institute assisted the Hanoi French Hospital in sterilizing its grounds to 
prevent the spread of SARS within the hospital.532  Vietnam imposed more stringent 
hospital discharge requirements than those recommended by WHO.  The Ministry of 
Health issued discharge protocols that went beyond WHO guidelines by requiring that 
patients be without a fever for five days; have clinical improvement; have normal blood 
examinations; have stable and improved chest x-rays; and have at least seven days in 
convalescence.533  Vietnam also followed different screening, diagnosing, treating, and 
discharging guidelines than other countries.  The Tropical Medicine Institute maintained 
contact with all discharged patients for up to a month after being discharged from the 
hospital.534   
 
 All 61 provinces and cities designated at least one quarantine area.  SARS 
Prevention Boards were set up in six northern provinces and at the port city of Haiphong.  
The boards were headed by the chairmen of the People’s Committees.  These boards 
worked closely with the Ministry of Health, border guards, police, immigration, and 
quarantine agencies.  Part of each province’s budget was reallocated to purchase 
necessary medical equipment.  Additionally, northern provinces received help from 
special medical teams created by the Ministry of Health.535  Although no SARS cases 
were reported in Ho Chi Minh City, the city also set up a SARS control board, and 
preventive measures were taken at the city’s medical centers.   
 
 Because of Vietnam’s expansive border with China, restrictions on entry or travel 
were particularly significant.  It is estimated that approximately 5,000 persons travel 
between China and Vietnam on a daily basis.536  Seven of the 68 cases of SARS in 
Vietnam were from the northern provinces; the rest of the SARS cases were from a single 
city, Hanoi.537  The government instituted stringent control of border entry points and 
maintained them even after WHO declared Vietnam SARS free.538  The Prime Minister 
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ordered the implementation of emergency epidemic prevention committees and doubled 
the personnel of the quarantine forces in the northern provinces bordering China.539  The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up checkpoints at all ports of entry.540  Infrared thermal 
imagers were installed at airports, and temperature screenings were implemented at all 
borders and airports for those entering the country.  Anyone with a temperature above 
38C was placed under mandatory quarantine.  Persons returning to Vietnam from a 
SARS-affected area were given the option to register to self-quarantine at home and 
undergo supervision by local medical clinic workers,541 or at a medical center.   
Quarantine stations were also set up at border checkpoints, airports, seaports, and at 54 
local hotels. 
 
 As an added measure to controlling entry points, the Health Department required 
that medical preventive centers at border provinces report daily by fax on the number, 
nationality, and status of arrivals to the Epidemic Prevention Agency.542  In late March, 
the Ministry of Health issued an Arrival/Departure medical card used to screen for SARS 
symptoms or exposures of all arriving and departing travelers by all air, land, and sea 
entry ports.  Vietnamese citizens from SARS affected areas completed health forms and 
had to provide health certificates from the country of origin and had to undergo a 10-day 
mandatory quarantine at a local medical clinic.  Foreigners from affected areas completed 
health forms and had to provide health certificates and were required to have regular 
health checks and provide addresses and telephone numbers during their stay in Vietnam.  
On March 19, 2003, the Health Department issued a letter to all local health departments 
dealing with infectious diseases to follow a set of 11 measures issues by the government.  
Among these, local health departments were asked to work closely with the Customs 
Department and police in enforcing SARS measures; assign medical personnel to handle 
passengers from airplanes and buses; notify all passengers of SARS symptoms and 
distribute Arrival/Departure Medical Forms to all travelers; send information, including 
case definition, on SARS symptoms to all ports of entry; distribute “Ten Measures for 
Prevention Against SARS” to all travelers; and report immediately to the Health 
Department on all issues relating to SARS.543  In late March 2003, the Airport Authority 
set up a task force to monitor all flights coming and going from SARS-affected areas.544   
 
 Persons who wanted to leave Vietnam were given a health examination and issued 
a health declaration if no symptoms or fever were present.  If the person had any 
symptoms or fever he or she would not be allowed to travel and would be placed on 
mandatory observation and be treated medically as needed.545   
 
Some of the more extreme measures included the government’s quarantine of 
2,000 Vietnamese students evacuated from China for 10-14 days upon their return to 
Vietnam,546 and the northern province of Quang Ninh’s decision to turn away all Chinese 
visitors seeking to enter the province in late April.  In the latter case, an exception was 
made for Chinese traders contingent upon a clean health exam conducted by Vietnamese 
health workers prior to entry.547   
 
 The national government provided a substantial amount of financial support, 
equivalent to US $5.3 million, for medicine, disinfectant, equipment, and other necessary 
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supplies to combat the SARS outbreak.548  Additionally, the northern province of Ninh 
Binh, which borders China, spent a substantial amount of money (VN $1.3 billion) on 
equipment, medicine, and protective gear for health workers.549  The Finance Ministry 
allocated VN $30 billion for the prevention of SARS.  The majority of the money was 
spent on medical equipment.  Also, the Ministry of Finance provided licensing support 
for the Vietnam-Russia Medical Centre to develop masks that could prevent the 
transmission of SARS under WHO guidelines.550 
 
 Personnel participating in the prevention of the spread of SARS and the treatment 
of SARS patients received a government allowance of five times the amount normally 
given to health care workers, as authorized by an order issued by the Treasury 
Department.  Funds for this increase were paid by each medical institution later to be 
reimbursed by the Health Department upon receiving the complete reports.551  
 
  5. Coordination Issues 
 
 On March 19, after an emergency central government meeting to discuss SARS, 
an Inter-Governmental Steering Committee (IGSC) on SARS headed by the Health 
Minister and reporting directly to the Deputy Prime Minister was established.552   The 
committee was charged with educating the public, monitoring SARS patients, ensuring 
isolation of SARS patients, and providing for coordination within the government on 
SARS issues.   The committee included members from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Civil Aviation, Culture and Information, Public Security, National Defense, Finance, and 
Transport.  The IGSC was subdivided into four subcommittees: surveillance and 
containment; clinical management; information, education, and communication (IEC); 
and logistics.553  The IGSC met on a daily basis from March 19 to mid-April554 and 
produced a number of recommendations for the Ministry of Health.  Additionally, in the 
weeks following the inception of the national IGSC task force, local task forces were 
implemented in 38 out of the 61 provinces and cities of Vietnam.555  Also on a local 
level, SARS Prevention Boards established in six northern provinces and one port city 
worked closely with the Ministry of Health, border guards, police, immigration, and 
quarantine agencies.     
 
 Officials at the provincial level were required to report daily with updates on 
SARS.  All localities were told to immediately isolate suspected SARS cases and send 
them via a special ambulance to one of the two designated hospitals.556  Other examples 
of coordination or cooperation within the government include the coordinated detection 
and quarantine activities undertaken at border points by the Ministry of Health, Public 
Security, Finance, Transportation, Agriculture, and Rural Development. These multi-
ministerial groups were called Quarantine Forces.   The Ministry of Health and the 
VNAT coordinated activities directed at tourists and travelers and education for those 
working at entry points, as described in more detail above.  Throughout the SARS 
outbreak the government of Viet Nam presented an image of continued cooperation 
between the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Transportation, 
Ministry of National Defense, and the General Organization of Customs.557  Details on 
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the level of coordination and cooperation and the ease with which this cooperation took 
place are not available from sources not affiliated with the central government. 
 
 The central government of Vietnam worked closely with WHO from the outset of 
the epidemic.  The Hanoi French Hospital informed the Ministry of Health of the first 
case of atypical pneumonia on March 5.  That same day the Hanoi Health Service was 
sent to investigate.  A few days later, on March 9, the first meeting was held with WHO 
experts.558  As noted in the introduction to this case study, it was in fact a WHO official, 
Dr. Carlo Urbani, who named SARS after examining the patient at the Hanoi French 
Hospital.  In early April, more experts from WHO were sent to Vietnam to assist the 
government in handling the SARS outbreak.559  The IGSC served to coordinate 
communication efforts between the government and international experts, inclucding the 
WHO representatives.560 
 
 Vietnam also received technical assistance from Singapore, Japan, and the World 
Bank.  Additionally, the Asian Development Bank reallocated US $6.17 million to help 
in the fight against SARS.561  Vietnam also received technical and financial support and 
assistance from the CDC in the United States, Malaysia, France, and Australia.  In 
addition to providing technical assistance, the Japanese government donated thousands of 
masks, protective suits, and gloves to Vietnam for use by health workers.562   
 
 Vietnam worked with Taiwan to protect the safety and health of Vietnamese 
workers in Taiwan.  The Taiwanese government’s regulations provide for guest workers 
who were suspected of having an infectious disease to be quarantined based upon the 
guidance of health authorities.563  Under the regulations, workers would be guaranteed 
their jobs and would continue to be paid their salaries while in quarantine.564   
Additionally, the Taiwanese government assured families of guest workers that if a guest 
worker died of SARS while working in Taiwan they would receive up to 45 months of 
salary, contingent upon approval by the Taiwanese government and availability of 
government and humanitarian aid funds.565  
 
  6. Public Reaction 
 
 Vietnamese officials concluded at the end of the SARS outbreak that the epidemic 
was a political challenge necessitating both political and technical measures.566  They 
also considered SARS an ethical challenge that required a great degree of transparency of 
action to the public and the media.567  The Prime Minister acknowledged the SARS 
outbreak on national television and through other mass media outlets on March 14.568  
Along with the announcement of the SARS outbreak, measures for prevention were 
disseminated via television and other media.  Written information was made available in 
Vietnamese and English from the Ho Chi Minh City Health Department.  Daily 
information was provided to the public through mass media and an intensive information, 
education and communication campaign.569   
  
 Residents of Vietnam could access information on SARS by calling a hotline or 
checking a website set up by the Municipal Centre for Health Education and 
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Communications.570  In Ho Chi Minh City, telephone hotlines were set up to provide the 
community with ongoing information.571  The hotlines were available during working 
hours, with health professionals available for information after hours.572 
 
In order to minimize the personal burden of SARS and to encourage people to 
seek medical treatment when they experienced SARS symptoms, the government of 
Vietnam announced that SARS treatment would be free of charge for citizens and 
foreigners alike.  All patients seeking treatment for respiratory system infections would 
be exempt from paying medical fees.573 
  7. Current Situation  
 
 As the second country to experience a SARS case and the first to contain the 
disease, Vietnam has been cited by many as a success.  Health authorities in Vietnam 
considered the early detection, isolation, and quarantine efforts taken by the government 
from the outset to be the keys to Vietnam’s success in containing SARS.574  Additionally, 
the government’s transparency, public acknowledgement of the epidemic, and early 
cooperation with WHO are often cited as reasons for Vietnam’s rapid containment of 
SARS. 
 
  Even after Vietnam was removed from WHO’s list of SARS-affected countries, 
the Health Minister reiterated the importance of maintaining preventive measures.  As of 
late April, health checks at entry points were recommended but no longer mandatory; all 
travelers were still required to complete health forms; all major border points and ports 
maintained their quarantine facilities in function; and temperature screens were still in 
place at airports.575 The quarantine period was reduced from 14 days to 10 days once 
Vietnam was taken off the SARS affected areas list by WHO.576 
 
 According to the Vice-Minister of Health of Vietnam, reflecting on his country’s 
experience, the International Health Regulations should be revised promptly by WHO to 
provide member states with specific guidelines on issues relating to quarantine.577  
Vietnam is also an advocate for an increase in sharing of scientific information, 
strengthening of the existing disease outbreak alert and response system at the regional 
and global levels, and the establishment of a regional referral laboratory capable of 
diagnosing emerging diseases.578   
 
 After the outbreak was brought under control, several sources, including WHO 
and the U.S. CDC, touted Vietnam’s efforts in both the management of the disease itself 
and the peripheral logistics associated with a much publicized and scrutinized epidemic 
of a new communicable disease.  The fact that Vietnam is both a communist nation and a 
poor country, make its success in the management of SARS all the more impressive to 







V. RELATED LEGAL ISSUES    
 
A. Discrimination in Health Care Services 
 
Individuals with serious infectious diseases pose health risks to physicians, 
nurses, and other health care providers.  Indeed, in the SARS epidemic health care 
providers were especially likely to become infected.  Is there a legal or ethical duty to 
treat infected individuals?  In the SARS outbreak, the infection originated in China, and 
with the exception of Canada, most of the countries with serious SARS problems were in 
Asia.  Is it legal or ethical to refuse to treat individuals who are Asian or of Asian 
descent?  Do health care providers have a legal or ethical duty to maintain their practices 
in a time of medical emergency?  The answers to these and similar questions will 
determine the effectiveness of public health responses to serious outbreaks of infection. 
 
1. Disability Discrimination 
 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973579 and Titles II and III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)580 prohibit disability discrimination by recipients 
of federal financial assistance (section 504), government entities (Title II), or public 
accommodations (Title III).  Public hospitals and health care facilities are covered by 
section 504 and Title II.  Title III offers the broadest coverage, because it applies to 
privately operated facilities used by the public.  “Health care provider facilities” are 
specifically mentioned as one of the categories covered by Title III.  Under Title III, 
however, individuals are not permitted to bring actions for damages.  Private remedies for 
violations are limited to injunctions, attorney fees, and court costs.  
 
In Bragdon v. Abbott,581 the Supreme Court held that a dentist violated Title III by 
refusing to fill the cavity of an asymptomatic HIV-positive patient in his office because 
of concern for his own safety and the safety of his other patients.  Although health care 
providers may not discriminate in refusing to treat an individual with disabilities, the 
plaintiff may have a difficult time satisfying the statutory definition of “an individual 
with a disability.”  To be covered under either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA the 
individual must have “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an 
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”582  In School Board of 
Nassau County v. Arline,583 the Supreme Court held that an individual with tuberculosis 
was covered under the Rehabilitation Act.  Subsequent Supreme Court cases, however, 
have applied narrow coverage standards, and it is not certain that all infectious diseases 
would be held to meet the standards for coverage.  Temporary and minor impairments are 
not considered disabilities under the ADA. 
 
Another limitation of the Bragdon decision is that a health care provider is not 
required to render services if doing so would create a direct threat to the health of the 
provider.  Indeed, the case was remanded for consideration of whether filling the cavity 
of an HIV-infected patient in the dentist’s office would create a threat of transmission to 
the dentist.  In the case of SARS, the large number of health care workers who became 
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infected, many despite infection control measures, would make the risk of transmission 
apparent.  Therefore there would be no violation of the ADA to refuse to treat a SARS-
infected patient. 
 
Title III of the ADA also prohibits discrimination against individuals who 
“associate” with individuals with disabilities.  “It shall be discriminatory to exclude or 
otherwise deny equal goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, 
or other opportunities to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an 
individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or 
association.”584  This provision prohibits discrimination against individuals because of 
the known infection of a family member or other associate.585  It would also prohibit 
discrimination against health care providers who treat individuals with infectious 
conditions. 
 
Another law with possible applicability in an epidemic is the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).586  The law attempts to prevent 
inappropriate “patient dumping,” and it applies to hospitals receiving Medicare payments.  
EMTALA prevents the transfer of medically unstable patients and those in active labor, 
thus creating two duties.  The first is a duty to screen the patient upon arrival to the 
hospital to determine if there is an emergency or active labor.  If the patient is in active 
labor, or is in an emergency, the second duty is triggered; the patient must be stabilized 
before transfer is permitted.  The screening and stabilization are based on standard 
medical practice.  An emergency is defined as a health problem that seriously jeopardizes 
the health of the patient, seriously impairs a bodily function, or seriously impairs the 
function of a bodily organ or part.587    As with the ADA, coverage of the condition turns 
on severity and thus it is not possible to state any general rules of applicability with 
respect to a range of infectious diseases affecting various patients.   
 
EMTALA could come into play if a hospital refuses to treat patients with SARS 
or other infectious diseases.  The hospital might claim that it lacked the equipment or 
facilities for proper infection control, such as negative pressure rooms.  A variety of 
approaches (including government subsidies and licensing requirements) should be 
explored to ensure that hospitals are ready, willing, and able to care for these patients.  
 
 2. Race and National Origin 
 
  It is possible to imagine that, in the context of SARS, certain health care facilities 
or providers would refuse to treat patients from China or other Asian countries, even if 
their medical complaints were unrelated to a respiratory infection.  The lawfulness of this 
conduct would be evaluated under a different set of laws.  Title II of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964588 prohibits health care entities from discriminating on the basis of race or 
national origin.  Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964589 prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, or national origin under any program or activity receiving federal 
financial assistance.  For purposes of Title VI, Medicare and Medicaid are considered 
federal financial assistance.   
 
 119
 Titles II and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were enacted to deal with the 
problem of racial segregation in public facilities.  The issue of institutional discrimination 
is no longer a concern, and one consequence is that the contours of the law have not been 
developed by case law.590  Clearly, the refusal to provide treatment to members of a 
particular race (e.g., refusal to treat any Asians) will violate the law, but the refusal to 
treat any SARS patients (which, hypothetically, might initially consist only of Asians) 
probably would not violate Titles II and VI, but may violate other federal or state health 
care or civil rights laws. 
 
 3. Codes of Ethics 
 
 In the prior discussion of Title III of the ADA, it was noted that if treating a 
patient with a chronic infection such as HIV created a “direct threat” to the health care 
provider, then refusing to provide treatment would not constitute disability 
discrimination.  Such a legal defense, however, does not resolve the issue of whether 
refusing to provide treatment would be ethical.  In other words, do health care providers 
have an ethical obligation to provide treatment to a patient when doing so creates a risk to 
their own health? 
   
One of the basic tenets of medical practice is that a physician is free to decide  
whom to treat, and this is reflected in the codes of ethics.  This ethical position is in 
accord with the legal principle that the physician-patient relationship is contractual in 
nature and either party may decline to enter into the relationship.  At the same time, there 
are ethical limits on this freedom of practice.  One limitation is emergency situations; 
another is a broad prohibition on discrimination based on race, national origin, color, sex, 
or religion.  Some codes of ethics, including that of the American Medical Association, 
also include a ban on sexual orientation discrimination.591   
 
The American Medical Association’s first Code of Ethics (1847) directly 
addressed the issue of physicians’ duty to serve patients during epidemics.  “When 
pestilence prevails it is [physicians’] duty to face the danger … even at the jeopardy of 
their own lives.”  The duty was a part of the AMA Code of Ethics until 1977, when it was 
deleted because of the belief that epidemics were over.  The AMA’s Declaration of 
Professional Responsibility, however, still contains a vague statement that physicians 
should use their knowledge and skills “though doing so may put us at risk.”592   
 
Today, aside from statements dealing with the duty to treat HIV-infected patients, 
of the medical specialty colleges only the American College of Physicians-American 
Society of Internal Medicine Code of Ethics directly addresses the general duty of 
physicians to treat patients when doing so would pose a risk to their own health. 
  
 Because physicians could possibly be exposed to a number of infectious 
 diseases like HIV and viral hepatitis, it is necessary to reaffirm the 
 physician’s ethical imperative to provide care even when there is a 
 great risk of infection.  As patients who are infected can pose a serious 
 risk to physicians, some physicians may not want to treat people with 
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 infectious diseases.  However, physicians and health care entities have 
 an obligation to treat all patients, regardless of disease state.  To deny 
 care to any class of patients is unethical.593  
 
 4. Summary 
 
There are only a few cases that consider whether a physician has a legal duty to 
treat an individual in the absence of a physician-patient relationship.  The courts are in 
agreement that there is no such duty.  “A physician is under no legal obligation to 
practice his profession or render services to whomsoever may request them.”594  
  
A variety of civil rights laws contain provisions dealing with discrimination in 
providing health services.  The applicability of these laws to any factual situation remains 
unclear because of vague and often limited definitions of covered entities, individuals, or 
health conditions.  The codes of ethics of the medical profession generally prohibit 
discrimination, but they do not say that physicians have an ethical duty to treat 
individuals whose infections create risks to the physician. 
 
 
 B. Privacy  
 
 Prompt, effective public health intervention requires timely, accurate, and 
thorough reporting by health care providers.  Although public health laws make the 
reporting of certain conditions mandatory, an unanticipated but serious threat to reporting 
cases of infectious disease is the misunderstanding of the provisions of a new health 
privacy law.  
 
 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),595 Title II 
(“Administrative Simplification”), directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
promulgate regulations to protect the privacy and security of individually-identifiable 
health information.  The final privacy regulation was promulgated on December 28, 
2000,596 took effect April 14, 2001, and had an implementation date of April 14, 2003, 
for most covered entities.597  
 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes the first comprehensive, federal health 
privacy standards.  It mandates sweeping changes in the way that covered entities (certain 
health care providers, health plans, and health clearinghouses) collect, use, and disclose 
protected (individually identifiable) health information.  The Rule provides various rights 
to individuals, including the right to receive notice of the privacy practices of covered 
entities, to view and obtain copies of their own health records, to request restrictions on 
the use and disclosure of their health records, to request amendments of their health 
records, to receive an accounting of disclosures of their protected health information, and 




The Rule permits the use and disclosure of protected health information (PHI) 
without individual consent or authorization for treatment, payment, and health care 
operations.  Although other uses and disclosures, such as fundraising, marketing, and 
research, require specific authorization, the Rule establishes numerous exceptions in 
which it seeks to achieve a balance between protecting the privacy of health information 
and the public need for disclosure.  These exceptions include law enforcement, organ 
donation, and national security. 
 
Public health is one of the most important of these exceptions.598  Under 45 
C.F.R. § 164.512(b), a covered entity is permitted to disclose PHI to public health 
authorities and their authorized representatives for public health surveillance, 
investigations, and interventions.  The drafters of the Rule intended that traditional public 
health reporting would not be affected by the Privacy Rule.  In fact, the Department of 
Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) Guidance on the Privacy Rule 
(December 3, 2002) specifically lists the following permissible disclosures for public 
health: child abuse or neglect; quality, safety, or effectiveness of a product or activity 
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA); persons at risk for contracting or 
spreading a disease; and workplace medical surveillance.  In addition, 45 C.F.R. § 
160.203(c) provides that state laws mandating the reporting of certain conditions are not 
preempted by the Privacy Rule.  It should be clear that HIPAA permits public health 
reporting, but it does not require it. 
 
Despite the express language of the Privacy Rule and the Guidance issued by 
OCR, there is much confusion and misunderstanding of the effect of the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule on public health reporting.  After the compliance date of April 14, 2003, there were 
concerns about a possible decrease in the reporting of essential public health information 
to local, state, and national public health authorities.  These “defensive practices” might 
be undertaken by certain covered entities to avoid the potentially severe penalties and 
criminal sanctions for noncompliance with the Privacy Rule.599  If such actions are 
widespread and not addressed, they threaten to undermine the nation’s public health 
surveillance system, including the reporting of infectious diseases. 
 
 C. Employment 
 
  1. Occupational Safety and Health 
 
 The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)600 is the primary federal law 
regulating safety and health conditions in the workplace.  It applies to virtually all private 
sector employers in the United States,601 an estimated 90 million employees at 6 million 
workplaces.  The OSH Act does not apply to federal, state, or local government 
employees. 
 
 In addition to complying with all duly promulgated safety and health standards,602 
employers must comply with the OSH Act’s general duty clause, which provides that 
each employer “shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of 
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to 
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cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.”603  Because there is no specific 
standard dealing with SARS, the general duty clause applies. 
 
 The OSH Act is enforced by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) in the U.S. Department of Labor.  OSHA has issued guidelines on measures for 
employers to take in dealing with SARS, including special provisions for health care 
workers, laboratory personnel, airline flight crew and airport personnel, and those 
handling the remains of SARS patients.604 The guidelines were developed in consultation 
with the CDC. 
 
 Section 11(c) of the OSH Act prohibits retaliation against an employee for 
exercising any right afforded under the OSH Act.605  This means that it would be 
unlawful for an employer to discipline or discharge an employee for filing a complaint 
about occupational safety and health issues related to SARS with OSHA or other public 
health agencies.  Weak remedies limit the effectiveness of this provision, however.  Only 
the Secretary of Labor is authorized to bring actions alleging retaliation; there is no 
private right of action.606 
 
 Health care workers, concerned about their own health from treating SARS 
patients with inadequate infection control measures, might refuse to work until they are 
satisfied that working is not unduly hazardous.  Would their “walkout” be protected 
under section 11(c) of the OSH Act?  Although the statute does not explicitly permit 
employees to refuse a work assignment because of hazardous conditions, the Secretary of 
Labor has issued a regulation giving employees this right under limited circumstances.607   
Under the regulation, an employee may not be disciplined for walking off the job if: (1) a 
reasonable employee believes in good faith; (2) that performing assigned work would 
involve a real danger of death or serious injury; (3) the employee is unable to obtain 
correction of the condition by the employer; and (4) there is insufficient time to eliminate 
the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels.  The Supreme Court 
has upheld the legality of the regulation.608 
 
  2. Nondiscrimination 
 
 Employees are always worried about losing their jobs.  In the case of SARS, even 
though the quarantine period is only 10 days, employees who are quarantined might be 
concerned that they will not have their job after their period of quarantine.  Would it be 
legal for an employer to discharge or replace an employee because of absences during a 
period of quarantine? 
 
 The common law doctrine of employment at will applies to virtually all 
employees working without a written contract for a definite term.609  Under the 
employment at will doctrine an employer is generally free to hire or fire an individual for 
any reason, so long as the reason has not been made unlawful by statute (e.g., 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability).  
There are numerous exceptions to the at-will doctrine.  Besides the statutory 
antidiscrimination laws noted above, the public policy exception prohibits discharge in 
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violation of a clearly articulated public policy (usually a constitutional or statutory 
provision).610  Some examples of discharges in violation of public policy include firing an 
employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim, serving on jury duty, refusing to 
commit perjury, and filing a complaint with a government agency such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency.   It is possible that a court would hold that discharge 
because an individual was quarantined and unable to work would violate public policy as 
set forth in the jurisdiction’s public health laws.  There are no cases on point, however, 
and not all states have adopted the public policy exception, further clouding the issue. 
 
 Another legal theory that could be used by an individual who was terminated due 
to quarantine is to claim that the discharge was disability discrimination under Title I of  
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)611 or an analogous state disability law.  The 
ADA applies to employers with 15 or more employees, but many state disability 
discrimination laws also apply to smaller employers.  The claim of disability 
discrimination is unlikely to be successful because an individual in quarantine is unlikely 
to be covered under the ADA.  An individual in quarantine does not currently have the 
requisite physical or mental impairment that constitutes a substantial limitation of a major 
life activity.612  An individual has no impairment at all at the time of quarantine and, even 
if he or she later has one, it is probably temporary.  Temporary and minor impairments 
are not covered under the ADA.613  The provision of the ADA protecting individuals who 
are “regarded as” having a substantially limiting impairment also would be unlikely to 
help because of court decisions requiring that the condition the individual is regarded as 
having be substantially limiting.614  An unresolved issue is whether an infected individual 
who was in isolation because of SARS would be covered.  Because most patients have 
SARS for a limited period of time, resolution of the issue of coverage under the ADA 
could turn on the individual’s degree of residual impairment after recovery from SARS.    
 
  3. Leave without Pay 
 
 Eligibility for leave without pay is related to the issue of termination from 
employment, but it implicates a different set of employment laws.  The federal Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)615 provides that employers of 50 or more employees 
must permit eligible workers to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave in any 12-month 
period for the birth or adoption of a child, to care for a child, spouse, or parent with a 
serious health condition, or for the employee’s own serious health condition that makes 
him or her unable to perform the job.  Only employees who have been employed by a 
covered employer for at least 12 months and have at least 1250 hours of service during 
that period are eligible.616  “Serious health condition” is defined as an illness, injury, 
impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves inpatient care or continuing 
treatment by a health care provider.617  Although a confirmed case of SARS would 
definitely satisfy the definition of “serious health condition,” it is not clear whether an 
asymptomatic person in quarantine would be protected by the FMLA.  Over half the 
states also have their own family and medical leave acts, some of which apply only to 
public employees.  A few laws go beyond the federal law,618 such as by covering smaller 




  4. Workers’ Compensation 
 
   a. Illness 
 
 Workers’ compensation laws, which differ in each state, would come into play if 
employees filed a workers’compensation claim as a result of contracting SARS on the 
job.  Health care workers, first responders, and law enforcement personnel who develop 
SARS probably would be eligible for workers’ compensation even without direct 
evidence of the method by which they contracted SARS.  Although workers’ 
compensation is often denied for “ordinary diseases of life,” where, as with SARS, a 
particular class of employees is at an unusually high risk of disease, most courts would 
consider that enough to satisfy the burden of proving work-relatedness.620   
 
 Health care workers who were in isolation because they were infected with SARS 
on the job would be entitled to workers’ compensation.  Asymptomatic, potentially 
exposed workers who were quarantined, however, are unlikely to be eligible for workers’ 
compensation because they have not suffered from any occupational injury or illness.  
Their ability to obtain compensation for lost work time is discussed in subpart c below. 
 
   b. Fear of illness 
 
 Many individuals who learn they are at risk for a life-threatening illness develop a 
severe psychological reaction.  If the potential exposure to SARS occurred in the 
workplace, the individuals may be entitled to workers’ compensation for their emotional 
distress.  Under workers’ compensation there is no recovery for pain and suffering or 
other tort damages.  Thus, “recovery” means medical expenses and a portion of lost 
wages for the period of time they were unable to work because of the emotional distress.   
 
 Some of the workplace cases dealing with fear of illness involve exposure to 
substances, such as asbestos, with a long latency period before the onset of symptoms.621  
This makes the period of uncertainty and thus potential psychological distress extremely 
long.  The courts are divided on whether compensation for emotional distress may be 
awarded in the absence of any physical symptoms.622  With SARS, where a definitive 
diagnosis can be made within four weeks of the onset of illness, it would appear that the 
only possible recovery would be for employees who suffered a severe and sustained 
emotional illness that developed at the time of their possible exposure or during their 
period of quarantine. 
 
   c. Lost work time 
 
 As discussed in previous sections of this report, wage replacement payments to 
quarantined individuals were widely recognized in other countries as being essential to 
ensure compliance with quarantine.  In the United States, there is currently no generally 
applicable legal mechanism to provide for the payment of wages or other compensation 
to workers who were in quarantine. 
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 First, for the minority of employees subject to a written contract of employment 
(mostly executives and employees subject to a collective bargaining agreement), the 
contract itself would determine the employees’ eligibility for lost wages.  These 
individuals may be able to take vacation days or paid sick leave on the days of their 
quarantine.  It is also possible that future collective bargaining agreements for health care 
workers and other employees at risk of infection will be drafted to include measures to 
provide for compensation in the event of quarantine. 
 
 Second, health care workers quarantined at their hospital or other place of 
employment may be entitled to their regular compensation, possibly including overtime 
pay, if they continue to perform work for the benefit of their employer during their period 
of quarantine.  These eligibility determinations would be based on the federal Fair Labor 
Standards Act623 and comparable state laws. 
 
 Third, for individuals quarantined at home and who perform no additional 
services for their employer during their quarantine, there is no legal basis for 
compensation.  For example, these individuals are not entitled to unemployment 
insurance because, in all fifty states, there is a requirement that the individual must be 
“able to work.”624 
 
  5. Summary 
 
 None of the various employment laws discussed in this section clearly prohibits 
the discharge of employees during their period of quarantine and none requires the 
payment of wages, although discharge is less likely a concern for employees than the loss 
of income uring quarantine. Even if unpaid leave were mandated by law, at least for 
lower paid and non-health care workers, income replacement and not job loss is the key 
problem.  Lower paid employees (of which there are many in the health care industry in 
food service, sanitation, and clerical jobs) are less likely to have sick leave, paid 
vacations, personal days, and other mechanisms in place to provide them with income 
during unanticipated periods of not working.  These are also the employees most likely to 
be living from paycheck to paycheck, and for whom a week or more without income 
would present the greatest hardship.  Self-employed individuals raise another set of 
issues.  Consequently, new legislation may be necessary to ensure that quarantined 
individuals will not violate their confinement in an effort to earn a living.  Legislation 
also may be necessary to protect individuals from the consequences of a quarantine-
caused loss of income, such as a moratorium on evictions and repossessions.  
 
 In contemplating legislative responses to these problems, one policy issue is 
whether income support and other protections for employees would apply to voluntary as 
well as mandatory quarantine.  It is time consuming to obtain an order of quarantine, and 
if only those under an order of quarantine could obtain income support, numerous orders 
would be needed.  Thus, income assistance policies should support the general preference 
for voluntary quarantine.  
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 VI. APPLICATIONS OF LESSONS LEARNED  
 
The response to SARS in the six jurisdictions we studied indicated some general 
themes.  The ability of public health systems to respond to SARS and to implement in a 
timely manner necessary measures for quarantine and isolation depended on the 
following three elements: 
 
A. To respond promptly and effectively to SARS, affected countries needed public 
health laws that established a mechanism for regulating travel into and out of affected 
areas; case surveillance, reporting, and analysis; and a range of increasingly coercive 
measures including quarantine and isolation.  They also needed the political will to 
enforce these measures.  
 
B. To minimize the toll from SARS through quarantine and isolation, affected 
countries needed the public health infrastructure to coordinate the public health response 
among all levels of government domestically and internationally, as well as a health care 
system with adequate levels of providers, facilities, equipment, and medications. 
 
C. To implement successful programs of quarantine and isolation, affected countries 
needed ancillary services and logistical support, including law enforcement and other 
measures to ensure compliance, wage replacement systems, delivery systems for food 
and medical supplies, and public education and communication measures to inform and 
gain the support of the public.  
 
 These three broad categories provide a framework for discussing measures that 
would be essential for the United States to take to prepare for a SARS outbreak or a 
comparable public health emergency. 
 
 A. Legal and Public Health Systems 
 
 1. Political/Legal system 
  
 Lessons Learned 
 
 The countries we studied differed widely in size, population, and political 
systems.  They differed in government structure, including the allocation of functions 
among different levels of government and in different departments of government.  They 
also differed in the degree to which they worked well with WHO.  For example, Taiwan 
is not a member of WHO and China did not cooperate fully with WHO in the critical 
stages of the epidemic, whereas Vietnam worked closely with WHO from the start.625 
 
 All of the countries studied needed to amend their public health laws (statutes 
and/or regulations) to authorize quarantine for SARS, but they were able to accomplish 
this rapidly.  Other legislation also was needed, such as Canada’s SARS Assistance and 
Recovery Strategy Act of 2003, which, among other things, prohibited discrimination 




A key factor in effective and “seamless” coordination among government officials 
was the existence of good working relationships.  In Taiwan, coordination between the 
national government and the city of Taipei was reportedly impeded by the adversarial 
relationship between the president and the mayor.  Good relationships were also essential 
between public health officials and the political officials who had the ultimate 
responsibility of issuing directives. 
 
 SARS also highlighted problems of WHO and its relationships with member 
countries.   Rapid action at the level of the Health Assembly is hampered by its structure, 
with only annual meetings and an agenda set many months in advance.  The Health 
Assembly still has not acted on the proposed revisions to the International Health 
Regulations.  Further, WHO regulations are not necessarily binding on member states – 
which may reject them or issue reservations – and it has little enforcement power.  The 
WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network is a valuable program that relies 
on technology and networking to gather and share information worldwide. 
 
 Finally, it is relatively easy for political leaders of countries to decide to invoke 
their extraordinary powers to protect the public’s health.  It is less clear when the special 
powers should be terminated.  For example, thermal imaging techniques have been used 
to assess whether incoming airline passengers have a fever as a symptom of SARS.  
Assuming that the devices were valuable from a public health standpoint and that their 
use was considered ethically and legally acceptable, for how long should they be used?  It 
could be argued that there is a public health value in taking temperature readings of all 
passengers to detect a range of diseases.  There must be vigilance and restraint in the use 
of extraordinary measures, lest they take on a life of their own.  Special public health 
measures adopted for SARS or another specific disease should not become standard 
practice without continually balancing the interests of public health and civil liberties.  
Independent state technical advisory committees should be used for these issues. 
 
 Two model acts provide for periodic review of continuing quarantine and 
isolation.  Under the Model Public Health Act,626 for example, “[t]he health status of 
isolated and quarantined individuals must be monitored regularly to determine if they 
continue to require isolation or quarantine.”627  Similarly, under the Model State 
Emergency Health Powers Act,628 public health authorities shall “adhere” to a number of 
“conditions and principles” when isolating or quarantining individuals, one of which is 
that “[t]he health status of isolated and quarantined individuals must be monitored 
regularly to determine if they require isolation and quarantine.”629 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 A.1.1 Clear delineation of authority and responsibility for the various 
public health functions in an epidemic needs to be undertaken among federal, state, 
and local officials. 
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 A.1.2  Because political boundaries are not barriers to infections, regional 
coordination should be supported and increased among all agencies with public 
health functions, including departments of public health, health care providers and 
hospitals, law enforcement, federal and state emergency preparedness officials, and 
the legal system. 
 
 A.1.3 Public health measures adopted in response to an emergency that 
restrain civil liberties should be reviewed periodically and should not be extended to 
other conditions unless previously established criteria are satisfied. 
 
 2. Travel restrictions 
 
  Lessons Learned 
 
 Restricting the travel of infected individuals is essential to containing the 
geographic range of an epidemic.  Yet, deciding on the appropriate level of travel 
restriction involves the difficult balancing of public health interests with the interests of 
human rights and the economy.  To make matters more complicated, the marginal public 
health utility of increasingly stringent travel restrictions is not always easy to predict. 
 
 WHO recommended exit and entrance screening for SARS, and these measures 
were adopted in all of the countries we studied.  Thermal screening also was widely used, 
including in countries, such as Japan, that had relatively few reported cases of SARS.  As 
this was the first widespread use of this technology, it is important to study its sensitivity 
and effectiveness as a public health strategy.  There were reports that the thermal 
screening at Tokyo’s international airport could not keep up with all of the travelers at 
peak times. A pilot thermal screening program at the airports in Toronto and Vancouver 
scanned 2.4 million passengers, with 832 referred for further assessments, and none of 
the passengers referred had or was determined to have SARS.  
 
 A range of other measures was adopted to prevent the spread of SARS by air 
travel.  For example, Taiwan required all passengers traveling from SARS-infected areas 
to wear masks on airplanes.  Hong Kong Airport turned off and sealed water fountains 
and frequently changed air filters and disinfected public spaces.  Some measures 
appeared to go too far.  India and Thailand quarantined foreign visitors from countries 
with SARS outbreaks, even if they had no symptoms or known exposures.630 
 
 Although much of the focus was placed on airline travel, other travel restrictions 
must be in place to control the spread of infectious diseases, including measures aimed at 
ground and sea transportation.  The latter includes the need for infection control on cruise 
ships and ferries, where close contact could result in the rapid spread of disease.  As 
discussed in Part C below, the quarantine of travelers also requires housing facilities and 
ancillary services. 
 
 The countries we studied also placed restrictions on travel within their countries.  
Local governments in China introduced exit and entry controls on inter-city travel by air, 
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rail, bus, ship, and ferry.  In China, entire villages in rural areas were quarantined and no 
travel was allowed in or out of the villages.  One village in Hebei Province was 
quarantined from April 12, 2003 until May 13, 2003.  In urban areas, such as Beijing, 
there were SARS checkpoints between districts where individuals and vehicles passing 
the checkpoints were subject to examination and disinfection.  It is not clear whether such 
a cordon sanitaire would be supported by the public in the U.S.  The key factor probably 
would be the degree of uncontrolled community transmission of the pathogen.  Singapore 
used thermal screening widely at entrances to public and private buildings, which may 
have encouraged people to seek medical care sooner because they were effectively 
excluded from public areas.  Individuals not in quarantine often had their temperature 
checked 5-10 times per day.    
 
 News of the global SARS epidemic caused the voluntary curtailment of 
international and domestic travel to affected areas.  Travel advisories and travel alerts 
from WHO and individual countries helped to provide timely and accurate information. 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 A.2.1 In the event that an international traveler develops an infectious 
disease, there is an urgent need to be able to locate crew members and other 
passengers from the same flight or ship.  Public health officials must have 
immediate access to passenger manifests or be able to require all arriving 
passengers to complete a public health form containing, for example, the 
individual’s health status, seat number, countries visited, and contact information.  
The information must be in electronic form. 
 
 A.2.2 Affected countries felt compelled to adopt thermal imaging and other 
screening methods before they were able to conduct rigorous research to assess their 
effectiveness.  Various new public health assessment tools should be carefully 
evaluated before the next epidemic strikes. 
 
 A.2.3 The authority of the United States government to control foreign and 
interstate travel is established by the Constitution and federal statute.  It is less 
clear, however, the circumstances under which states may restrict interstate travel 
to prevent the spread of infection, and this issue should be thoroughly researched 
and resolved through memoranda of understanding or other means. 
 
 3. Surveillance, reporting, and epidemiology 
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 Early identification of case clusters, expert laboratory and pathology analysis, 
timely tracking of contacts, and prompt reporting of findings to public health officials at 
all levels are the first lines of defense against an epidemic of infectious disease.  The 
public health significance of the slowness of the initial response in China is perhaps the 
greatest lesson of the SARS epidemic.  The original outbreak of the unknown respiratory 
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illness in Guangdong Province occurred in November 2002.  The first report to public 
health officials was not made until January 31, 2003, the WHO travel advisory was not 
issued until March 13, 2003, and it was not until April 2003 that China became an active 
participant in international surveillance and reporting. 
 
 Once Chinese public health officials recognized the magnitude of the problem and 
the potential for a catastrophic pandemic, China began to collect and store samples from 
SARS cases and allowed WHO officials to meet with the first SARS patient.  China’s 
cooperation with the scientific investigation of SARS was outside of the framework of 
any treaty obligation, but it represented an essential appreciation of the connectedness of 
worldwide population health irrespective of political conventions.  
 
 Although all of the countries we studied had public health systems in place before 
the SARS epidemic, there were human resource shortages in one or more of the core 
public health disciplines in every country. The same would be true if a public health crisis 
occurred in the U.S.  State and local public health departments need to have surveillance 
systems and sufficient numbers of epidemiologists to detect suspicious patterns of disease 
and to investigate the circumstances surrounding the illness of index cases.  Laboratories 
need to have adequate staffing and expertise, as well as quality control, to identify the 
suspected pathogen, and reporting channels need to be in place to trigger large-scale 
investigations and public health alerts.  In light of the September 2003 case of a 
laboratory worker infected in Singapore, it is important to develop international standards 
for certifying laboratories and their personnel in infection control measures. 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 A.3.1 The U.S. would benefit from undertaking a nationwide public health 
human resource needs assessment, and measures should be taken to increase 
training programs, recruitment, and staffing levels to meet these needs.  Prior 
assessments by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists and the 
Association of Public Health Laboratories need to be updated and expanded.  
 
 A.3.2 There should be a greater emphasis on public health in medical school 
curricula and continuing medical education programs to provide the training 
essential for prompt identification and reporting of suspicious cases.  Health 
professionals also need to have a clear understanding of the laws related to public 
health reporting so that, for example, misunderstanding the requirements of the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) does not lead to a 
failure to report cases of infectious disease to public health officials.   
 
 A.3.3 Signing comprehensive international agreements for cooperation on 
public health and developing public health infrastructure should be a high priority 
for U.S. foreign policy.  International agreements must be sufficiently flexible to 
permit a quick response to emerging infections and other public health emergencies. 
 
 4. Quarantine and isolation 
 131
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 Although public health laws were on the books in all of the jurisdictions before 
the outbreak of SARS, the legal authority to order quarantine was limited to certain 
specific diseases.  The SARS epidemic required amending the existing legal authority.  
For example, in Toronto, the Ontario public health regulation was amended within 24 
hours of the discovery of SARS to declare it a reportable, communicable, and virulent 
disease.  In Hong Kong, the Quarantine and Disease Prevention Ordinance was amended 
to add SARS to the list of notifiable diseases.   
 
 Once it adopted quarantine measures, China exceeded the other countries we 
studied in the extent of the quarantine it imposed.  Not only were individuals subject to 
quarantine and isolation, but entire hospitals, districts of cities, villages, universities, and 
residential areas were subject to collective quarantine. The use of mass quarantine proved 
to be effective in China, but it is not clear that such measures would be constitutional or 
politically acceptable in the U.S. 
   
 Taiwan illustrates the delicate balance between public health and political 
considerations in quarantine. During the SARS epidemic 131,132 people were placed 
under quarantine, but only 12 were found to be potential cases of SARS, and there were 
only two confirmed cases of SARS among those quarantined.  Officials in Taiwan now 
believe that its aggressive use of quarantine contributed to public panic and thus proved 
counterproductive.631 In September 2003, the Taiwan Department of Health announced 
its new quarantine policy: “no fever, no quarantine.”  This means that, in the future, there 
will be isolation of symptomatic individuals, but no quarantine of contacts.  It remains to 
be seen what effect, if any, the new policy will have if there is a new epidemic of SARS 
or another infectious disease.    
 
In virtually all of the jurisdictions we studied, there were incidents of violation of 
quarantine.  In Toronto, the two groups most likely to violate quarantine were teenagers 
and health care workers.  In Hong Kong, many residents of the Amoy Gardens complex 
violated quarantine and had to be located.  In Singapore, the Infectious Diseases Act of 
1976 had not been used before SARS.  After the SARS outbreak, the law was quickly 
amended to provide for a fine of up to SGD $10,000 and imprisonment for up to six 
months for violating quarantine.  A total of 26 individuals were found to have violated 
the quarantine law, and one individual was sentenced to six months imprisonment.  This 
was an individual whose photograph at a local bar appeared on the front page of a leading 
newspaper.  He had his quarantine order in one hand and a beer in the other.  A special 
facility was established to house quarantine violators.  In Toronto, one quarantine violator 
was known to have gone to work, where he infected a co-worker.  The police were 
investigating the incident and were prepared to bring criminal charges when the alleged 
violator died. 
 
 Issues to Consider 
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 A.4.1 The decision whether to order a large-scale quarantine requires a 
complex analysis of scientific, political, and social considerations.  Public health 
officials need to be able to present comprehensive, understandable assessments of 
the options to government officials in a timely manner.  Contingency planning for 
emergencies through simulations and establishing vertical and horizontal lines of 
communication are extremely valuable in ensuring a prompt response to a public 
health emergency. 
 
 A.4.2 Public health laws need to be flexible enough to permit appropriate 
responses to new epidemics and new circumstances, and public health officials and 
professionals need to be familiar with the statutory and regulatory procedures for 
invoking their (or the governor’s) authority for quarantine and isolation as well as 
the mechanisms to enforce directives. 
 
 A.4.3 Legal authority and public health strategies need to be in place for 
dealing with individuals who violate the law, and judges and law enforcement 
officials should be educated about the relevant enforcement provisions of public 
health laws.  Studies need to be undertaken to determine if incentives or penalties 
promote compliance with quarantine.  
 
 B.  Public Health and Health Care Infrastructure 
 
 1. Public health officials and health care providers 
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 The SARS epidemic highlighted an acute shortage of epidemiologists and other 
essential public health professionals.  In Toronto, it took an average of over nine hours 
per case to perform contact tracing, and there were 2,282 cases to investigate.  To meet 
this need, virtually all of Toronto’s public health employees (over 400 individuals) were 
diverted from other tasks (e.g., food safety, STDs) to SARS, and key personnel worked 
around the clock for weeks.  It is not clear how much longer this effort could have been 
sustained.  Bringing in staff from other jurisdictions was not a satisfactory alternative 
because knowledge of local conditions was essential in contact tracing.  
 
 The strain of SARS on local public health resources highlights the role that WHO 
played in several countries.  For example, Vietnam worked closely with WHO from the 
beginning of the epidemic, held meetings with WHO officials, and brought in experts 
from WHO to help with SARS.  It was Dr. Carlo Urbani of WHO who alerted 
Vietnamese authorities to the severity of the threat posed by SARS.  WHO’s Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) for communication among public 
health practitioners was an important source of technical assistance, and experts located 
throughout the world provided essential knowledge of local conditions and politics. 
 
 Epidemics also place tremendous burdens on health care providers, and SARS, by 
infecting health care providers at a high rate, presented even greater challenges.  The first 
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challenge was to maintain adequate staffing levels during the epidemic.  Deaths and 
illnesses of health care workers and quarantine of others limited the availability of 
physicians and nurses.  For example, in Hong Kong, 22% of the deaths were among 
health care workers, and in Taiwan over 90% of the infections occurred in hospitals.  
There were other aggravating factors as well.  Even where there were adequate supplies, 
working with personal protective equipment, including gloves masks, and respirators, 
was physically and psychologically difficult, which required even more frequent staff 
rotation. 
 
 The SARS epidemic is also likely to have long-term repercussions for health care 
staffing.  For example, some health care workers who went through quarantine have had 
a residual psychological burden and have found it difficult to treat patients with any type 
of infection.  In Toronto, a substantial number of health care workers have left the 
profession, and there has been a decline in enrollment in training programs. 
 
 Perhaps the most troubling aspect of health care staffing in the SARS epidemic 
was the widespread reluctance of physicians and nurses to treat infected patients due to 
concerns for their own health.  This phenomenon was experienced in every country we 
studied.  For example, in Taiwan, 160 health care workers quit or refused to work on 
SARS wards.  Three physicians were fined $2,600 and three hospitals were fined $43,000 
for covering up or delaying the reporting of possible cases of SARS.  In China, the 
government fired at least six physicians for refusing to treat SARS patients and banned 
them from practicing medicine for life.  Besides punishing health care workers who 
refused to care for SARS patients, the governments in affected countries adopted a range 
of financial incentives to encourage health care workers.  In Vietnam, health care and 
public health personnel were given an allowance of five times their regular salary.  In 
Toronto, the hospitals doubled the salaries of nurses handling SARS patients.  In Taiwan, 
physicians caring for SARS patients were given “danger pay” of $300 per day and nurses 
were given $150 per day. 
 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 B.1.1 The current shortage of epidemiologists, public health nurses, and 
other personnel in the U.S. will reach a crisis stage in the event of an epidemic.  
Budget cuts in state and local health departments have further depleted the human 
resources needed to deal with a public health emergency, and if these positions are 
not restored an otherwise containable epidemic may spread rapidly. 
 
 B.1.2 Contingency planning and cross-training are needed to ensure that 
sufficient numbers of health care workers trained in infectious disease, emergency 
medicine, pulmonology, toxicology, and other specialties are available in an 
epidemic or bioterrorism event.  
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 B.1.3   Training to diagnose, treat, and report infectious diseases as well as to 
take precautions for their own protection must become an essential part of the 
continuing education of front-line health care professionals.  
 
 B.1.4 Ongoing studies in Toronto of the long-term effects of SARS on health 
care workers need to be followed closely and a range of psycho-social and 
educational interventions should be assessed. 
 
 B.1.5 More fundamental and comprehensive measures may be necessary to 
deal with the unwillingness of health care providers to treat infected patients.  Some 
options include a greater emphasis on teaching professional responsibility in 
professional schools and continuing education, and more closely linking licensure 
with public service obligations.  We also need to study whether fragmentation of the 
health care system and its effects on the provider-patient relationship would have 
adverse consequences in a public health emergency.  
      
 2. Hospitals and other facilities 
 
  Lessons Learned 
 
 The SARS epidemic demonstrated the lack of surge capacity for isolation and 
treatment in hospitals and the lack of adequate residential facilities for quarantine.  
Because SARS was in large measure a hospital-based epidemic it was necessary to close 
hospitals in every jurisdiction we studied.  The loss of hospital beds prevented many 
elective procedures, and it is difficult to calculate the overall health effects of this lack of 
access to health care.  In addition, there were frequent shortages of essential supplies, 
including gowns, gloves, masks, protective eyewear, and ventilators as well as inadequate 
laboratory capacity and infection control measures. 
 
 In China, new hospital facilities were built rapidly to respond to SARS, but this 
approach is unlikely to be effective in the U.S.  It probably would be much better to have 
standby hospital facilities that could be used in the event of any emergency.  This surge 
space could be an unused wing or floor of a hospital or even a separate facility that could 
be ready for use in short order.  As a result of SARS, Hong Kong plans to add 1,000 
isolation beds in public hospitals and stockpile three months of protective clothing and 
equipment for health professionals.  
 
 During the SARS epidemic a variety of facilities were used for the quarantine of 
people who were transients, homeless, or did not want to be quarantined at home.  These 
facilities were selected and converted to use on an ad hoc basis.  Quarantine plans should 
be in place, and periodically updated, that designate certain facilities for use in a public 
health emergency.  Planning needs to be coordinated with local emergency management 
agencies and the Red Cross. Quarantine areas also need to be identified for other special 
facilities, including jails, prisons, and military installations. 
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 The prospect of a SARS-like epidemic in the U.S. raises another practical 
problem, and that is the issue of cost.  Unlike the jurisdictions we studied, many of the 
hospitals in the U.S. are privately owned, both non-profit and for-profit.  Closing a 
hospital for a month or more because of quarantine and isolation would be extremely 
costly to a hospital both in terms of the costs incurred in treating the patients and staff, 
and in the lost revenue from other patients.  It is quite possible that some hospitals would 
go bankrupt.  Hospitals concerned about these consequences also might be reluctant to 
treat individuals in an epidemic.  A public hospital later designated as the “SARS 
hospital” may be the only place that was providing health care to indigents.  
 
 Measures need to be taken at once to ensure the continued financial viability of 
institutions taking care of patients in an epidemic.  Similarly, there must be a plan for the 
allocation of financial responsibility among local, state, and federal governments in the 
event of a public health emergency.  There also needs to be a plan to ensure uninterrupted 
health care in the event of a hospital closure.  
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 B.2.1  Surge capacity hospital space for public health emergencies needs to 
be developed for every area of the country. 
 
B.2.2 Every public health district needs to develop an emergency 
quarantine and isolation plan with local facilities that could be used to house people 
in the event of a large-scale quarantine.  The plan should be coordinated with local 
emergency management agencies and the Red Cross. 
 
B.2.3 Legislation should be considered to provide for the funding of health 
care institutions during public health emergencies.  One possibility is to award 
grants to hospitals in each area to develop and maintain a public health emergency 
capacity.  The Health Resources and Services Administration has begun programs 
in ths area.  
  
 3. Medication and equipment 
 
  Lessons Learned 
 
 Shortages of protective equipment were common.  In Taiwan, the lack of 
protective equipment, especially masks, led to a “state of panic” among some health care 
workers.632  In Vietnam, the Japanese government donated thousands of masks, 
protective suits, and gloves.  In Toronto, health care providers complained that the 
provincial authorities were too slow in providing equipment, and some doctors sought to 
purchase their own supplies.  Inadequate supplies of oxygen, ventilators, and laboratory 
equipment undermined patient care. 
 
 Public health planning includes stockpiling medical supplies and equipment, 
which may be expensive.  Because many hospitals in the U.S. are having financial 
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difficulties, government assistance is needed in getting the necessary supplies on hand in 
advance of an emergency.  The Strategic National Stockpile is reportedly expanding its 
supply of ventilators and other equipment, but logistics also need to be in place for the 
prompt delivery of the equipment.633 
 
 Besides hospital-based equipment, many of the countries affected by SARS 
distributed a vast amount of medical supplies directly to the population.  For example, 
Singapore issued over one million SARS toolkits with digital thermometers and masks.  
Taiwan gave out 1.5 million thermometers and asked individuals to take their 
temperature several times a day.  
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 B.3.1 A public health preparedness inventory should be undertaken for 
each public health district, noting needs and available supplies. 
 
 B.3.2 Emergency distribution plans should be developed among federal, 
state, and local public health and disaster preparedness officials. 
 
 4. Coordination  
 
  Lessons Learned 
 
 All of the countries we studied made concerted efforts to coordinate their 
response to SARS among all of the departments of government, both horizontally and 
vertically.  There was no advance planning for the coordination, however, and measures 
undertaken “on the fly” led to problems. For example, in Canada, early coordination 
efforts among city, provincial, and federal officials were weak, thereby delaying an 
effective, unified response to SARS.  In Hong Kong, there was inadequate 
communication among the Hospital Authority, Department of Health, and university 
health experts.  In Taiwan, there was no single spokesperson during much of the SARS 
crisis, and the lack of coordination was a major factor leading to the resignation of the 
Minister of Health. 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 B.4.1 Joint response plans involving all appropriate government agencies 
should be developed for a range of public health emergencies, including natural 
disasters, infectious diseases, and bioterrorism events.   
 
 B.4.2 To conserve state and local public health resources and ensure 
consistency, there should be a single, integrated, public health response plan for all 
public health threats, including SARS, bioterrorism, and West Nile virus, rather 
than layering a new plan for responding to the threat onto prior response plans. 
   
 C. Law Enforcement and Ancillary Services 
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 1. Law enforcement  
  
 Lessons Learned 
 
 Law enforcement was very important in controlling SARS in every jurisdiction 
we studied.  For example, in Toronto law enforcement personnel were used to enforce the 
isolation of patients with SARS at hospitals, to serve quarantine orders, to conduct spot 
checks on people in quarantine, and to track down people who broke quarantine.  
Specially equipped emergency medical service personnel also were used to transport 
quarantined individuals to designated hospitals in the event they became symptomatic. 
 
 Traditional law enforcement functions also were affected by SARS.  In 
Singapore, the police were directed not to arrest individuals with SARS who were 
engaged in certain illegal acts, including entering the country illegally and gambling, 
because they did not want infected individuals to be “driven underground” where they 
would spread the infection and not be subject to isolation or treatment. 
 
 As mentioned earlier, “voluntary compliance” with quarantine was extremely 
successful in the countries we studied.  It is not clear whether a largely voluntary 
approach would be as easy to implement in the U.S., where notions of individuality, due 
process, and skepticism of government are more deeply ingrained.  Securing large 
numbers of quarantine orders, however, would severely strain the resources of public 
health agencies, prosecutors, and the courts.  Judicial education about public health laws, 
advance notice of filings, and clear understanding of federal, state and local responsibility 
are essential. 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 C.1.1 Public health law training should be provided to all health care 
providers and government officials charged with obtaining and enforcing orders for 
quarantine and isolation of individuals, including police officers, prosecutors, public 
health officials, and judges.  Public health law training also should be incorporated 
into law school curricula. 
 
 C.1.2 Because federal and state health officials have concurrent jurisdiction 
in many quarantine cases, memoranda of understanding should be developed 
setting forth the responsibilities of various agencies and departments. 
 
 C.1.3 Appellate courts with jurisdiction to hear appeals of quarantine and 
isolation cases should review their procedures for emergency appeals so that a trial 
court’s granting or denying an order of quarantine may be appealed immediately, 
before an individual is wrongly denied his or her liberty or wrongly permitted to 
infect other people.  In jurisdictions that issue quarantine orders administratively, 
procedures for emergency judicial review need to be in place.     
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 2. Delivery of food and medicine 
 
 Lessons Learned 
 
 A large-scale quarantine requires a wide range of services to be provided to 
individuals confined in their homes.  In all of the countries we studied, food and supplies 
were delivered by public and private social service agencies.  Medications for conditions 
other than SARS also needed to be delivered.  A special ambulance system was needed.  
Special waste disposal precautions had to be put into effect, and mortuary services 
needed to pay particular attention to infection control.  Furthermore, all of these 
“ancillary” services needed to be provided with special regard for the cultural and 
religious diversity and varied practices among the people in the affected countries. 
 
 In the U.S., the issue of payment for these services must be addressed.  How 
much of the responsibility would be borne by state and local governments and how much 
would be borne by the federal government?  Would individuals in quarantine be required 
to pay for some of the food and supplies they received and, if so, how much would they 
be charged and on what basis?  Would only “authorized” delivery services be permitted 
or would private, for-profit home delivery services be allowed to operate, perhaps to 
provide food and supplies beyond the items offered by social service agencies?  Who 
would handle maintenance and repair problems involving such essential services as heat, 
plumbing, electricity, or telephone service? 
 
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 
 C.2.1 Public health planning for a large-scale quarantine needs to consider 
the wide range of logistical issues involved in providing food, medicine, and essential 
services for thousands of people in quarantine.  Planning should be coordinated 
with the Red Cross. 
 
 C.2.2  Representatives of people from all racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
and cultural groups as well as people with disabilities and other special needs in 
each geographic area need to be involved in the quarantine planning process so that 
a plan appropriate to the needs of each group is developed in advance of an 
emergency.  Policies need to be developed on the appropriate site for quarantine of 
individuals who have mental illness, mental retardation, substance abuse problems, 
or other conditions that make home quarantine infeasible. 
 
 C.2.3 Legislation is needed to further address the responsibility for funding 
ancillary services in a quarantine. 
 
 3. Nondiscrimination and wage replacement  
 
 Lessons Learned 
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 Quarantine resulted in the home confinement of thousands of individuals who 
were well enough to work and who needed to work to support themselves and their 
families.   Because the success of quarantine depended on compliance by the affected 
individuals, all of the countries we studied took some steps to provide for income 
replacement and employment security of individuals in quarantine. 
 
 SARS-based discrimination in employment was a problem in all of the countries 
we studied.  Many of the individuals subject to discrimination were health care workers.  
In Hong Kong, a study of 150 recovered SARS patients subject to employment 
discrimination indicated that 45% had psychiatric problems when they were discharged 
from their jobs.634  Many other individuals lost their jobs because of a downturn in the 
local economy caused by SARS.  
 
 In Hong Kong, sick leave was granted to individuals in home confinement.  
Canada enacted the SARS Assistance and Recovery Strategy Act of 2003, which 
amended the Employment Standards Act.  Under the new law, employers are prohibited 
from discharging employees under quarantine unless the employer can prove that a 
business downturn necessitated the elimination of positions.  The law also provides 
compensation for individuals from $500 to $6,000 if they are required to be absent from 
work for at least five days.  Physicians whose hospitals are closed because of quarantine 
are eligible for up to 80% of their regular billing for the period of closure. 
 
 In Singapore, the government paid an allowance of SGD $70 for self-employed 
persons, and daily salary up to SGD $70 for employees of small businesses closed due to 
SARS and having employees on home quarantine.  In Taiwan, individuals who 
completed quarantine were paid an amount equivalent to US$150.  Families of workers 
who died from SARS at work were eligible for up to 45 months of salary.  
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 C.3.1  In general, under current U.S. law, employees without a contrary 
contractual provision may be discharged for being in quarantine.  Laws need to be 
enacted to prohibit discrimination and to provide for the job security of individuals 
in quarantine.   
 
 C.3.2 With the exception of those contractually entitled to paid sick leave, 
employees in the U. S. are not eligible for income replacement due to quarantine 
under any federal or state law.  Providing income replacement for employees and 
self-employed persons is essential to ensure a high rate of compliance with 
quarantine. 
  
 C.3.3  To promote adherence to quarantine, individuals in quarantine need 
to be held harmless for various consequences of lost income, and therefore measures 
need to be explored that would, for example, provide for insurance and rent 
payments and protect against repossession for missed car payments. 
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  4. Public education and communication 
 
  Lessons Learned 
 
Public education and communication played an essential part in the strategy of 
preventing people from panicking and fleeing, protecting against discrimination directed 
at certain individuals, promoting sanitary practices, and adhering to quarantine.  For 
example, publicity campaigns in Hong Kong attempted to raise public awareness of the 
symptoms, mode of transmission, prevention, and treatment of SARS.  It also attempted 
to get people to seek prompt medical attention. 
 
 The communication and education programs varied by country. Singapore 
initiated a 24-hour SARS television channel. Toronto had a SARS hotline staffed 
primarily by public health nurses that received a peak of over 47,000 calls in a single day.  
Sometimes, public opinion was molded by unusual events.  In Singapore, the quarantine 
effort received greater public support after it was learned that a member of Parliament 
and the wife of a cabinet minister were in quarantine.  Special outreach programs were 
needed to reach minority populations.  In Toronto, SARS materials were printed in 14 
languages. 
 
 Not all of the efforts to allay public fears were successful.  Singapore closed the 
public schools because of fear and not because it was necessary to protect public health.  
In the U.S., where there were relatively few cases of SARS and no fatalities, there were 
reports of discrimination against Asians.  For example, rumors became so prevalent 
within the Chinese American community in Portland that four businesses ran an ad in the 
Chinese-language newspaper saying that all of their employees were healthy.635  In 
Vineland, New Jersey, a dance troupe from Chinatown in New York City was turned 
away from its annual performance at two middle schools because of fear of SARS.  One 
school even sprayed the hallways with Lysol after they left.636  
 
 Issues to Consider 
 
 C.4.1 Additional research and funding are needed to study and improve 
programs for public health education and communication. 
 
 C.4.2   Prior communication involving public officials, public health experts, 
public health lawyers, business officials, and other civic leaders is essential in 
implementing a quarantine. 
 
 C.4.3 Frequent communication by a single, or a very limited number of 
credible spokesperson(s) throughout an epidemic is essential to improving public 
understanding of and maintaining public support for quarantine, isolation, and 
other public health measures. 
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